In 2006 Pope Benedict XVI provoked an international furore by using in his Regensburg speech the words of a medieval Byzantine emperor which condemned both the Prophet Muhammad and the Islamic religion. Vatican authorities were quick to deny any anti-Islamic intent, but many of the world's Muslims took a different view.
This month Pope Francis, Benedict's successor, has awarded sainthood to 800 Catholic Christians said to have been massacred at Otranto, Italy, in 1480 by invading Muslim troops of the Ottoman Turkish sultan. The martyrs were put to death for refusing to convert to Islam. As in 2006, the Vatican has claimed this papal action is not anti-Islamic, but will it be seen that way in the Muslim world?
Although it is Pope Francis who has completed the canonization process, the decision to fast track the Otranto martyrs to sainthood was taken by Pope Benedict XVI. In July 2007 he issued a decree recognizing that the martyrs were killed 'out of hatred for their faith', and by late 2012 the last formalities had been completed. In February 2013, at the same time as he announced his own retirement, Benedict announced that the Otranto martyrs would become saints.
The Ottoman Turkish sultan Mehmed II had captured the city of Constantinople (now Istanbul), the 'second Rome', in 1453 and put an end to the Byzantine empire. The conqueror added the name of Caesar to his already long list of titles. However, he was well aware that he could not truly claim to be the inheritor of the legacy of the ancient Roman empire until he captured Rome itself. However, many distractions delayed Mehmed's plan to invade Italy and drive the pope out of Rome. Only in 1480 did he begin serious preparations for an invasion.
As a first step in this operation, the Ottoman ruler ordered his forces to seize the Italian port of Otranto, which was not far across the Adriatic Sea from Ottoman-held Albania. The city fell to the Muslim invaders in August 1480. Many of the Christian inhabitants were killed or enslaved, with 800 said to have been offered their lives if they converted to Islam. They refused and were executed. Leaving a garrison in the captured port, most of the Ottoman forces returned to Albania, but with the intention of returning in the following year to begin the march on Rome.
The Ottoman capture of Otranto spread panic throughout Italy. Plans were made for Pope Sixtus IV to flee from Rome, but instead he called for a crusade against the infidel invaders. In 1481 a Christian crusader army, largely made up of soldiers from the kingdom of Naples and a foreign contingent from the kingdom of Hungary, marched to recapture Otranto. The crusaders laid siege to the port in May 1481, and in the same month Sultan Mehmed II died. This latter event prevented Ottoman reinforcements being sent to Otranto, and the port was soon recaptured by the Christian forces, with most of the Muslim garrison escaping to Albania. The Ottoman threat to Rome had been removed.
Quite why Pope Benedict chose to remember this otherwise forgotten event in the centuries-old struggle between Christianity and Islam is not clear. How the canonization of the Otranto martyrs will be received in the Muslim world is also unknown, despite all the Vatican claims that it is not an anti-Islamic gesture. When Pope Benedict made his Regensburg speech in 2006 the hostility between the West and the Islamic world was intense. Today, Western forces have left Iraq; they will be leaving Afghanistan next year; Osama bin Laden is dead; and Al Qaeda is now just a shadow of its former self. Tensions have eased, so perhaps Muslims will merely ignore the papal action rather than be offended.
Nevertheless, how would Westerners feel if Muslims took to lavish celebration of their martyrs for the faith? Should Tunisians commemorate the thousands of Muslims slaughtered when Christian emperor Charles V conquered Tunis in 1535? Of course they could declare that there was no anti-Christian intent in their celebration, but would they be believed? Catholics do not have a monopoly in remembering martyrs, and they should think carefully about the possible contemporary impact of their actions.
Friday, May 17, 2013
Sunday, October 21, 2012
A New NATO War in Syria?
After raising international tensions to new heights, it now seems that Israel and the United States are going to postpone a direct attack upon Iran until next year, aiming to get elections in both countries out of the way and to give sanctions against Iran a last chance to work. However, the proxy war against Iran in strife-torn Syria seems likely to be intensified once the US presidential elections are over in early November.
Both US presidential candidates have made it clear that some action must be taken soon about the civil war in Syria. The warlike Mitt Romney, should he win the election, has virtually promised an American invasion of Syria. However, he would not formally take up office until early next year, so he could not exercise his powers as American commander-in-chief until then.
A re-elected President Obama could act much sooner. He would no doubt like to repeat America's arms-length role in securing victory for the anti-Gaddafi insurgents in Libya in 2011. This would mean imposing an air and sea blockade and deploying special forces to assist the local rebels. This strategy worked against the friendless Gaddafi regime in Libya, but it seems less likely to bring a swift and cheap victory over President Assad in Syria, given his close support from Iran.
The United States would obviously like its NATO ally Turkey to carry out any direct military intervention in Syria if that is required. However, the Turkish government has clearly stated that it will only authorize a military invasion if it receives open and substantial assistance from those NATO states which have talked most loudly in favour of outside intervention in Syria, namely the United States, Britain, and France (the former colonial power in Syria).
Turkey has already lost one warplane to Syria's air defences. It will expect support from other NATO air forces and particularly that of the United States. Whether by accident or design, Britain, France, and the United States will all have amphibious task forces in the eastern Mediterranean in the next month or so. Will this be an opportunity for British, French and American marines to storm ashore on Syria's Mediterranean coastline?
If this is the NATO plan, it seems extremely foolish. One of the areas of strongest support for President Assad's regime is along Syria's Mediterranean coastline, where so many of his fellow Alawites live. Even with the distraction of a Turkish land invasion to the north, Syrian government forces may well be able to put up considerable resistance to a NATO amphibious assault.
Another problem with Syria's Mediterranean coast is that it is home to Russia's only overseas military base - the naval facility at the port of Tartus. So far Russia has given much support to President Assad's regime, albeit mostly in the dipolmatic sphere. Would Russia move to direct military aid if NATO threatened to invade Syria? This seems unlikely. Despite Russia's supposed military revival during the Putin years, it remains incapable of any serious overseas power projection. In 1999 the Russians let down their Serb friends when they were the victims of NATO air attacks; in 2012 it seems unlikely the Russians will do anything very different if a NATO assault is launched against Assad's forces in Syria.
If Russia remains powerless in the Syrian crisis, what will Israel do? Although the Israelis almost reached Damascus in both the wars of 1967 and 1973, it seems unlikely that they will mount a direct invasion of Syria at the moment. Nevertheless an Israeli military build-up in the occupied Golan Heights would no doubt be useful to distract President Assad's forces while NATO operations took place on Syria's northern borders. Already the Syrian civil war is spreading into neighbouring Lebanon, and that is one area where Israel might be ready to intervene. It will hope to crush Hezbollah, friends of both Assad and Iran, more effectively than it did when it attacked Lebanon in 2006.
One would have thought that after more than a decade of ineffectual but costly combat in Afghanistan, NATO countries would have grown tired of launching wars in Islamic states. Apparently not. No doubt encouraged by the supposed NATO victory in Libya in 2011, the alliance seems ready to plunge into a new conflict in Syria without having the slightest idea where it will lead. NATO countries are said to be democracies, but neither Turkey, Britain, France nor the United States have any mandate from their electorates to initiate a new war in the Muslim world.
Both US presidential candidates have made it clear that some action must be taken soon about the civil war in Syria. The warlike Mitt Romney, should he win the election, has virtually promised an American invasion of Syria. However, he would not formally take up office until early next year, so he could not exercise his powers as American commander-in-chief until then.
A re-elected President Obama could act much sooner. He would no doubt like to repeat America's arms-length role in securing victory for the anti-Gaddafi insurgents in Libya in 2011. This would mean imposing an air and sea blockade and deploying special forces to assist the local rebels. This strategy worked against the friendless Gaddafi regime in Libya, but it seems less likely to bring a swift and cheap victory over President Assad in Syria, given his close support from Iran.
The United States would obviously like its NATO ally Turkey to carry out any direct military intervention in Syria if that is required. However, the Turkish government has clearly stated that it will only authorize a military invasion if it receives open and substantial assistance from those NATO states which have talked most loudly in favour of outside intervention in Syria, namely the United States, Britain, and France (the former colonial power in Syria).
Turkey has already lost one warplane to Syria's air defences. It will expect support from other NATO air forces and particularly that of the United States. Whether by accident or design, Britain, France, and the United States will all have amphibious task forces in the eastern Mediterranean in the next month or so. Will this be an opportunity for British, French and American marines to storm ashore on Syria's Mediterranean coastline?
If this is the NATO plan, it seems extremely foolish. One of the areas of strongest support for President Assad's regime is along Syria's Mediterranean coastline, where so many of his fellow Alawites live. Even with the distraction of a Turkish land invasion to the north, Syrian government forces may well be able to put up considerable resistance to a NATO amphibious assault.
Another problem with Syria's Mediterranean coast is that it is home to Russia's only overseas military base - the naval facility at the port of Tartus. So far Russia has given much support to President Assad's regime, albeit mostly in the dipolmatic sphere. Would Russia move to direct military aid if NATO threatened to invade Syria? This seems unlikely. Despite Russia's supposed military revival during the Putin years, it remains incapable of any serious overseas power projection. In 1999 the Russians let down their Serb friends when they were the victims of NATO air attacks; in 2012 it seems unlikely the Russians will do anything very different if a NATO assault is launched against Assad's forces in Syria.
If Russia remains powerless in the Syrian crisis, what will Israel do? Although the Israelis almost reached Damascus in both the wars of 1967 and 1973, it seems unlikely that they will mount a direct invasion of Syria at the moment. Nevertheless an Israeli military build-up in the occupied Golan Heights would no doubt be useful to distract President Assad's forces while NATO operations took place on Syria's northern borders. Already the Syrian civil war is spreading into neighbouring Lebanon, and that is one area where Israel might be ready to intervene. It will hope to crush Hezbollah, friends of both Assad and Iran, more effectively than it did when it attacked Lebanon in 2006.
One would have thought that after more than a decade of ineffectual but costly combat in Afghanistan, NATO countries would have grown tired of launching wars in Islamic states. Apparently not. No doubt encouraged by the supposed NATO victory in Libya in 2011, the alliance seems ready to plunge into a new conflict in Syria without having the slightest idea where it will lead. NATO countries are said to be democracies, but neither Turkey, Britain, France nor the United States have any mandate from their electorates to initiate a new war in the Muslim world.
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
Existential Threats and Wars of Choice
The article is entitled 'Bombs Away: A Suitable Case for Pre-Emption?'. It warns of the threat posed by Iran's supposed programme to develop nuclear weapons. It notes that the Israeli prime minister has said that his country cannot live with a nuclear-armed Iran. The article declares that if sanctions are not successful in curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions, then Israel (inevitably supported by the USA) has plans to launch a pre-emptive military attack against Iranian nuclear sites. Faced with a dire threat to its very existence, the state of Israel reserves the right to strike first.
Given its content, a casual reader might think this article appeared in the media today, or yesterday, or maybe last week. In fact it was published in 'The Economist' magazine in July 2007, more than five years ago. One would have thought that if Iran was an existential threat to Israel in 2007 the latter country would have taken some action by now to remove the threat, instead of endlessly postponing its attack from year to year.
The fact is that Israeli governments are rightly worried about starting a new war in the Middle East whose final outcome nobody can definitely predict. In the end Israel can probably co-exist with a nuclear-armed Iran, just as the USA learned to live with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. After all, Israelis and Iranians have one thing in common: both groups dislike the Arabs. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab monarchies in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) have played as great a role as Israel and the USA in bringing about the present situation where an attack on Iran seems increasingly likely. Indeed Saudi Arabia has now replaced Egypt as Israel's principal de facto Muslim ally, whatever the denials from Riyadh.
Thus the forces assembling to assault Iran are not doing so because of some existential threat posed by that country, but are engaged in an exercise in great power aggression, a war of choice. The three principal actors - Israel, the USA, and Saudi Arabia - believe that curbing Iran's power will benefit their interests. Israel wants to preserve its monopoly of nuclear weapons in the Middle East; America wants vengeance on the only non-nuclear armed state which has persistently defied its hegemonic power since 1979; and Saudi Arabia desperately wants to preserve its self-declared leadership of the Muslim world in the face of Iranian challenges. Will these three powers succeed in their aims?
If past precedent is anything to go by, they may be successful, at least in the short run. The traditional script for an Israeli or American attack on a Muslim country in the Middle East goes as follows. Israel/USA is said to be provoked beyond endurance by the state and threatens military action. The target Muslim state blusters and makes wild threats of the destruction it can reap on the attackers, a refrain taken up by its various supporters around the world, who forecast nothing less than world chaos if the country is attacked. Israel/USA launches a military assault on the country; it is quickly defeated; and the world does not collapse into chaos. Any wider effects of the conflict (higher oil prices, etc.) are only short-lived. The regime of the country may or may not be overthrown as a consequence of its defeat, but it will certainly be reluctant to face such a military onslaught again, no matter how much its people may resent their humiliation.
Only if Israel or the USA unwisely turns military victory into the occupation of Muslim territory does their success all too quickly turn to prolonged, expensive and bloody asymmetric warfare. Israel learned this in the Arab lands seized in 1967 and in Lebanon after 1982; the USA has had similar experiences in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq from 2003. Governments are easy to curb or overthrow, but popular resistance is much more difficult to suppress.
Despite Iran's dogged performance in its war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, when it eventually ended up fighting an Iraq supported not just by the rest of the Arab world but also by the USA and other Western states, such prolonged revolutionary resistance is unlikely in a future conflict. More likely a new war with Iran will follow the scenario noted above. Israel and the USA (now with the added assistance of a Muslim power, Saudi Arabia) will find continued Iranian intransigence a provocation and will threaten military action. The Iranians will bluster and threaten the destruction of anybody who attacks them, while worldwide 'liberal' opinion will prophesy the end of civilisation if war comes to the Middle East. Iran will be attacked and its armed forces swiftly crushed (so that oil prices do not soar to great heights for too long). The chastened ayatollahs will have to admit defeat, but most Iranians will never forget this unholy onslaught by Christians, Jews and (Sunni) Muslims, and sooner or later Iran will return to the pursuit of the nuclear option as the only way to guarantee national independence.
Of course the past is merely a possible guide to the future. Nothing is inevitable. If, unlike Nasser's Egypt in 1967 or Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003, Iran can survive the initial attack and preserve the means to retaliate, then it may be able to sustain a prolonged war against its principal adversaries, certainly longer than the one month war recently forecast by an Israeli government minister. The longer the war goes on, the more likely its effects will further damage an already weak world economy.
Given its content, a casual reader might think this article appeared in the media today, or yesterday, or maybe last week. In fact it was published in 'The Economist' magazine in July 2007, more than five years ago. One would have thought that if Iran was an existential threat to Israel in 2007 the latter country would have taken some action by now to remove the threat, instead of endlessly postponing its attack from year to year.
The fact is that Israeli governments are rightly worried about starting a new war in the Middle East whose final outcome nobody can definitely predict. In the end Israel can probably co-exist with a nuclear-armed Iran, just as the USA learned to live with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. After all, Israelis and Iranians have one thing in common: both groups dislike the Arabs. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab monarchies in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) have played as great a role as Israel and the USA in bringing about the present situation where an attack on Iran seems increasingly likely. Indeed Saudi Arabia has now replaced Egypt as Israel's principal de facto Muslim ally, whatever the denials from Riyadh.
Thus the forces assembling to assault Iran are not doing so because of some existential threat posed by that country, but are engaged in an exercise in great power aggression, a war of choice. The three principal actors - Israel, the USA, and Saudi Arabia - believe that curbing Iran's power will benefit their interests. Israel wants to preserve its monopoly of nuclear weapons in the Middle East; America wants vengeance on the only non-nuclear armed state which has persistently defied its hegemonic power since 1979; and Saudi Arabia desperately wants to preserve its self-declared leadership of the Muslim world in the face of Iranian challenges. Will these three powers succeed in their aims?
If past precedent is anything to go by, they may be successful, at least in the short run. The traditional script for an Israeli or American attack on a Muslim country in the Middle East goes as follows. Israel/USA is said to be provoked beyond endurance by the state and threatens military action. The target Muslim state blusters and makes wild threats of the destruction it can reap on the attackers, a refrain taken up by its various supporters around the world, who forecast nothing less than world chaos if the country is attacked. Israel/USA launches a military assault on the country; it is quickly defeated; and the world does not collapse into chaos. Any wider effects of the conflict (higher oil prices, etc.) are only short-lived. The regime of the country may or may not be overthrown as a consequence of its defeat, but it will certainly be reluctant to face such a military onslaught again, no matter how much its people may resent their humiliation.
Only if Israel or the USA unwisely turns military victory into the occupation of Muslim territory does their success all too quickly turn to prolonged, expensive and bloody asymmetric warfare. Israel learned this in the Arab lands seized in 1967 and in Lebanon after 1982; the USA has had similar experiences in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq from 2003. Governments are easy to curb or overthrow, but popular resistance is much more difficult to suppress.
Despite Iran's dogged performance in its war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, when it eventually ended up fighting an Iraq supported not just by the rest of the Arab world but also by the USA and other Western states, such prolonged revolutionary resistance is unlikely in a future conflict. More likely a new war with Iran will follow the scenario noted above. Israel and the USA (now with the added assistance of a Muslim power, Saudi Arabia) will find continued Iranian intransigence a provocation and will threaten military action. The Iranians will bluster and threaten the destruction of anybody who attacks them, while worldwide 'liberal' opinion will prophesy the end of civilisation if war comes to the Middle East. Iran will be attacked and its armed forces swiftly crushed (so that oil prices do not soar to great heights for too long). The chastened ayatollahs will have to admit defeat, but most Iranians will never forget this unholy onslaught by Christians, Jews and (Sunni) Muslims, and sooner or later Iran will return to the pursuit of the nuclear option as the only way to guarantee national independence.
Of course the past is merely a possible guide to the future. Nothing is inevitable. If, unlike Nasser's Egypt in 1967 or Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003, Iran can survive the initial attack and preserve the means to retaliate, then it may be able to sustain a prolonged war against its principal adversaries, certainly longer than the one month war recently forecast by an Israeli government minister. The longer the war goes on, the more likely its effects will further damage an already weak world economy.
Wednesday, August 8, 2012
After Assad: Kurdish Autonomy in Syria?
It is often stated that the Kurds are the largest national group in the world without their own country. Around thirty million Kurds are spread, across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, with the largest group (some eleven million) in the latter country.
After the 1991 Gulf war, the Kurds of northern Iraq who had revolted against Saddam Hussein were protected from his vengeance by American and British air power. Thanks to Western protection, these Kurds were able to develop a virtually autonomous region within Iraq.
Once Saddam Hussein had been overthrown in 2003, it was hoped that Iraqi Kurdistan would be fully integrated into the new, democratic Iraq. This has not happened. Although nominally part of the wider state, the Kurdish administration in Arbil takes relatively little notice of the Iraqi national government in Baghdad. Not only that, but the PKK, the Kurdish militants fighting in Turkey, have found refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, only occasionally being disturbed by cross-border Turkish military attacks.
Now the Kurdish community in Syria, who mostly live in the north-east of the country, have taken advantage of the ongoing civil war to make a claim for autonomy for themselves. President Assad has withdrawn troops from their area to reinforce his assaults on rebel forces in Damascus and Aleppo. The Syrian Kurds, encouraged by their neighbours in Iraqi Kurdistan, have taken control of a number of towns and deployed their own militia. They claim not to be seeking independence but merely the same degree of local autonomy within Syria as Iraqi Kurds have achieved within that country.
This claim will not only be troubling to whatever government next takes power in Damascus, assuming the long promised downfall of President Assad finally takes place, but it will also be a provocative challenge to the government of Turkey.
Almost continuously since the creation of the Turkish republic in 1923, the rulers in Ankara have been in conflict, sometimes amounting to open war, with the Kurdish population which dominates the south-east of that country. The Turks have always refused to concede any degree of autonomy to their large Kurdish minority. The creation of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan on Turkey's southern border was provocation enough. For it to be joined by an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan would be an even greater challenge. If Kurds can achieve autonomy in Iraq and Syria, why not in Turkey as well?
Already the Turkish government has said that if the PKK militant group sets up bases in Syrian Kurdistan it will launch military attacks against such terrorists. So far there seems no prospect of this happening and Syrian Kurdish groups have been at pains to make clear they pose no threat to Turkey. Certainly the recent upsurge of PKK attacks in south-east Turkey does not seem to have any links to Syria.
In any case, a Turkish military invasion of Syria, whether to overthrow President Assad or to stifle the growth of Kurdish autonomy in that country, seems unlikely at present. On the one hand the Islamist government of Turkish prime minister Erdogan has strained relations with the largely secularist Turkish armed forces. On the other hand all Arabs (and Kurds) are likely to resent a Turkish incursion into their territory since this would seem too much like a revival of the old Ottoman Turkish empire which ruled that region before 1918.
Even if one assumes that President Assad will soon be ousted from power in Damascus, the new Syria which follows is likely to be a politically confused place. Whether this confusion is considerable, as in post-Gadaffi Libya, or more controlled, as in post-Mubarak Egypt, the Kurdish population of Syria seems likely to exploit the situation to claim some sort of autonomy for themselves. What sort of reaction this will provoke in Damascus is unclear, but it is already obvious that Turkey will view the establishment of yet another autonomous Kurdish region along its southern border with considerable concern.
After the 1991 Gulf war, the Kurds of northern Iraq who had revolted against Saddam Hussein were protected from his vengeance by American and British air power. Thanks to Western protection, these Kurds were able to develop a virtually autonomous region within Iraq.
Once Saddam Hussein had been overthrown in 2003, it was hoped that Iraqi Kurdistan would be fully integrated into the new, democratic Iraq. This has not happened. Although nominally part of the wider state, the Kurdish administration in Arbil takes relatively little notice of the Iraqi national government in Baghdad. Not only that, but the PKK, the Kurdish militants fighting in Turkey, have found refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, only occasionally being disturbed by cross-border Turkish military attacks.
Now the Kurdish community in Syria, who mostly live in the north-east of the country, have taken advantage of the ongoing civil war to make a claim for autonomy for themselves. President Assad has withdrawn troops from their area to reinforce his assaults on rebel forces in Damascus and Aleppo. The Syrian Kurds, encouraged by their neighbours in Iraqi Kurdistan, have taken control of a number of towns and deployed their own militia. They claim not to be seeking independence but merely the same degree of local autonomy within Syria as Iraqi Kurds have achieved within that country.
This claim will not only be troubling to whatever government next takes power in Damascus, assuming the long promised downfall of President Assad finally takes place, but it will also be a provocative challenge to the government of Turkey.
Almost continuously since the creation of the Turkish republic in 1923, the rulers in Ankara have been in conflict, sometimes amounting to open war, with the Kurdish population which dominates the south-east of that country. The Turks have always refused to concede any degree of autonomy to their large Kurdish minority. The creation of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan on Turkey's southern border was provocation enough. For it to be joined by an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan would be an even greater challenge. If Kurds can achieve autonomy in Iraq and Syria, why not in Turkey as well?
Already the Turkish government has said that if the PKK militant group sets up bases in Syrian Kurdistan it will launch military attacks against such terrorists. So far there seems no prospect of this happening and Syrian Kurdish groups have been at pains to make clear they pose no threat to Turkey. Certainly the recent upsurge of PKK attacks in south-east Turkey does not seem to have any links to Syria.
In any case, a Turkish military invasion of Syria, whether to overthrow President Assad or to stifle the growth of Kurdish autonomy in that country, seems unlikely at present. On the one hand the Islamist government of Turkish prime minister Erdogan has strained relations with the largely secularist Turkish armed forces. On the other hand all Arabs (and Kurds) are likely to resent a Turkish incursion into their territory since this would seem too much like a revival of the old Ottoman Turkish empire which ruled that region before 1918.
Even if one assumes that President Assad will soon be ousted from power in Damascus, the new Syria which follows is likely to be a politically confused place. Whether this confusion is considerable, as in post-Gadaffi Libya, or more controlled, as in post-Mubarak Egypt, the Kurdish population of Syria seems likely to exploit the situation to claim some sort of autonomy for themselves. What sort of reaction this will provoke in Damascus is unclear, but it is already obvious that Turkey will view the establishment of yet another autonomous Kurdish region along its southern border with considerable concern.
Sunday, July 1, 2012
Somali Piracy: The Beginning of the End?
It took the naval powers of Christian Europe three hundred years to defeat the Barbary corsairs of North Africa, with the new United States of America taking a leading role in the final victory in the early nineteenth century. Today's Muslim sea raiders from Africa, the Somali pirates, seem to have been beaten in a much shorter time, barely twelve months. From being a scourge of the sea routes in the Indian Ocean during the first half of 2011, they have now been reduced, it seems, to just a minor nuisance.
When the tempo of pirate attacks first began to decline in the summer of 2011, this was blamed on the monsoon season in the Indian Ocean. The seas were simply too rough for the pirates to take their small craft out hunting for prizes. When the monsoon ended and pirate attacks remained at a reduced level, a new explanation was put forward. The pirates had so many captured ships in their ports that priority was being given to ransom negotiations. Once the stock of prizes had been reduced, the pirates would put to sea once more. Ransoms were paid and ships released, but by the end of 2011 the number of pirate attacks had still not greatly increased.
By the spring of 2012 it seemed that there had been a definite and apparently lasting reduction in the level of Somali pirate activity, and their opponents were quick to take credit for this change. Commanders of the NATO, EU, and other international naval forces on patrol off Somalia claimed that their activities had restricted pirate operations. Similarly, ship owners said that the spread of anti-piracy measures on merchant ships, including the provision of armed guards, had made it much more difficult for the pirates to get on board their intended prey.
In the first half of 2012 five merchant ships have been captured by the Somali pirates, compared with sixteen in the first half of 2011. Nevertheless this much smaller number of prizes did include one major catch - the new Greek-owned tanker 'Smyrni', loaded with 135,000 tons of crude oil, which was captured on 10 May off the coast of Oman. Judging by past experience, the ship and its cargo will only be freed for a ransom of a least US $10 million. After months of little success, this one ship will bring substantial wealth to at least one group of Somali pirates.
It is generally accepted that whatever measures are taken against the Somali pirates at sea, their final defeat can only be assured when law and order are restored on land within Somalia. After years of turmoil, even this now seems within the realms of possibility. The government of the Puntland region of Somalia has recently taken military action against some pirate groups based in its territory. Meanwhile the most destabilising force in Somalia, the Islamist militants of al-Shabaab, are said to be facing final defeat by African Union forces in the south of the country. With order being restored ashore and maritime counter-measures apparently becoming more effective at sea, it might seem that Somali piracy is doomed. However, as some commentators have noted, the Somali pirates have been contained rather than defeated. If the international naval effort is reduced, Somali piracy may quickly stage a revival.
On several occasions in past centuries, European naval powers felt they had defeated the Barbary corsairs. However, when they had to withdraw their fleets to fight new wars elsewhere, the Barbary corsairs soon renewed their attacks on Christian shipping. Given the present increasingly tense political situation in the Middle East, particularly with regard to Syria and Iran, there is always the possibility that new conflicts in that region will lead to a reduction in naval patrols off Somalia and a revival of piracy there. At present we can only be cautiously hopeful that the Somali pirate menace has been beaten.
When the tempo of pirate attacks first began to decline in the summer of 2011, this was blamed on the monsoon season in the Indian Ocean. The seas were simply too rough for the pirates to take their small craft out hunting for prizes. When the monsoon ended and pirate attacks remained at a reduced level, a new explanation was put forward. The pirates had so many captured ships in their ports that priority was being given to ransom negotiations. Once the stock of prizes had been reduced, the pirates would put to sea once more. Ransoms were paid and ships released, but by the end of 2011 the number of pirate attacks had still not greatly increased.
By the spring of 2012 it seemed that there had been a definite and apparently lasting reduction in the level of Somali pirate activity, and their opponents were quick to take credit for this change. Commanders of the NATO, EU, and other international naval forces on patrol off Somalia claimed that their activities had restricted pirate operations. Similarly, ship owners said that the spread of anti-piracy measures on merchant ships, including the provision of armed guards, had made it much more difficult for the pirates to get on board their intended prey.
In the first half of 2012 five merchant ships have been captured by the Somali pirates, compared with sixteen in the first half of 2011. Nevertheless this much smaller number of prizes did include one major catch - the new Greek-owned tanker 'Smyrni', loaded with 135,000 tons of crude oil, which was captured on 10 May off the coast of Oman. Judging by past experience, the ship and its cargo will only be freed for a ransom of a least US $10 million. After months of little success, this one ship will bring substantial wealth to at least one group of Somali pirates.
It is generally accepted that whatever measures are taken against the Somali pirates at sea, their final defeat can only be assured when law and order are restored on land within Somalia. After years of turmoil, even this now seems within the realms of possibility. The government of the Puntland region of Somalia has recently taken military action against some pirate groups based in its territory. Meanwhile the most destabilising force in Somalia, the Islamist militants of al-Shabaab, are said to be facing final defeat by African Union forces in the south of the country. With order being restored ashore and maritime counter-measures apparently becoming more effective at sea, it might seem that Somali piracy is doomed. However, as some commentators have noted, the Somali pirates have been contained rather than defeated. If the international naval effort is reduced, Somali piracy may quickly stage a revival.
On several occasions in past centuries, European naval powers felt they had defeated the Barbary corsairs. However, when they had to withdraw their fleets to fight new wars elsewhere, the Barbary corsairs soon renewed their attacks on Christian shipping. Given the present increasingly tense political situation in the Middle East, particularly with regard to Syria and Iran, there is always the possibility that new conflicts in that region will lead to a reduction in naval patrols off Somalia and a revival of piracy there. At present we can only be cautiously hopeful that the Somali pirate menace has been beaten.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
Libya: War's End or Endless War?
In 2009 Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi arrived in Rome for a state visit to Italy. Pinned to his uniform was a photograph of Omar Mukhtar, hero of the Libyan resistance to Italian imperialism. In 2011 the rebels fighting to overthrow Gaddafi named one of their military formations the 'Omar Mukhtar brigade'. Both sides in the current Libyan civil war claim Omar Mukhtar as their inspiration. He remains one of Libya's national heroes, the 'Lion of the Desert' who fought the Italian invaders for twenty years, until he was captured and executed by them in 1931.
The Italians had invaded Libya, then ruled by the Ottoman empire, in 1911. The Turks made peace in the following year and handed over the territory to Italy, but the native Muslim inhabitants refused to accept infidel rule. Their resistance struggle went on for more than two decades and Omar Mukhtar became its figurehead.
Today the victory of the NATO-backed Libyan rebels seems almost complete. Yet Muammar Gaddafi and his forces are still fighting, still resisting. Is it possible that he can go on resisting for years just as Omar Mukhtar did?
This seems unlikely since Gaddafi has few of the advantages which allowed Omar Mukhtar to carry on a guerrilla war for decades. These advantages were terrain, religious commitment, foreign support, and the distraction of his enemies.
Omar Mukhtar was a native of Cyrenaica, the north eastern region of Libya, and its difficult terrain provided hiding places for his guerrilla forces. Today Cyrenaica is completely hostile to Gaddafi and its principal city, Benghazi, served as the rebel capital until the liberation of Tripoli. It seems likely that Gaddafi will be driven out of his remaining strongholds near the Mediterranean coast and be forced southwards into the Sahara. There his forces will be even more vulnerable to NATO air attacks.
Omar Mukhtar was a member of the Senussi religious brotherhood, which enjoyed considerable support in North Africa and the wider Islamic world. Gaddafi has few supporters among the world's Muslims and he is regarded as a secular apostate by most Islamists, ranging from Al Qaeda to the House of Saud.
Omar Mukhtar's resistance struggle in Libya received the backing of neighbouring Egypt. Although the Egyptian government of the period was under British domination, the British had little interest in assisting their Italian imperial rivals. Gaddafi is not totally shunned by Libya's neighbours today. Algeria in particular is suspicious that the new NATO-backed Libyan regime is just a front for a revival of Western colonialism in North Africa. However, it seems unlikely that Algeria will give Gaddafi direct military assistance or provide him with a safe haven.
The initial Italian invasion led to the subjugation of most of Libya by 1913, but once Italy joined the First World War in 1915 the situation changed dramatically. Many Italian troops were withdrawn and the Libyan resistance took possession of most of the interior of the country. Even when Mussolini and his fascists came to power in Italy in 1922, Italian control of Libya was still largely restricted to a coastal strip. With no other distractions, Italian military conquest was renewed from 1925 onwards. However, it was only after General Rodolfo Graziani took charge in 1930 that Italian counter-insurgency efforts became truly effective. The rural inhabitants of Cyrenaica were driven into concentration camps; the Libya-Egypt border was sealed; and mobile columns, supported by aircraft, harassed the guerrillas relentlessly until Omar Mukhtar was captured and killed.
The First World War was a major distraction for the Italians. It gave the Libyan resistance a chance to regroup and reoccupy territory, setting back the Italian pacification of the country by perhaps a decade. Despite French president Sarkozy's remark that Syria may well be NATO's next target, it seems unlikely that the alliance will be distracted by a new war before it has finished its work in Libya. Gaddafi, unlike Omar Mukhtar, will not be given a chance to regroup his forces and regain ground. His defeat seems certain.
Yet only ten years ago commentators were making similar predictions about the Taliban in Afghanistan. Western military strategy in that country in late 2001 was very similar to the current strategy in Libya. The West would provide air power, while local forces, aided by a few Western special forces troops, would do most of the ground fighting against the enemy.
Unfortunately, the Taliban, supposedly crushed at the end of 2001, were to enjoy most of the advantages which allowed Omar Mukhtar to prolong his resistance in Libya. The Taliban found refuge in the rugged terrain of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; they continued to enjoy support within the wider Islamic world; many in the political and military establishment of neighbouring Pakistan assisted their cause; and their main Western enemy, the USA, was distracted by a new war in Iraq from 2003 onwards.
These factors allowed the Taliban to survive their apparently crushing defeat in 2001. For the reasons already noted, Muammar Gaddafi does not seem to have those advantages and it seems unlikely that he can stave off final defeat for much longer.
The Italians had invaded Libya, then ruled by the Ottoman empire, in 1911. The Turks made peace in the following year and handed over the territory to Italy, but the native Muslim inhabitants refused to accept infidel rule. Their resistance struggle went on for more than two decades and Omar Mukhtar became its figurehead.
Today the victory of the NATO-backed Libyan rebels seems almost complete. Yet Muammar Gaddafi and his forces are still fighting, still resisting. Is it possible that he can go on resisting for years just as Omar Mukhtar did?
This seems unlikely since Gaddafi has few of the advantages which allowed Omar Mukhtar to carry on a guerrilla war for decades. These advantages were terrain, religious commitment, foreign support, and the distraction of his enemies.
Omar Mukhtar was a native of Cyrenaica, the north eastern region of Libya, and its difficult terrain provided hiding places for his guerrilla forces. Today Cyrenaica is completely hostile to Gaddafi and its principal city, Benghazi, served as the rebel capital until the liberation of Tripoli. It seems likely that Gaddafi will be driven out of his remaining strongholds near the Mediterranean coast and be forced southwards into the Sahara. There his forces will be even more vulnerable to NATO air attacks.
Omar Mukhtar was a member of the Senussi religious brotherhood, which enjoyed considerable support in North Africa and the wider Islamic world. Gaddafi has few supporters among the world's Muslims and he is regarded as a secular apostate by most Islamists, ranging from Al Qaeda to the House of Saud.
Omar Mukhtar's resistance struggle in Libya received the backing of neighbouring Egypt. Although the Egyptian government of the period was under British domination, the British had little interest in assisting their Italian imperial rivals. Gaddafi is not totally shunned by Libya's neighbours today. Algeria in particular is suspicious that the new NATO-backed Libyan regime is just a front for a revival of Western colonialism in North Africa. However, it seems unlikely that Algeria will give Gaddafi direct military assistance or provide him with a safe haven.
The initial Italian invasion led to the subjugation of most of Libya by 1913, but once Italy joined the First World War in 1915 the situation changed dramatically. Many Italian troops were withdrawn and the Libyan resistance took possession of most of the interior of the country. Even when Mussolini and his fascists came to power in Italy in 1922, Italian control of Libya was still largely restricted to a coastal strip. With no other distractions, Italian military conquest was renewed from 1925 onwards. However, it was only after General Rodolfo Graziani took charge in 1930 that Italian counter-insurgency efforts became truly effective. The rural inhabitants of Cyrenaica were driven into concentration camps; the Libya-Egypt border was sealed; and mobile columns, supported by aircraft, harassed the guerrillas relentlessly until Omar Mukhtar was captured and killed.
The First World War was a major distraction for the Italians. It gave the Libyan resistance a chance to regroup and reoccupy territory, setting back the Italian pacification of the country by perhaps a decade. Despite French president Sarkozy's remark that Syria may well be NATO's next target, it seems unlikely that the alliance will be distracted by a new war before it has finished its work in Libya. Gaddafi, unlike Omar Mukhtar, will not be given a chance to regroup his forces and regain ground. His defeat seems certain.
Yet only ten years ago commentators were making similar predictions about the Taliban in Afghanistan. Western military strategy in that country in late 2001 was very similar to the current strategy in Libya. The West would provide air power, while local forces, aided by a few Western special forces troops, would do most of the ground fighting against the enemy.
Unfortunately, the Taliban, supposedly crushed at the end of 2001, were to enjoy most of the advantages which allowed Omar Mukhtar to prolong his resistance in Libya. The Taliban found refuge in the rugged terrain of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; they continued to enjoy support within the wider Islamic world; many in the political and military establishment of neighbouring Pakistan assisted their cause; and their main Western enemy, the USA, was distracted by a new war in Iraq from 2003 onwards.
These factors allowed the Taliban to survive their apparently crushing defeat in 2001. For the reasons already noted, Muammar Gaddafi does not seem to have those advantages and it seems unlikely that he can stave off final defeat for much longer.
Friday, August 19, 2011
Endgame in Libya: Back to Western Colonialism?
As the fall of Muamar Gadaffi seems increasingly inevitable, thoughts are turning to what kind of government the Libyan opposition will put in his place. Also worthy of consideration is how far the new Libya will fall under the sort of Western control that existed in the country before Gadaffi's revolution in 1969.
The United States, Britain and France, along with their NATO and other allies, have gone to considerable expense, in treasure rather than blood, to support the Libyan opposition and remove Gadaffi, despite having no United Nations mandate for regime change. Whatever their high-minded claims to be only acting to protect the Libyan people, they will now look for political and economic returns on their investment.
In 1943 the Italian colony of Libya was overrun by the British army. A British military administration was installed in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, with the United States retaining use of various air bases. In the south of Libya, known as the Fezzan, French administrators were installed, running the area as an extension of France's existing North African colonies.
In 1949 the United Nations agreed that Libya should become an independent country, and in 1951 the kingdom of Libya came into being, ruled by King Idris. However, both Britain and the United States retained military bases in Libya.
Initially the bases brought much needed money into an impoverished country, but the situation changed after oil was discovered in Libya in 1959. With the French exit from Algeria in 1962, it seemed that Western colonialism in North Africa had come to an end. However, Western military bases remained in Libya until Gadaffi's bloodless coup in 1969.
In March 1970 the British gave up the RAF base at El Adem; in June the Americans left Wheelus air base; and in October Gadaffi expelled the last Italian settlers from Libya. For the next forty years Gadaffi would keep Libya firmly in the anti-Western camp in international affairs.
Now that Gadaffi seems on the verge of being consigned to the scrapheap of history, what spoils will be demanded by the victors? The Libyan opposition will set up a new government, but the NATO powers who backed the rebels will be the real victors.
Will the United States, Britain and France want new military bases in Libya? These would be useful to keep an eye on Egypt, where the new political setup after the fall of Mubarak still remains in flux. Canada has made its contribution to the NATO war effort against Gadaffi, and the Harper government has said it is looking to create a worldwide chain of Canadian military support bases. Might not Libya host one such base?
Military bases would probably be too provocative to certain sections of the Libyan opposition, especially the Islamists. Nevertheless it seems likely that the new, democratic Libya will quickly be overrun by Western civilian and military 'advisers', while Western oil companies and other businesses will be given economic opportunities in Libya that have largely been closed to them for the last forty years.
The new Libyan regime will have little choice but to give in to Western demands. After all, the West will only unfreeze Libya's financial assets held abroad if it gets a new Libyan government friendly to its interests. Whether this brave new world can be seen as a return to colonial exploitation by the West or as a boost for freedom and democracy in Libya depends on one's political viewpoint.
The United States, Britain and France, along with their NATO and other allies, have gone to considerable expense, in treasure rather than blood, to support the Libyan opposition and remove Gadaffi, despite having no United Nations mandate for regime change. Whatever their high-minded claims to be only acting to protect the Libyan people, they will now look for political and economic returns on their investment.
In 1943 the Italian colony of Libya was overrun by the British army. A British military administration was installed in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, with the United States retaining use of various air bases. In the south of Libya, known as the Fezzan, French administrators were installed, running the area as an extension of France's existing North African colonies.
In 1949 the United Nations agreed that Libya should become an independent country, and in 1951 the kingdom of Libya came into being, ruled by King Idris. However, both Britain and the United States retained military bases in Libya.
Initially the bases brought much needed money into an impoverished country, but the situation changed after oil was discovered in Libya in 1959. With the French exit from Algeria in 1962, it seemed that Western colonialism in North Africa had come to an end. However, Western military bases remained in Libya until Gadaffi's bloodless coup in 1969.
In March 1970 the British gave up the RAF base at El Adem; in June the Americans left Wheelus air base; and in October Gadaffi expelled the last Italian settlers from Libya. For the next forty years Gadaffi would keep Libya firmly in the anti-Western camp in international affairs.
Now that Gadaffi seems on the verge of being consigned to the scrapheap of history, what spoils will be demanded by the victors? The Libyan opposition will set up a new government, but the NATO powers who backed the rebels will be the real victors.
Will the United States, Britain and France want new military bases in Libya? These would be useful to keep an eye on Egypt, where the new political setup after the fall of Mubarak still remains in flux. Canada has made its contribution to the NATO war effort against Gadaffi, and the Harper government has said it is looking to create a worldwide chain of Canadian military support bases. Might not Libya host one such base?
Military bases would probably be too provocative to certain sections of the Libyan opposition, especially the Islamists. Nevertheless it seems likely that the new, democratic Libya will quickly be overrun by Western civilian and military 'advisers', while Western oil companies and other businesses will be given economic opportunities in Libya that have largely been closed to them for the last forty years.
The new Libyan regime will have little choice but to give in to Western demands. After all, the West will only unfreeze Libya's financial assets held abroad if it gets a new Libyan government friendly to its interests. Whether this brave new world can be seen as a return to colonial exploitation by the West or as a boost for freedom and democracy in Libya depends on one's political viewpoint.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)