The Iraqi government has announced that its forces are beginning the final battle to retake Fallujah. Although close to the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, the town has been held by ISIS for almost two and a half years. Like the Iraqi recapture of Ramadi from ISIS at the end of 2015, the fight for Fallujah is expected to be prolonged and bloody, but few doubt that ISIS will be defeated.
Combined with ISIS defeats elsewhere in Iraq and in neighbouring Syria, the loss of Fallujah will be a major blow to the Sunni Islamist terror group. Perhaps even more worrying for ISIS has been the recent Iraqi successes at Hit and Rutba. In both towns it is claimed Irqi government forces were aided by Sunni tribesmen who had turned against ISIS. If the group can no longer rely on the support of Iraqi Sunnis, previously hostile to the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, then it is indeed in deep trouble.
Optimists are talking about a rapid collapse of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq before the end of this year. The ISIS capital at Raqqa in Syria is already said to be under threat. Should the Iraqi recapture of Fallujah prove easier than expected, then there will be growing pressure to liberate Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, from ISIS control this year rather than wait until 2017 as previously planned. ISIS would certainly appear to be on the ropes, but it is unlikely to go down without a fight. Nevertheless, if its many enemies deliver the final knockout punch more quickly than expected, what will a post-ISIS Middle East look like?
No doubt many parties will rush to claim they played a major role in the defeat of ISIS. The United States and its allies will point to their two year bombing campaign against ISIS targets as a vital factor in ensuring victory. However, whatever the role of airpower, only ground forces can recapture towns and territory. The two principal victors will be the Shiites and the Kurds, both of whom will be looking to derive new advantages from their success.
In Syria the Shiite-linked victors will be the Alawite government of Bashir Assad, backed by Iran and Russia. In Iraq the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad will claim victory, once again with Iran as its chief backer. Despite its many sins, ISIS has been the most powerful Sunni militant group in the Middle East and its defeat by Shiite forces will give that side a major boost in the Sunni-Shiite struggle that increasingly dominates the region.
In addition, Saudi Arabia, the self-declared leader of Sunni Islam, has embarked on an internal reform programme that some see as a dangerous gamble. If it succeeds, it will bring about a major economic and social transformation of the kingdom. If it fails, the result could be internal disorder and even the fall of the House of Saud. Such a collapse would be a greater blow to Sunnis than the defeat of ISIS.
The other victors in the ground struggle against ISIS would be the Kurds. In both Syria and Iraq they have played a vital role in fighting ISIS, being particularly close to the United States and its Western allies. However, the long-term aim of the Kurds is to create their own state, and this goal makes their Western friends uneasy. The Kurds have been denied heavy weapons and even minor incidents, such as Canadian special forces personnel attaching Iraqi Kurdistan flags to their uniforms, have caused protests.
Yet if the Kurds are on the winning side against ISIS, they will certainly want to build upon their success. During the chaos caused by ISIS successes in the summer of 2014, the Kurds seized control of the Iraqi city of Kirkuk. If the Iraqi government recaptures Mosul from ISIS, it will surely want Kirkuk returned to its control as well. The Kurds are unlikely to agree to this. Which side would the West take in an Iraqi-Kurd conflict? Similarly, the Iraqi Kurds may increase their support for the revived Kurdish insurgency in south-east Turkey. What will the United States do if the Iraqi Kurds come into open conflict with Turkey, a major NATO ally?
The fall of ISIS would certainly be very welcome to the international community, but it is unlikely to bring peace and stability to the Middle East. Old conflicts will grow in importance while new ones will be created.
Tuesday, May 24, 2016
Monday, March 2, 2015
Islamic State: Who Will Crush the Extremists?
Extremist Sunni Muslim movements are nothing new in the history of the Middle East. Today we have the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL) in Syria and Iraq. Two hundred years ago it was the first Saudi state, bursting out of the Arabian desert to raid Iraq and the Hijaz.
Both movements share a religious ideology which is intolerant of Jews, Christians, and Shia Muslims; indeed any Muslims who are not obedient to their fundamentalist creed. Although the Saudis raided Iraq as early as 1802, destroying the Shia shrine at Karbala and killing thousands of the city's Shia inhabitants, they came to world notice in 1806 by taking control of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Similarly, although IS has its origins in the Syrian civil war, it came to world attention in June 2014 by seizing control of Mosul, Iraq's second biggest city.
Such challenges to the established order in the Middle East could not go unanswered. Who was willing and able to crush the extremists?
In 1806 Mecca and Medina were part of the Ottoman empire, but the Ottoman sultan did not have adequate military forces of his own to expel the Saudi occupiers. He could not call on European assistance in what was a Muslim quarrel, and in any case the Europeans were too busy with their own affairs, namely the Napoleonic wars.
After the French occupation of 1798-1801, the Ottoman province of Egypt had remained in confusion for some years. Then an Albanian soldier, Muhammad Ali, had risen to power in Cairo and built up a strong local army. As he was nominally the vassal of the Ottoman sultan, he seemed the ideal candidate to deal with the Saudi menace.
From 1811 Muhammad Ali sent his sons to lead Egyptian forces against the Saudis in Arabia. The holy cities were recaptured by 1813, but Muhammad Ali was determined to continue the war until the Saudis were totally destroyed. Only in 1818 was the Saudi capital city captured and the three principal Saudi leaders sent to Istanbul, where the Ottoman sultan had them publicly executed.
The Ottoman sultan had been vindicated and the extremists crushed, but victory came with a price. The sultan had to overlook the increasing autonomy of his Egyptian vassal, with his growing army and navy. By the early 1830s it was Muhammad Ali who was threatening to overthrow the sultan, and it was only the intervention of the European powers which forced the Egyptian ruler to curb his ambitions.
Today, after its recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USA is reluctant to intervene directly against IS. It would prefer the major Muslim regional powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to do the job, but they show no willingness to undertake the task. So the USA has fallen back on the old formula that seemed to work well in Afghanistan in 2001-2 and in northern Iraq in 2003. The USA and its allies will provide air power and assistance from special forces, while most of the boots on the ground will be provided by local fighters.
Against IS in Syria these fighters will be provided by the Syrian opponents of President Assad and by the Kurds; in Iraq by the Kurds and the Iraqi army. Unfortunately none of these local forces look particularly strong, and even if they are successful, the consequences of their victory over IS may not be what the USA desires, just as the Ottoman sultan found the price of Muhammad Ali's victory over the Saudis was not to his taste.
The Syrian opposition is dominated by jihadists, even if some of them are in conflict with IS. The current plan is for Turkey to train Western-approved 'moderate' jihadists to fight both Assad and IS in Syria, but whether this is really possible is still unclear. The Syrian Kurds won the first victory over IS at Kobani largely thanks to air strikes by the USA and its allies, but whether this success can be translated into a wider campaign against IS in Syria remains problematic.
In Iraq the Shia-dominated national army is being rebuilt after its poor performance against IS in 2014, with US and other Western military advisors playing an important role. However, the Iraqi Shia militias, trained by the Iranians, are judged to be more effective, but also more sectarian. Whatever their suffering at the hands of IS, the Sunni Muslim majority in the city of Mosul is unlikely to relish the prospect of being 'liberated' by Shia fanatics.
The Kurds of northern Iraq are being built up as a major anti-IS military force, but even if they play a major role in defeating IS in Iraq, they will demand a reward for their services. For almost a quarter of a century the Kurds of northern Iraq have enjoyed de facto autonomy. If they defeat IS, they will probably expect international recognition as an independent nation. Just as victory over the Saudis increased Muhammad Ali's political and military power within the Ottoman empire, so victory over IS would be a boost for Kurdish nationhood, not only in Iraq but also among the Kurdish minorities in Syria and Turkey.
However, before the rewards of victory can be reaped, there must be victory. Somebody must crush IS. The much-trumpeted Kurdish/Iraqi spring offensive aimed at freeing Mosul from IS control seems to be underway, with Iraqi efforts to capture Tikrit as a first step. If it succeeds, it may well begin the collapse of IS power in the Middle East. If it fails, it will show that local fighters are incapable of overcoming IS. The USA and its allies will then be faced with the grim prospect of having to send large armies of their own back to the Middle East if they wish to be certain of achieving the downfall of IS.
Both movements share a religious ideology which is intolerant of Jews, Christians, and Shia Muslims; indeed any Muslims who are not obedient to their fundamentalist creed. Although the Saudis raided Iraq as early as 1802, destroying the Shia shrine at Karbala and killing thousands of the city's Shia inhabitants, they came to world notice in 1806 by taking control of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Similarly, although IS has its origins in the Syrian civil war, it came to world attention in June 2014 by seizing control of Mosul, Iraq's second biggest city.
Such challenges to the established order in the Middle East could not go unanswered. Who was willing and able to crush the extremists?
In 1806 Mecca and Medina were part of the Ottoman empire, but the Ottoman sultan did not have adequate military forces of his own to expel the Saudi occupiers. He could not call on European assistance in what was a Muslim quarrel, and in any case the Europeans were too busy with their own affairs, namely the Napoleonic wars.
After the French occupation of 1798-1801, the Ottoman province of Egypt had remained in confusion for some years. Then an Albanian soldier, Muhammad Ali, had risen to power in Cairo and built up a strong local army. As he was nominally the vassal of the Ottoman sultan, he seemed the ideal candidate to deal with the Saudi menace.
From 1811 Muhammad Ali sent his sons to lead Egyptian forces against the Saudis in Arabia. The holy cities were recaptured by 1813, but Muhammad Ali was determined to continue the war until the Saudis were totally destroyed. Only in 1818 was the Saudi capital city captured and the three principal Saudi leaders sent to Istanbul, where the Ottoman sultan had them publicly executed.
The Ottoman sultan had been vindicated and the extremists crushed, but victory came with a price. The sultan had to overlook the increasing autonomy of his Egyptian vassal, with his growing army and navy. By the early 1830s it was Muhammad Ali who was threatening to overthrow the sultan, and it was only the intervention of the European powers which forced the Egyptian ruler to curb his ambitions.
Today, after its recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USA is reluctant to intervene directly against IS. It would prefer the major Muslim regional powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to do the job, but they show no willingness to undertake the task. So the USA has fallen back on the old formula that seemed to work well in Afghanistan in 2001-2 and in northern Iraq in 2003. The USA and its allies will provide air power and assistance from special forces, while most of the boots on the ground will be provided by local fighters.
Against IS in Syria these fighters will be provided by the Syrian opponents of President Assad and by the Kurds; in Iraq by the Kurds and the Iraqi army. Unfortunately none of these local forces look particularly strong, and even if they are successful, the consequences of their victory over IS may not be what the USA desires, just as the Ottoman sultan found the price of Muhammad Ali's victory over the Saudis was not to his taste.
The Syrian opposition is dominated by jihadists, even if some of them are in conflict with IS. The current plan is for Turkey to train Western-approved 'moderate' jihadists to fight both Assad and IS in Syria, but whether this is really possible is still unclear. The Syrian Kurds won the first victory over IS at Kobani largely thanks to air strikes by the USA and its allies, but whether this success can be translated into a wider campaign against IS in Syria remains problematic.
In Iraq the Shia-dominated national army is being rebuilt after its poor performance against IS in 2014, with US and other Western military advisors playing an important role. However, the Iraqi Shia militias, trained by the Iranians, are judged to be more effective, but also more sectarian. Whatever their suffering at the hands of IS, the Sunni Muslim majority in the city of Mosul is unlikely to relish the prospect of being 'liberated' by Shia fanatics.
The Kurds of northern Iraq are being built up as a major anti-IS military force, but even if they play a major role in defeating IS in Iraq, they will demand a reward for their services. For almost a quarter of a century the Kurds of northern Iraq have enjoyed de facto autonomy. If they defeat IS, they will probably expect international recognition as an independent nation. Just as victory over the Saudis increased Muhammad Ali's political and military power within the Ottoman empire, so victory over IS would be a boost for Kurdish nationhood, not only in Iraq but also among the Kurdish minorities in Syria and Turkey.
However, before the rewards of victory can be reaped, there must be victory. Somebody must crush IS. The much-trumpeted Kurdish/Iraqi spring offensive aimed at freeing Mosul from IS control seems to be underway, with Iraqi efforts to capture Tikrit as a first step. If it succeeds, it may well begin the collapse of IS power in the Middle East. If it fails, it will show that local fighters are incapable of overcoming IS. The USA and its allies will then be faced with the grim prospect of having to send large armies of their own back to the Middle East if they wish to be certain of achieving the downfall of IS.
Friday, May 17, 2013
The Saints of Otranto: A Papal Provocation?
In 2006 Pope Benedict XVI provoked an international furore by using in his Regensburg speech the words of a medieval Byzantine emperor which condemned both the Prophet Muhammad and the Islamic religion. Vatican authorities were quick to deny any anti-Islamic intent, but many of the world's Muslims took a different view.
This month Pope Francis, Benedict's successor, has awarded sainthood to 800 Catholic Christians said to have been massacred at Otranto, Italy, in 1480 by invading Muslim troops of the Ottoman Turkish sultan. The martyrs were put to death for refusing to convert to Islam. As in 2006, the Vatican has claimed this papal action is not anti-Islamic, but will it be seen that way in the Muslim world?
Although it is Pope Francis who has completed the canonization process, the decision to fast track the Otranto martyrs to sainthood was taken by Pope Benedict XVI. In July 2007 he issued a decree recognizing that the martyrs were killed 'out of hatred for their faith', and by late 2012 the last formalities had been completed. In February 2013, at the same time as he announced his own retirement, Benedict announced that the Otranto martyrs would become saints.
The Ottoman Turkish sultan Mehmed II had captured the city of Constantinople (now Istanbul), the 'second Rome', in 1453 and put an end to the Byzantine empire. The conqueror added the name of Caesar to his already long list of titles. However, he was well aware that he could not truly claim to be the inheritor of the legacy of the ancient Roman empire until he captured Rome itself. However, many distractions delayed Mehmed's plan to invade Italy and drive the pope out of Rome. Only in 1480 did he begin serious preparations for an invasion.
As a first step in this operation, the Ottoman ruler ordered his forces to seize the Italian port of Otranto, which was not far across the Adriatic Sea from Ottoman-held Albania. The city fell to the Muslim invaders in August 1480. Many of the Christian inhabitants were killed or enslaved, with 800 said to have been offered their lives if they converted to Islam. They refused and were executed. Leaving a garrison in the captured port, most of the Ottoman forces returned to Albania, but with the intention of returning in the following year to begin the march on Rome.
The Ottoman capture of Otranto spread panic throughout Italy. Plans were made for Pope Sixtus IV to flee from Rome, but instead he called for a crusade against the infidel invaders. In 1481 a Christian crusader army, largely made up of soldiers from the kingdom of Naples and a foreign contingent from the kingdom of Hungary, marched to recapture Otranto. The crusaders laid siege to the port in May 1481, and in the same month Sultan Mehmed II died. This latter event prevented Ottoman reinforcements being sent to Otranto, and the port was soon recaptured by the Christian forces, with most of the Muslim garrison escaping to Albania. The Ottoman threat to Rome had been removed.
Quite why Pope Benedict chose to remember this otherwise forgotten event in the centuries-old struggle between Christianity and Islam is not clear. How the canonization of the Otranto martyrs will be received in the Muslim world is also unknown, despite all the Vatican claims that it is not an anti-Islamic gesture. When Pope Benedict made his Regensburg speech in 2006 the hostility between the West and the Islamic world was intense. Today, Western forces have left Iraq; they will be leaving Afghanistan next year; Osama bin Laden is dead; and Al Qaeda is now just a shadow of its former self. Tensions have eased, so perhaps Muslims will merely ignore the papal action rather than be offended.
Nevertheless, how would Westerners feel if Muslims took to lavish celebration of their martyrs for the faith? Should Tunisians commemorate the thousands of Muslims slaughtered when Christian emperor Charles V conquered Tunis in 1535? Of course they could declare that there was no anti-Christian intent in their celebration, but would they be believed? Catholics do not have a monopoly in remembering martyrs, and they should think carefully about the possible contemporary impact of their actions.
This month Pope Francis, Benedict's successor, has awarded sainthood to 800 Catholic Christians said to have been massacred at Otranto, Italy, in 1480 by invading Muslim troops of the Ottoman Turkish sultan. The martyrs were put to death for refusing to convert to Islam. As in 2006, the Vatican has claimed this papal action is not anti-Islamic, but will it be seen that way in the Muslim world?
Although it is Pope Francis who has completed the canonization process, the decision to fast track the Otranto martyrs to sainthood was taken by Pope Benedict XVI. In July 2007 he issued a decree recognizing that the martyrs were killed 'out of hatred for their faith', and by late 2012 the last formalities had been completed. In February 2013, at the same time as he announced his own retirement, Benedict announced that the Otranto martyrs would become saints.
The Ottoman Turkish sultan Mehmed II had captured the city of Constantinople (now Istanbul), the 'second Rome', in 1453 and put an end to the Byzantine empire. The conqueror added the name of Caesar to his already long list of titles. However, he was well aware that he could not truly claim to be the inheritor of the legacy of the ancient Roman empire until he captured Rome itself. However, many distractions delayed Mehmed's plan to invade Italy and drive the pope out of Rome. Only in 1480 did he begin serious preparations for an invasion.
As a first step in this operation, the Ottoman ruler ordered his forces to seize the Italian port of Otranto, which was not far across the Adriatic Sea from Ottoman-held Albania. The city fell to the Muslim invaders in August 1480. Many of the Christian inhabitants were killed or enslaved, with 800 said to have been offered their lives if they converted to Islam. They refused and were executed. Leaving a garrison in the captured port, most of the Ottoman forces returned to Albania, but with the intention of returning in the following year to begin the march on Rome.
The Ottoman capture of Otranto spread panic throughout Italy. Plans were made for Pope Sixtus IV to flee from Rome, but instead he called for a crusade against the infidel invaders. In 1481 a Christian crusader army, largely made up of soldiers from the kingdom of Naples and a foreign contingent from the kingdom of Hungary, marched to recapture Otranto. The crusaders laid siege to the port in May 1481, and in the same month Sultan Mehmed II died. This latter event prevented Ottoman reinforcements being sent to Otranto, and the port was soon recaptured by the Christian forces, with most of the Muslim garrison escaping to Albania. The Ottoman threat to Rome had been removed.
Quite why Pope Benedict chose to remember this otherwise forgotten event in the centuries-old struggle between Christianity and Islam is not clear. How the canonization of the Otranto martyrs will be received in the Muslim world is also unknown, despite all the Vatican claims that it is not an anti-Islamic gesture. When Pope Benedict made his Regensburg speech in 2006 the hostility between the West and the Islamic world was intense. Today, Western forces have left Iraq; they will be leaving Afghanistan next year; Osama bin Laden is dead; and Al Qaeda is now just a shadow of its former self. Tensions have eased, so perhaps Muslims will merely ignore the papal action rather than be offended.
Nevertheless, how would Westerners feel if Muslims took to lavish celebration of their martyrs for the faith? Should Tunisians commemorate the thousands of Muslims slaughtered when Christian emperor Charles V conquered Tunis in 1535? Of course they could declare that there was no anti-Christian intent in their celebration, but would they be believed? Catholics do not have a monopoly in remembering martyrs, and they should think carefully about the possible contemporary impact of their actions.
Sunday, October 21, 2012
A New NATO War in Syria?
After raising international tensions to new heights, it now seems that Israel and the United States are going to postpone a direct attack upon Iran until next year, aiming to get elections in both countries out of the way and to give sanctions against Iran a last chance to work. However, the proxy war against Iran in strife-torn Syria seems likely to be intensified once the US presidential elections are over in early November.
Both US presidential candidates have made it clear that some action must be taken soon about the civil war in Syria. The warlike Mitt Romney, should he win the election, has virtually promised an American invasion of Syria. However, he would not formally take up office until early next year, so he could not exercise his powers as American commander-in-chief until then.
A re-elected President Obama could act much sooner. He would no doubt like to repeat America's arms-length role in securing victory for the anti-Gaddafi insurgents in Libya in 2011. This would mean imposing an air and sea blockade and deploying special forces to assist the local rebels. This strategy worked against the friendless Gaddafi regime in Libya, but it seems less likely to bring a swift and cheap victory over President Assad in Syria, given his close support from Iran.
The United States would obviously like its NATO ally Turkey to carry out any direct military intervention in Syria if that is required. However, the Turkish government has clearly stated that it will only authorize a military invasion if it receives open and substantial assistance from those NATO states which have talked most loudly in favour of outside intervention in Syria, namely the United States, Britain, and France (the former colonial power in Syria).
Turkey has already lost one warplane to Syria's air defences. It will expect support from other NATO air forces and particularly that of the United States. Whether by accident or design, Britain, France, and the United States will all have amphibious task forces in the eastern Mediterranean in the next month or so. Will this be an opportunity for British, French and American marines to storm ashore on Syria's Mediterranean coastline?
If this is the NATO plan, it seems extremely foolish. One of the areas of strongest support for President Assad's regime is along Syria's Mediterranean coastline, where so many of his fellow Alawites live. Even with the distraction of a Turkish land invasion to the north, Syrian government forces may well be able to put up considerable resistance to a NATO amphibious assault.
Another problem with Syria's Mediterranean coast is that it is home to Russia's only overseas military base - the naval facility at the port of Tartus. So far Russia has given much support to President Assad's regime, albeit mostly in the dipolmatic sphere. Would Russia move to direct military aid if NATO threatened to invade Syria? This seems unlikely. Despite Russia's supposed military revival during the Putin years, it remains incapable of any serious overseas power projection. In 1999 the Russians let down their Serb friends when they were the victims of NATO air attacks; in 2012 it seems unlikely the Russians will do anything very different if a NATO assault is launched against Assad's forces in Syria.
If Russia remains powerless in the Syrian crisis, what will Israel do? Although the Israelis almost reached Damascus in both the wars of 1967 and 1973, it seems unlikely that they will mount a direct invasion of Syria at the moment. Nevertheless an Israeli military build-up in the occupied Golan Heights would no doubt be useful to distract President Assad's forces while NATO operations took place on Syria's northern borders. Already the Syrian civil war is spreading into neighbouring Lebanon, and that is one area where Israel might be ready to intervene. It will hope to crush Hezbollah, friends of both Assad and Iran, more effectively than it did when it attacked Lebanon in 2006.
One would have thought that after more than a decade of ineffectual but costly combat in Afghanistan, NATO countries would have grown tired of launching wars in Islamic states. Apparently not. No doubt encouraged by the supposed NATO victory in Libya in 2011, the alliance seems ready to plunge into a new conflict in Syria without having the slightest idea where it will lead. NATO countries are said to be democracies, but neither Turkey, Britain, France nor the United States have any mandate from their electorates to initiate a new war in the Muslim world.
Both US presidential candidates have made it clear that some action must be taken soon about the civil war in Syria. The warlike Mitt Romney, should he win the election, has virtually promised an American invasion of Syria. However, he would not formally take up office until early next year, so he could not exercise his powers as American commander-in-chief until then.
A re-elected President Obama could act much sooner. He would no doubt like to repeat America's arms-length role in securing victory for the anti-Gaddafi insurgents in Libya in 2011. This would mean imposing an air and sea blockade and deploying special forces to assist the local rebels. This strategy worked against the friendless Gaddafi regime in Libya, but it seems less likely to bring a swift and cheap victory over President Assad in Syria, given his close support from Iran.
The United States would obviously like its NATO ally Turkey to carry out any direct military intervention in Syria if that is required. However, the Turkish government has clearly stated that it will only authorize a military invasion if it receives open and substantial assistance from those NATO states which have talked most loudly in favour of outside intervention in Syria, namely the United States, Britain, and France (the former colonial power in Syria).
Turkey has already lost one warplane to Syria's air defences. It will expect support from other NATO air forces and particularly that of the United States. Whether by accident or design, Britain, France, and the United States will all have amphibious task forces in the eastern Mediterranean in the next month or so. Will this be an opportunity for British, French and American marines to storm ashore on Syria's Mediterranean coastline?
If this is the NATO plan, it seems extremely foolish. One of the areas of strongest support for President Assad's regime is along Syria's Mediterranean coastline, where so many of his fellow Alawites live. Even with the distraction of a Turkish land invasion to the north, Syrian government forces may well be able to put up considerable resistance to a NATO amphibious assault.
Another problem with Syria's Mediterranean coast is that it is home to Russia's only overseas military base - the naval facility at the port of Tartus. So far Russia has given much support to President Assad's regime, albeit mostly in the dipolmatic sphere. Would Russia move to direct military aid if NATO threatened to invade Syria? This seems unlikely. Despite Russia's supposed military revival during the Putin years, it remains incapable of any serious overseas power projection. In 1999 the Russians let down their Serb friends when they were the victims of NATO air attacks; in 2012 it seems unlikely the Russians will do anything very different if a NATO assault is launched against Assad's forces in Syria.
If Russia remains powerless in the Syrian crisis, what will Israel do? Although the Israelis almost reached Damascus in both the wars of 1967 and 1973, it seems unlikely that they will mount a direct invasion of Syria at the moment. Nevertheless an Israeli military build-up in the occupied Golan Heights would no doubt be useful to distract President Assad's forces while NATO operations took place on Syria's northern borders. Already the Syrian civil war is spreading into neighbouring Lebanon, and that is one area where Israel might be ready to intervene. It will hope to crush Hezbollah, friends of both Assad and Iran, more effectively than it did when it attacked Lebanon in 2006.
One would have thought that after more than a decade of ineffectual but costly combat in Afghanistan, NATO countries would have grown tired of launching wars in Islamic states. Apparently not. No doubt encouraged by the supposed NATO victory in Libya in 2011, the alliance seems ready to plunge into a new conflict in Syria without having the slightest idea where it will lead. NATO countries are said to be democracies, but neither Turkey, Britain, France nor the United States have any mandate from their electorates to initiate a new war in the Muslim world.
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
Existential Threats and Wars of Choice
The article is entitled 'Bombs Away: A Suitable Case for Pre-Emption?'. It warns of the threat posed by Iran's supposed programme to develop nuclear weapons. It notes that the Israeli prime minister has said that his country cannot live with a nuclear-armed Iran. The article declares that if sanctions are not successful in curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions, then Israel (inevitably supported by the USA) has plans to launch a pre-emptive military attack against Iranian nuclear sites. Faced with a dire threat to its very existence, the state of Israel reserves the right to strike first.
Given its content, a casual reader might think this article appeared in the media today, or yesterday, or maybe last week. In fact it was published in 'The Economist' magazine in July 2007, more than five years ago. One would have thought that if Iran was an existential threat to Israel in 2007 the latter country would have taken some action by now to remove the threat, instead of endlessly postponing its attack from year to year.
The fact is that Israeli governments are rightly worried about starting a new war in the Middle East whose final outcome nobody can definitely predict. In the end Israel can probably co-exist with a nuclear-armed Iran, just as the USA learned to live with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. After all, Israelis and Iranians have one thing in common: both groups dislike the Arabs. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab monarchies in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) have played as great a role as Israel and the USA in bringing about the present situation where an attack on Iran seems increasingly likely. Indeed Saudi Arabia has now replaced Egypt as Israel's principal de facto Muslim ally, whatever the denials from Riyadh.
Thus the forces assembling to assault Iran are not doing so because of some existential threat posed by that country, but are engaged in an exercise in great power aggression, a war of choice. The three principal actors - Israel, the USA, and Saudi Arabia - believe that curbing Iran's power will benefit their interests. Israel wants to preserve its monopoly of nuclear weapons in the Middle East; America wants vengeance on the only non-nuclear armed state which has persistently defied its hegemonic power since 1979; and Saudi Arabia desperately wants to preserve its self-declared leadership of the Muslim world in the face of Iranian challenges. Will these three powers succeed in their aims?
If past precedent is anything to go by, they may be successful, at least in the short run. The traditional script for an Israeli or American attack on a Muslim country in the Middle East goes as follows. Israel/USA is said to be provoked beyond endurance by the state and threatens military action. The target Muslim state blusters and makes wild threats of the destruction it can reap on the attackers, a refrain taken up by its various supporters around the world, who forecast nothing less than world chaos if the country is attacked. Israel/USA launches a military assault on the country; it is quickly defeated; and the world does not collapse into chaos. Any wider effects of the conflict (higher oil prices, etc.) are only short-lived. The regime of the country may or may not be overthrown as a consequence of its defeat, but it will certainly be reluctant to face such a military onslaught again, no matter how much its people may resent their humiliation.
Only if Israel or the USA unwisely turns military victory into the occupation of Muslim territory does their success all too quickly turn to prolonged, expensive and bloody asymmetric warfare. Israel learned this in the Arab lands seized in 1967 and in Lebanon after 1982; the USA has had similar experiences in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq from 2003. Governments are easy to curb or overthrow, but popular resistance is much more difficult to suppress.
Despite Iran's dogged performance in its war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, when it eventually ended up fighting an Iraq supported not just by the rest of the Arab world but also by the USA and other Western states, such prolonged revolutionary resistance is unlikely in a future conflict. More likely a new war with Iran will follow the scenario noted above. Israel and the USA (now with the added assistance of a Muslim power, Saudi Arabia) will find continued Iranian intransigence a provocation and will threaten military action. The Iranians will bluster and threaten the destruction of anybody who attacks them, while worldwide 'liberal' opinion will prophesy the end of civilisation if war comes to the Middle East. Iran will be attacked and its armed forces swiftly crushed (so that oil prices do not soar to great heights for too long). The chastened ayatollahs will have to admit defeat, but most Iranians will never forget this unholy onslaught by Christians, Jews and (Sunni) Muslims, and sooner or later Iran will return to the pursuit of the nuclear option as the only way to guarantee national independence.
Of course the past is merely a possible guide to the future. Nothing is inevitable. If, unlike Nasser's Egypt in 1967 or Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003, Iran can survive the initial attack and preserve the means to retaliate, then it may be able to sustain a prolonged war against its principal adversaries, certainly longer than the one month war recently forecast by an Israeli government minister. The longer the war goes on, the more likely its effects will further damage an already weak world economy.
Given its content, a casual reader might think this article appeared in the media today, or yesterday, or maybe last week. In fact it was published in 'The Economist' magazine in July 2007, more than five years ago. One would have thought that if Iran was an existential threat to Israel in 2007 the latter country would have taken some action by now to remove the threat, instead of endlessly postponing its attack from year to year.
The fact is that Israeli governments are rightly worried about starting a new war in the Middle East whose final outcome nobody can definitely predict. In the end Israel can probably co-exist with a nuclear-armed Iran, just as the USA learned to live with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. After all, Israelis and Iranians have one thing in common: both groups dislike the Arabs. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab monarchies in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) have played as great a role as Israel and the USA in bringing about the present situation where an attack on Iran seems increasingly likely. Indeed Saudi Arabia has now replaced Egypt as Israel's principal de facto Muslim ally, whatever the denials from Riyadh.
Thus the forces assembling to assault Iran are not doing so because of some existential threat posed by that country, but are engaged in an exercise in great power aggression, a war of choice. The three principal actors - Israel, the USA, and Saudi Arabia - believe that curbing Iran's power will benefit their interests. Israel wants to preserve its monopoly of nuclear weapons in the Middle East; America wants vengeance on the only non-nuclear armed state which has persistently defied its hegemonic power since 1979; and Saudi Arabia desperately wants to preserve its self-declared leadership of the Muslim world in the face of Iranian challenges. Will these three powers succeed in their aims?
If past precedent is anything to go by, they may be successful, at least in the short run. The traditional script for an Israeli or American attack on a Muslim country in the Middle East goes as follows. Israel/USA is said to be provoked beyond endurance by the state and threatens military action. The target Muslim state blusters and makes wild threats of the destruction it can reap on the attackers, a refrain taken up by its various supporters around the world, who forecast nothing less than world chaos if the country is attacked. Israel/USA launches a military assault on the country; it is quickly defeated; and the world does not collapse into chaos. Any wider effects of the conflict (higher oil prices, etc.) are only short-lived. The regime of the country may or may not be overthrown as a consequence of its defeat, but it will certainly be reluctant to face such a military onslaught again, no matter how much its people may resent their humiliation.
Only if Israel or the USA unwisely turns military victory into the occupation of Muslim territory does their success all too quickly turn to prolonged, expensive and bloody asymmetric warfare. Israel learned this in the Arab lands seized in 1967 and in Lebanon after 1982; the USA has had similar experiences in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq from 2003. Governments are easy to curb or overthrow, but popular resistance is much more difficult to suppress.
Despite Iran's dogged performance in its war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, when it eventually ended up fighting an Iraq supported not just by the rest of the Arab world but also by the USA and other Western states, such prolonged revolutionary resistance is unlikely in a future conflict. More likely a new war with Iran will follow the scenario noted above. Israel and the USA (now with the added assistance of a Muslim power, Saudi Arabia) will find continued Iranian intransigence a provocation and will threaten military action. The Iranians will bluster and threaten the destruction of anybody who attacks them, while worldwide 'liberal' opinion will prophesy the end of civilisation if war comes to the Middle East. Iran will be attacked and its armed forces swiftly crushed (so that oil prices do not soar to great heights for too long). The chastened ayatollahs will have to admit defeat, but most Iranians will never forget this unholy onslaught by Christians, Jews and (Sunni) Muslims, and sooner or later Iran will return to the pursuit of the nuclear option as the only way to guarantee national independence.
Of course the past is merely a possible guide to the future. Nothing is inevitable. If, unlike Nasser's Egypt in 1967 or Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003, Iran can survive the initial attack and preserve the means to retaliate, then it may be able to sustain a prolonged war against its principal adversaries, certainly longer than the one month war recently forecast by an Israeli government minister. The longer the war goes on, the more likely its effects will further damage an already weak world economy.
Wednesday, August 8, 2012
After Assad: Kurdish Autonomy in Syria?
It is often stated that the Kurds are the largest national group in the world without their own country. Around thirty million Kurds are spread, across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, with the largest group (some eleven million) in the latter country.
After the 1991 Gulf war, the Kurds of northern Iraq who had revolted against Saddam Hussein were protected from his vengeance by American and British air power. Thanks to Western protection, these Kurds were able to develop a virtually autonomous region within Iraq.
Once Saddam Hussein had been overthrown in 2003, it was hoped that Iraqi Kurdistan would be fully integrated into the new, democratic Iraq. This has not happened. Although nominally part of the wider state, the Kurdish administration in Arbil takes relatively little notice of the Iraqi national government in Baghdad. Not only that, but the PKK, the Kurdish militants fighting in Turkey, have found refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, only occasionally being disturbed by cross-border Turkish military attacks.
Now the Kurdish community in Syria, who mostly live in the north-east of the country, have taken advantage of the ongoing civil war to make a claim for autonomy for themselves. President Assad has withdrawn troops from their area to reinforce his assaults on rebel forces in Damascus and Aleppo. The Syrian Kurds, encouraged by their neighbours in Iraqi Kurdistan, have taken control of a number of towns and deployed their own militia. They claim not to be seeking independence but merely the same degree of local autonomy within Syria as Iraqi Kurds have achieved within that country.
This claim will not only be troubling to whatever government next takes power in Damascus, assuming the long promised downfall of President Assad finally takes place, but it will also be a provocative challenge to the government of Turkey.
Almost continuously since the creation of the Turkish republic in 1923, the rulers in Ankara have been in conflict, sometimes amounting to open war, with the Kurdish population which dominates the south-east of that country. The Turks have always refused to concede any degree of autonomy to their large Kurdish minority. The creation of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan on Turkey's southern border was provocation enough. For it to be joined by an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan would be an even greater challenge. If Kurds can achieve autonomy in Iraq and Syria, why not in Turkey as well?
Already the Turkish government has said that if the PKK militant group sets up bases in Syrian Kurdistan it will launch military attacks against such terrorists. So far there seems no prospect of this happening and Syrian Kurdish groups have been at pains to make clear they pose no threat to Turkey. Certainly the recent upsurge of PKK attacks in south-east Turkey does not seem to have any links to Syria.
In any case, a Turkish military invasion of Syria, whether to overthrow President Assad or to stifle the growth of Kurdish autonomy in that country, seems unlikely at present. On the one hand the Islamist government of Turkish prime minister Erdogan has strained relations with the largely secularist Turkish armed forces. On the other hand all Arabs (and Kurds) are likely to resent a Turkish incursion into their territory since this would seem too much like a revival of the old Ottoman Turkish empire which ruled that region before 1918.
Even if one assumes that President Assad will soon be ousted from power in Damascus, the new Syria which follows is likely to be a politically confused place. Whether this confusion is considerable, as in post-Gadaffi Libya, or more controlled, as in post-Mubarak Egypt, the Kurdish population of Syria seems likely to exploit the situation to claim some sort of autonomy for themselves. What sort of reaction this will provoke in Damascus is unclear, but it is already obvious that Turkey will view the establishment of yet another autonomous Kurdish region along its southern border with considerable concern.
After the 1991 Gulf war, the Kurds of northern Iraq who had revolted against Saddam Hussein were protected from his vengeance by American and British air power. Thanks to Western protection, these Kurds were able to develop a virtually autonomous region within Iraq.
Once Saddam Hussein had been overthrown in 2003, it was hoped that Iraqi Kurdistan would be fully integrated into the new, democratic Iraq. This has not happened. Although nominally part of the wider state, the Kurdish administration in Arbil takes relatively little notice of the Iraqi national government in Baghdad. Not only that, but the PKK, the Kurdish militants fighting in Turkey, have found refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, only occasionally being disturbed by cross-border Turkish military attacks.
Now the Kurdish community in Syria, who mostly live in the north-east of the country, have taken advantage of the ongoing civil war to make a claim for autonomy for themselves. President Assad has withdrawn troops from their area to reinforce his assaults on rebel forces in Damascus and Aleppo. The Syrian Kurds, encouraged by their neighbours in Iraqi Kurdistan, have taken control of a number of towns and deployed their own militia. They claim not to be seeking independence but merely the same degree of local autonomy within Syria as Iraqi Kurds have achieved within that country.
This claim will not only be troubling to whatever government next takes power in Damascus, assuming the long promised downfall of President Assad finally takes place, but it will also be a provocative challenge to the government of Turkey.
Almost continuously since the creation of the Turkish republic in 1923, the rulers in Ankara have been in conflict, sometimes amounting to open war, with the Kurdish population which dominates the south-east of that country. The Turks have always refused to concede any degree of autonomy to their large Kurdish minority. The creation of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan on Turkey's southern border was provocation enough. For it to be joined by an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan would be an even greater challenge. If Kurds can achieve autonomy in Iraq and Syria, why not in Turkey as well?
Already the Turkish government has said that if the PKK militant group sets up bases in Syrian Kurdistan it will launch military attacks against such terrorists. So far there seems no prospect of this happening and Syrian Kurdish groups have been at pains to make clear they pose no threat to Turkey. Certainly the recent upsurge of PKK attacks in south-east Turkey does not seem to have any links to Syria.
In any case, a Turkish military invasion of Syria, whether to overthrow President Assad or to stifle the growth of Kurdish autonomy in that country, seems unlikely at present. On the one hand the Islamist government of Turkish prime minister Erdogan has strained relations with the largely secularist Turkish armed forces. On the other hand all Arabs (and Kurds) are likely to resent a Turkish incursion into their territory since this would seem too much like a revival of the old Ottoman Turkish empire which ruled that region before 1918.
Even if one assumes that President Assad will soon be ousted from power in Damascus, the new Syria which follows is likely to be a politically confused place. Whether this confusion is considerable, as in post-Gadaffi Libya, or more controlled, as in post-Mubarak Egypt, the Kurdish population of Syria seems likely to exploit the situation to claim some sort of autonomy for themselves. What sort of reaction this will provoke in Damascus is unclear, but it is already obvious that Turkey will view the establishment of yet another autonomous Kurdish region along its southern border with considerable concern.
Sunday, July 1, 2012
Somali Piracy: The Beginning of the End?
It took the naval powers of Christian Europe three hundred years to defeat the Barbary corsairs of North Africa, with the new United States of America taking a leading role in the final victory in the early nineteenth century. Today's Muslim sea raiders from Africa, the Somali pirates, seem to have been beaten in a much shorter time, barely twelve months. From being a scourge of the sea routes in the Indian Ocean during the first half of 2011, they have now been reduced, it seems, to just a minor nuisance.
When the tempo of pirate attacks first began to decline in the summer of 2011, this was blamed on the monsoon season in the Indian Ocean. The seas were simply too rough for the pirates to take their small craft out hunting for prizes. When the monsoon ended and pirate attacks remained at a reduced level, a new explanation was put forward. The pirates had so many captured ships in their ports that priority was being given to ransom negotiations. Once the stock of prizes had been reduced, the pirates would put to sea once more. Ransoms were paid and ships released, but by the end of 2011 the number of pirate attacks had still not greatly increased.
By the spring of 2012 it seemed that there had been a definite and apparently lasting reduction in the level of Somali pirate activity, and their opponents were quick to take credit for this change. Commanders of the NATO, EU, and other international naval forces on patrol off Somalia claimed that their activities had restricted pirate operations. Similarly, ship owners said that the spread of anti-piracy measures on merchant ships, including the provision of armed guards, had made it much more difficult for the pirates to get on board their intended prey.
In the first half of 2012 five merchant ships have been captured by the Somali pirates, compared with sixteen in the first half of 2011. Nevertheless this much smaller number of prizes did include one major catch - the new Greek-owned tanker 'Smyrni', loaded with 135,000 tons of crude oil, which was captured on 10 May off the coast of Oman. Judging by past experience, the ship and its cargo will only be freed for a ransom of a least US $10 million. After months of little success, this one ship will bring substantial wealth to at least one group of Somali pirates.
It is generally accepted that whatever measures are taken against the Somali pirates at sea, their final defeat can only be assured when law and order are restored on land within Somalia. After years of turmoil, even this now seems within the realms of possibility. The government of the Puntland region of Somalia has recently taken military action against some pirate groups based in its territory. Meanwhile the most destabilising force in Somalia, the Islamist militants of al-Shabaab, are said to be facing final defeat by African Union forces in the south of the country. With order being restored ashore and maritime counter-measures apparently becoming more effective at sea, it might seem that Somali piracy is doomed. However, as some commentators have noted, the Somali pirates have been contained rather than defeated. If the international naval effort is reduced, Somali piracy may quickly stage a revival.
On several occasions in past centuries, European naval powers felt they had defeated the Barbary corsairs. However, when they had to withdraw their fleets to fight new wars elsewhere, the Barbary corsairs soon renewed their attacks on Christian shipping. Given the present increasingly tense political situation in the Middle East, particularly with regard to Syria and Iran, there is always the possibility that new conflicts in that region will lead to a reduction in naval patrols off Somalia and a revival of piracy there. At present we can only be cautiously hopeful that the Somali pirate menace has been beaten.
When the tempo of pirate attacks first began to decline in the summer of 2011, this was blamed on the monsoon season in the Indian Ocean. The seas were simply too rough for the pirates to take their small craft out hunting for prizes. When the monsoon ended and pirate attacks remained at a reduced level, a new explanation was put forward. The pirates had so many captured ships in their ports that priority was being given to ransom negotiations. Once the stock of prizes had been reduced, the pirates would put to sea once more. Ransoms were paid and ships released, but by the end of 2011 the number of pirate attacks had still not greatly increased.
By the spring of 2012 it seemed that there had been a definite and apparently lasting reduction in the level of Somali pirate activity, and their opponents were quick to take credit for this change. Commanders of the NATO, EU, and other international naval forces on patrol off Somalia claimed that their activities had restricted pirate operations. Similarly, ship owners said that the spread of anti-piracy measures on merchant ships, including the provision of armed guards, had made it much more difficult for the pirates to get on board their intended prey.
In the first half of 2012 five merchant ships have been captured by the Somali pirates, compared with sixteen in the first half of 2011. Nevertheless this much smaller number of prizes did include one major catch - the new Greek-owned tanker 'Smyrni', loaded with 135,000 tons of crude oil, which was captured on 10 May off the coast of Oman. Judging by past experience, the ship and its cargo will only be freed for a ransom of a least US $10 million. After months of little success, this one ship will bring substantial wealth to at least one group of Somali pirates.
It is generally accepted that whatever measures are taken against the Somali pirates at sea, their final defeat can only be assured when law and order are restored on land within Somalia. After years of turmoil, even this now seems within the realms of possibility. The government of the Puntland region of Somalia has recently taken military action against some pirate groups based in its territory. Meanwhile the most destabilising force in Somalia, the Islamist militants of al-Shabaab, are said to be facing final defeat by African Union forces in the south of the country. With order being restored ashore and maritime counter-measures apparently becoming more effective at sea, it might seem that Somali piracy is doomed. However, as some commentators have noted, the Somali pirates have been contained rather than defeated. If the international naval effort is reduced, Somali piracy may quickly stage a revival.
On several occasions in past centuries, European naval powers felt they had defeated the Barbary corsairs. However, when they had to withdraw their fleets to fight new wars elsewhere, the Barbary corsairs soon renewed their attacks on Christian shipping. Given the present increasingly tense political situation in the Middle East, particularly with regard to Syria and Iran, there is always the possibility that new conflicts in that region will lead to a reduction in naval patrols off Somalia and a revival of piracy there. At present we can only be cautiously hopeful that the Somali pirate menace has been beaten.
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