One of the few things Turkey's moderate Islamist government of the Justice and Development (AK) party has in common with the secularist high command of the country's armed forces is a declared wish to take strong action against the terrorists of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The nationalist current is running strongly in Turkey and public hostlity to perceived enemies such as the Kurds and their American backers is both intense and widespread. The Turkish parliament passed a resolution giving the AK government approval to take military action against PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan by a massive majority. However, is this Turkish nationalist front really so monolithic?
One reason the PKK is desperate to provoke reckless Turkish military action that will rally all Kurds behind them is because their party is losing ground in the predominantly Kurdish areas of south-east Turkey. The AK government has made a significant effort to win over Kurdish opinion in that region by favourable treatment. This is not just a cynical exercise to win support in the European Union, which the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan is keen for Turkey to join. Erdogan wants to win over the Kurds with kindness, but the Turkish military has put him on the spot and forced him to take up a hard-line nationalist position.
Turkey's military high command tried to use scare tactics to discourage the electorate from returning the AK government to power in the July general election. They claimed there was an Islamist plot to overthrow Turkey's secular republic, but the electors were unimpressed, Erdogan returned to power, and an AK party candidate was appointed president. The military has now played the nationalist card, claiming the AK government is failing to stand up to the PKK terrorists. Reluctantly Erdogan has been forced to support the idea of a Turkish military incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan to destroy PKK bases.
Yet is the Turkish miltary high command itself really that enthusiastic about such an invasion? Past incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan, such as those of 1992 and 1997, undoubtedly did much damage to the PKK, but they could inflict no lasting defeat upon the insurgents. Those past Turkish incursions actually enjoyed the support of some Iraqi Kurd factions who were hostile to the PKK, but it seems unlikely that Kurdish ranks will be split this time. This will worry the Turkish generals as the last thing they want is to become bogged down in a prolonged guerrilla war, especially as this would restrict their chances of launching a coup against the AK government should its current revision of the Turkish constitution prove a clear threat to the secular state.
Thus both Turkish politicians and generals have reservations about an invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan, but the less bellicose alternative of economic sanctions against the Iraqi Kurds also presents problems. Most trade to and from Iraqi Kurdistan goes through Turkey, so an economic blockade would be a major blow. However, Turkish business interests have played a major part in the economic development of Iraqi Kurdistan and any such blockade would hit them as well. The Ankara government may refuse to recognise the semi-independent Kurdistan Regional Government, but on the ground Turkish companies have been happy to do business with the Iraqi Kurds. A short-lived military incursion would do less damage to such business links than a prolonged economic blockade. In any case, whatever the economic considerations, Erdogan and the generals seem to have painted themselves into a corner. Trapped by their nationalist rhetoric, they have increasingly left themselves with only one option: a military invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Such an invasion will put the USA in a very difficult position. The Kurds are the principal American ally within Iraq, but Turkey is America's most important military ally in the Middle East, after Israel. If armed conflict breaks out between the two sides, who will the USA support? To alienate the Kurds is to inject even more chaos into Iraq; to anger the Turks is to risk losing a vital ally at a time when a final showdown between the USA and Iran seems to be approaching. The Iranians would be delighted to join the Turks in action against the Iraqi Kurds and to seek to draw them away from the Americans.
Unless at the last minute the Iraqi Kurds decide to curb the PKK themselves, Turkish politicians and generals have taken such entrenched positions that they must launch some sort of military incursion in the near future. It will no doubt be a limited operation and the USA will seek to ignore it, restricting any criticism to diplomatic protests. Indeed Turkish action against PKK 'terrorist bases' in Iraq may provide a useful precedent for the Americans, who have long been promising to take action against 'terrorist bases' in Iran. Unfortunately while Turkish attacks on Iraqi Kurds are only likely to produce a short-lived crisis, American attacks on the Iranians will produce a conflict which may engulf the whole Middle East.
