Islamic State: Who Will Crush the Extremists?

Extremist Sunni Muslim movements are nothing new in the history of the Middle East. Today we have the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL) in Syria and Iraq. Two hundred years ago it was the first Saudi state, bursting out of the Arabian desert to raid Iraq and the Hijaz.

Both movements share a religious ideology which is intolerant of Jews, Christians, and Shia Muslims; indeed any Muslims who are not obedient to their fundamentalist creed. Although the Saudis raided Iraq as early as 1802, destroying the Shia shrine at Karbala and killing thousands of the city's Shia inhabitants, they came to world notice in 1806 by taking control of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Similarly, although IS has its origins in the Syrian civil war, it came to world attention in June 2014 by seizing control of Mosul, Iraq's second biggest city.

Such challenges to the established order in the Middle East could not go unanswered. Who was willing and able to crush the extremists?

In 1806 Mecca and Medina were part of the Ottoman empire, but the Ottoman sultan did not have adequate military forces of his own to expel the Saudi occupiers. He could not call on European assistance in what was a Muslim quarrel, and in any case the Europeans were too busy with their own affairs, namely the Napoleonic wars.

After the French occupation of 1798-1801, the Ottoman province of Egypt had remained in confusion for some years. Then an Albanian soldier, Muhammad Ali, had risen to power in Cairo and built up a strong local army. As he was nominally the vassal of the Ottoman sultan, he seemed the ideal candidate to deal with the Saudi menace.

From 1811 Muhammad Ali sent his sons to lead Egyptian forces against the Saudis in Arabia. The holy cities were recaptured by 1813, but Muhammad Ali was determined to continue the war until the Saudis were totally destroyed. Only in 1818 was the Saudi capital city captured and the three principal Saudi leaders sent to Istanbul, where the Ottoman sultan had them publicly executed.

The Ottoman sultan had been vindicated and the extremists crushed, but victory came with a price. The sultan had to overlook the increasing autonomy of his Egyptian vassal, with his growing army and navy. By the early 1830s it was Muhammad Ali who was threatening to overthrow the sultan, and it was only the intervention of the European powers which forced the Egyptian ruler to curb his ambitions.

Today, after its recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USA is reluctant to intervene directly against IS. It would prefer the major Muslim regional powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to do the job, but they show no willingness to undertake the task. So the USA has fallen back on the old formula that seemed to work well in Afghanistan in 2001-2 and in northern Iraq in 2003. The USA and its allies will provide air power and assistance from special forces, while most of the boots on the ground will be provided by local fighters.

Against IS in Syria these fighters will be provided by the Syrian opponents of President Assad and by the Kurds; in Iraq by the Kurds and the Iraqi army. Unfortunately none of these local forces look particularly strong, and even if they are successful, the consequences of their victory over IS may not be what the USA desires, just as the Ottoman sultan found the price of Muhammad Ali's victory over the Saudis was not to his taste.

The Syrian opposition is dominated by jihadists, even if some of them are in conflict with IS. The current plan is for Turkey to train Western-approved 'moderate' jihadists to fight both Assad and IS in Syria, but whether this is really possible is still unclear. The Syrian Kurds won the first victory over IS at Kobani largely thanks to air strikes by the USA and its allies, but whether this success can be translated into a wider campaign against IS in Syria remains problematic.

In Iraq the Shia-dominated national army is being rebuilt after its poor performance against IS in 2014, with US and other Western military advisors playing an important role. However, the Iraqi Shia militias, trained by the Iranians, are judged to be more effective, but also more sectarian. Whatever their suffering at the hands of IS, the Sunni Muslim majority in the city of Mosul is unlikely to relish the prospect of being 'liberated' by Shia fanatics.

The Kurds of northern Iraq are being built up as a major anti-IS military force, but even if they play a major role in defeating IS in Iraq, they will demand a reward for their services. For almost a quarter of a century the Kurds of northern Iraq have enjoyed de facto autonomy. If they defeat IS, they will probably expect international recognition as an independent nation. Just as victory over the Saudis increased Muhammad Ali's political and military power within the Ottoman empire, so victory over IS would be a boost for Kurdish nationhood, not only in Iraq but also among the Kurdish minorities in Syria and Turkey.

However, before the rewards of victory can be reaped, there must be victory. Somebody must crush IS. The much-trumpeted Kurdish/Iraqi spring offensive aimed at freeing Mosul from IS control seems to be underway, with Iraqi efforts to capture Tikrit as a first step. If it succeeds, it may well begin the collapse of IS power in the Middle East. If it fails, it will show that local fighters are incapable of overcoming IS. The USA and its allies will then be faced with the grim prospect of having to send large armies of their own back to the Middle East if they wish to be certain of achieving the downfall of IS.