Afghanistan: More Troops, More Hostility

Long ago Britain's General Roberts, hero of the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-1880 observed: 'I feel sure I am right when I say the less the Afghans see of us, the less they dislike us.'



In our own day President Barack Obama seems to be taking the opposite view. More American and NATO troops are to be poured into Afghanistan in the belief that this will improve Afghan security and end Afghan popular support for the Taliban insurgents. Apparently the more Western troops the Afghans see, the more they will like the West.



This Afghan 'surge' in troop numbers is based on false analogies with the apparent success of the 'surge' in American forces in Iraq. The principal aim of the latter effort was to end the sectarian civil war that was tearing Iraq apart, and this was largely achieved. The conflict in Afghanistan is much more a struggle by the country's largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, to drive out foreign troops, who were once liberators, but are now seen as a Western army of occupation.



The main beneficiary of America's 'surge' in Iraq has been the country's prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki. With comparative peace restored, he could ask the Americans to leave. The agreement he achieved last year which promised that all American combat troops will be out of Iraq by mid-2011 has proved hugely popular with Iraqis. Maliki received his reward with the success of his party in the recent provincial elections in Iraq.

President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan has little hope of such popular acclaim at the moment. The army of 'foreign infidels' in his country is to be increased, not decreased. Yet even if all the additional reinforcements requested do appear in Afghanistan, America and her NATO allies will only have as many men as the Soviet Union had at its peak deployment during the failed attempt to subdue the Afghan insurgency during the 1980s.

Increased Western forces are said to be needed to increase security for the Afghan population, especially the Pashtuns living in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Afghans are to be 'protected' from the Taliban, as if the Taliban was some malevolent outside force distinct from local people. This is clearly a false picture. Most Taliban are drawn from the local people, whose concerns they can address much better than well-meaning Westerners who arrive surrounded by heavily-armed Western troops.

Even with reinforcements, American and NATO forces are not going to enjoy more than short-term success against the Taliban, if that. By 1984 the Soviets had beaten down Afghan resistance and several insurgent commanders had agreed truces with them. Nevertheless, then as now, as long as the Afghan insurgents had safe bases in Pakistan, they could survive to regroup and fight another day.

If American and NATO commanders want to go a step further and pacify the Pakistani borderlands, which Pakistan's own army has largely failed to do, then they will need reinforcements on a scale which would make the present 'surge' look small. Clearly that is not going to happen, so the insurgent safe havens in Pakistan are likely to continue to exist and as long as they do, resistance in Afghanistan will also survive any temporary setbacks.

President Obama has said the Afghan conflict can only be finally resolved by political means, yet almost the first act of his presidency has been to increase the American military presence in Afghanistan, thus apparently giving his support to the idea that a military victory is possible. Only when Obama's actions match his words can Afghans start to have faith in the new American president.

Real efforts must be made to start a political dialogue with the Taliban movement. If its main groups can be won over, then there is a definite chance of peace in Afghanistan. In addition, just as the Awakening movement in Iraq turned Sunni Arab insurgents against al Qaeda, the Taliban may be turned against al Qaeda once their political concerns are addressed.

One of the principal Taliban concerns is the need to remove foreign troops from Afghanistan. The sooner an outline timetable for the removal of American and NATO troops can be agreed, the sooner peace and stability can be restored to Afghanistan. One may alter General Roberts' observation to say that the less the Afghans see of Western troops, the more likely they are to negotiate a political solution to their problems.