Karak: Echoes of Past Conflict.
The recent terrorist attack in Jordan which killed ten people, including a Canadian tourist, took place at al-Karak, a city of much significance in past Christian-Muslim conflict. The principal tourist attraction is Karak (or Kerak) Castle, usually described as a Crusader fortress. In the twelfth century it was controlled by Reynald de Chatillon, a Christian warrior whose relentless attacks on Muslim lands would in 1187 lead to the capture of Christian-held Jerusalem by the great Muslim leader Saladin.
Reynald might be unknown to most people but for his portrayal by actor Brendan Gleeson in the 2005 movie Kingdom of Heaven. In the context of Christian-Muslim conflict in the Middle East in the medieval period he was a major figure. Originally from France, he came to the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem during the Second Crusade. After marrying the heiress to the neighbouring Principality of Antioch in 1153, he became its ruler. However, in 1160 Reynald was captured by the Muslim emir of Aleppo and he was a prisoner until ransomed in 1176.
Reynald's wife had died during his captivity and he could not return to Antioch. Instead he married the heiress of Oultrejourdain, the Christian territory to the south of the Dead Sea. Its principal stronghold was Karak Castle, where Reynald took up residence. The fortress held an important strategic position at what might be called the hinge of Saladin's emerging Egyptian-Syrian state. From Karak Reynald could attack the caravan route from Egypt to Syria and the route from Damascus to the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Reynald also gave support to the Kingdom of Jerusalem and in 1177 was one of the leaders of the Christian army that defeated Saladin at Montgisard.
Reynald later seized the port of Aqaba and in 1182 sent a raiding squadron into the Red Sea. He intended that the ships would prey on the pilgrim trade and then put men ashore to attack Mecca and Medina. Saladin sent forces to oppose the raiders, and their last remnant was captured and executed only a few miles from Medina. This was the closest the Christians ever came to attacking the two holiest cities of Islam, and their near success was a major embarrassment for Saladin.
Twice Saladin tried to capture Reynald's castle at Karak, but each time he failed. Finally, in 1187, during a time of Christian-Muslim truce, Reynald launched a treacherous attack on a caravan from Damascus that was passing his lands. Being now prepared for a final confrontation with the Christians, Saladin used this attack as an excuse to go to war. In July 1187 Saladin defeated the Christian army of King Guy of Jerusalem at the Horns of Hattin. Reynald was among those captured and Saladin had him executed. Jerusalem fell to Saladin in October, returning the city to Muslim control after nearly a century of Christian occupation. Karak Castle fell to the Muslims a year later.
Thus an apparently minor incident near Karak, the attack on a caravan, had culminated in momentous events for the Christians: defeat at Hattin and the loss of Jerusalem. No doubt the recent attackers at al-Karak hoped their actions would lead to larger consequences, but they are very unlikely to be as significant as those of 1187. No doubt Jordan's tourist industry will be damaged for a time, but it is unlikely that the pro-Western government of Jordan's King Abdullah will be undermined. There is no new Saladin waiting to attack Christian, or rather Western, interests in the Middle East.
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
How Jihadist States End: The Mahdists and ISIS
When the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was set up in the summer of 2014 it was the first jihadist political entity since the Mahdist state which controlled Sudan between 1885 and 1898.
The Mahdist state ended when its army was slaughtered by forces under Britain's General Kitchener at the battle of Omdurman on 2 September 1898, almost 118 years ago. This was a decisive victory from which the Mahdists never recovered. As anti-ISIS forces advance on Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq today, it seems the state ruled by ISIS will perish not in some great climactic battle but in protracted and bloody street fighting among urban ruins. Yet it remains doubtful whether the end of the jihadist state will mean the end of ISIS terrorist activities.
Ruled by Egypt since 1820, the inhabitants of Sudan exploited the turmoil caused by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 to regain their freedom. Their leader was Muhammad Ahmad, who claimed to be the Mahdi, the Islamic messiah who would come to deliver Muslims from oppression. Initially the British were ready to give up Sudan and sent General Gordon to evacuate the last Egyptian forces from the country. However, Gordon decided to oppose the Mahdi and ended up besieged in Khartoum. Reluctantly the British government sent a small army to save Gordon, but at the start of 1885 the Mahdists stormed Khartoum and killed the general. For the moment the British withdrew from Sudan, but this blow to British imperial prestige would not be forgotten.
The Mahdi died only six months after Gordon, but Abdallahi ibn Muhammad took his place, being known as the Khalifa (caliph or successor). Mahdist Sudan was an Islamic fundamentalist state, but its efforts to spread its influence into other countries were largely unsuccessful. Expeditions against both Egypt and Ethiopia were defeated, and in 1896 General Kitchener led a British army into Sudan, intent on destroying the Mahdist state and avenging Gordon. Logistical problems initially proved more of an obstacle than Mahdist resistance, but Kitchener's slow and methodical advance down the River Nile never faltered. In September 1898 the invaders finally reached the Mahdist capital of Omdurman and the Khalifa decided to risk everything in a major battle. Unfortunately religious fanaticism was no match for artillery and machine guns. The Mahdists were slaughtered and their state was at an end, with the Khalifa being killed during mopping up operations in 1899. The Mahdist challenge had been totally crushed and Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan would continue largely undisturbed until the country finally became independent in 1956.
Exploiting civil war in Syria and internal turmoil in Iraq, ISIS set up its state in the summer of 2014. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was not presumptuous enough to call himself the Mahdi, but he did claim the title of caliph (successor to the Prophet Muhammad). Taking the name Caliph Ibrahim, he claimed to rule the world's Muslims and imposed an Islamic fundamentalist regime on the territories he controlled in Syria and Iraq. The Mahdists were left alone for some years to consolidate their control of Sudan, but almost as soon as it came into being, ISIS was under attack from its enemies. The USA and its allies have been carrying out air attacks on ISIS positions and America's local proxies have been making steady, if slow, progress in driving ISIS forces from towns in both Syria and Iraq. Raqqa and Mosul, the last remaining major ISIS-held cities, seem likely to be the final combat zones for the movement, scenes of brutal urban conflict rather than a final great battle.
However, by the terms of its own ideology, ISIS is committed to one final apocalyptic battle. It claims that at Dabiq (near Aleppo in Syria) the forces of Islam, with the Mahdi among their leaders, will defeat the forces of 'Rome' and win dominion over the world. (Dabiq is also the name of the movement's online magazine.) Even if such an encounter were to take place, the result would only be a new Omdurman, with 'Roman' (Western) firepower slaughtering the Islamic militants.
However the ISIS state ends, will its demise be as complete as that of the Mahdist state in Sudan in 1898? There were no Mahdist militants carrying out terror attacks in Victorian London as General Kitchener closed in on Omdurman. ISIS can launch or inspire terrorist attacks in Western cities even as its hold on towns in Syria and Iraq begins to crumble.
The battle of Omdurman marked the definite end of the Mahdist state in Sudan, but the end of the state controlled by ISIS will not be the end of the struggle. ISIS-linked groups are already fighting in Egypt, Libya, and Afghanistan, and ISIS-inspired terrorists may pop up at any time in Western countries. Mahdist Sudan was a geographically limited phenomenon; ISIS can live on in other forms as a continuing global threat even after its state has disappeared.
When the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was set up in the summer of 2014 it was the first jihadist political entity since the Mahdist state which controlled Sudan between 1885 and 1898.
The Mahdist state ended when its army was slaughtered by forces under Britain's General Kitchener at the battle of Omdurman on 2 September 1898, almost 118 years ago. This was a decisive victory from which the Mahdists never recovered. As anti-ISIS forces advance on Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq today, it seems the state ruled by ISIS will perish not in some great climactic battle but in protracted and bloody street fighting among urban ruins. Yet it remains doubtful whether the end of the jihadist state will mean the end of ISIS terrorist activities.
Ruled by Egypt since 1820, the inhabitants of Sudan exploited the turmoil caused by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 to regain their freedom. Their leader was Muhammad Ahmad, who claimed to be the Mahdi, the Islamic messiah who would come to deliver Muslims from oppression. Initially the British were ready to give up Sudan and sent General Gordon to evacuate the last Egyptian forces from the country. However, Gordon decided to oppose the Mahdi and ended up besieged in Khartoum. Reluctantly the British government sent a small army to save Gordon, but at the start of 1885 the Mahdists stormed Khartoum and killed the general. For the moment the British withdrew from Sudan, but this blow to British imperial prestige would not be forgotten.
The Mahdi died only six months after Gordon, but Abdallahi ibn Muhammad took his place, being known as the Khalifa (caliph or successor). Mahdist Sudan was an Islamic fundamentalist state, but its efforts to spread its influence into other countries were largely unsuccessful. Expeditions against both Egypt and Ethiopia were defeated, and in 1896 General Kitchener led a British army into Sudan, intent on destroying the Mahdist state and avenging Gordon. Logistical problems initially proved more of an obstacle than Mahdist resistance, but Kitchener's slow and methodical advance down the River Nile never faltered. In September 1898 the invaders finally reached the Mahdist capital of Omdurman and the Khalifa decided to risk everything in a major battle. Unfortunately religious fanaticism was no match for artillery and machine guns. The Mahdists were slaughtered and their state was at an end, with the Khalifa being killed during mopping up operations in 1899. The Mahdist challenge had been totally crushed and Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan would continue largely undisturbed until the country finally became independent in 1956.
Exploiting civil war in Syria and internal turmoil in Iraq, ISIS set up its state in the summer of 2014. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was not presumptuous enough to call himself the Mahdi, but he did claim the title of caliph (successor to the Prophet Muhammad). Taking the name Caliph Ibrahim, he claimed to rule the world's Muslims and imposed an Islamic fundamentalist regime on the territories he controlled in Syria and Iraq. The Mahdists were left alone for some years to consolidate their control of Sudan, but almost as soon as it came into being, ISIS was under attack from its enemies. The USA and its allies have been carrying out air attacks on ISIS positions and America's local proxies have been making steady, if slow, progress in driving ISIS forces from towns in both Syria and Iraq. Raqqa and Mosul, the last remaining major ISIS-held cities, seem likely to be the final combat zones for the movement, scenes of brutal urban conflict rather than a final great battle.
However, by the terms of its own ideology, ISIS is committed to one final apocalyptic battle. It claims that at Dabiq (near Aleppo in Syria) the forces of Islam, with the Mahdi among their leaders, will defeat the forces of 'Rome' and win dominion over the world. (Dabiq is also the name of the movement's online magazine.) Even if such an encounter were to take place, the result would only be a new Omdurman, with 'Roman' (Western) firepower slaughtering the Islamic militants.
However the ISIS state ends, will its demise be as complete as that of the Mahdist state in Sudan in 1898? There were no Mahdist militants carrying out terror attacks in Victorian London as General Kitchener closed in on Omdurman. ISIS can launch or inspire terrorist attacks in Western cities even as its hold on towns in Syria and Iraq begins to crumble.
The battle of Omdurman marked the definite end of the Mahdist state in Sudan, but the end of the state controlled by ISIS will not be the end of the struggle. ISIS-linked groups are already fighting in Egypt, Libya, and Afghanistan, and ISIS-inspired terrorists may pop up at any time in Western countries. Mahdist Sudan was a geographically limited phenomenon; ISIS can live on in other forms as a continuing global threat even after its state has disappeared.
Tuesday, May 24, 2016
ISIS on the Ropes: After a Knockout, What Then?
The Iraqi government has announced that its forces are beginning the final battle to retake Fallujah. Although close to the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, the town has been held by ISIS for almost two and a half years. Like the Iraqi recapture of Ramadi from ISIS at the end of 2015, the fight for Fallujah is expected to be prolonged and bloody, but few doubt that ISIS will be defeated.
Combined with ISIS defeats elsewhere in Iraq and in neighbouring Syria, the loss of Fallujah will be a major blow to the Sunni Islamist terror group. Perhaps even more worrying for ISIS has been the recent Iraqi successes at Hit and Rutba. In both towns it is claimed Irqi government forces were aided by Sunni tribesmen who had turned against ISIS. If the group can no longer rely on the support of Iraqi Sunnis, previously hostile to the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, then it is indeed in deep trouble.
Optimists are talking about a rapid collapse of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq before the end of this year. The ISIS capital at Raqqa in Syria is already said to be under threat. Should the Iraqi recapture of Fallujah prove easier than expected, then there will be growing pressure to liberate Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, from ISIS control this year rather than wait until 2017 as previously planned. ISIS would certainly appear to be on the ropes, but it is unlikely to go down without a fight. Nevertheless, if its many enemies deliver the final knockout punch more quickly than expected, what will a post-ISIS Middle East look like?
No doubt many parties will rush to claim they played a major role in the defeat of ISIS. The United States and its allies will point to their two year bombing campaign against ISIS targets as a vital factor in ensuring victory. However, whatever the role of airpower, only ground forces can recapture towns and territory. The two principal victors will be the Shiites and the Kurds, both of whom will be looking to derive new advantages from their success.
In Syria the Shiite-linked victors will be the Alawite government of Bashir Assad, backed by Iran and Russia. In Iraq the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad will claim victory, once again with Iran as its chief backer. Despite its many sins, ISIS has been the most powerful Sunni militant group in the Middle East and its defeat by Shiite forces will give that side a major boost in the Sunni-Shiite struggle that increasingly dominates the region.
In addition, Saudi Arabia, the self-declared leader of Sunni Islam, has embarked on an internal reform programme that some see as a dangerous gamble. If it succeeds, it will bring about a major economic and social transformation of the kingdom. If it fails, the result could be internal disorder and even the fall of the House of Saud. Such a collapse would be a greater blow to Sunnis than the defeat of ISIS.
The other victors in the ground struggle against ISIS would be the Kurds. In both Syria and Iraq they have played a vital role in fighting ISIS, being particularly close to the United States and its Western allies. However, the long-term aim of the Kurds is to create their own state, and this goal makes their Western friends uneasy. The Kurds have been denied heavy weapons and even minor incidents, such as Canadian special forces personnel attaching Iraqi Kurdistan flags to their uniforms, have caused protests.
Yet if the Kurds are on the winning side against ISIS, they will certainly want to build upon their success. During the chaos caused by ISIS successes in the summer of 2014, the Kurds seized control of the Iraqi city of Kirkuk. If the Iraqi government recaptures Mosul from ISIS, it will surely want Kirkuk returned to its control as well. The Kurds are unlikely to agree to this. Which side would the West take in an Iraqi-Kurd conflict? Similarly, the Iraqi Kurds may increase their support for the revived Kurdish insurgency in south-east Turkey. What will the United States do if the Iraqi Kurds come into open conflict with Turkey, a major NATO ally?
The fall of ISIS would certainly be very welcome to the international community, but it is unlikely to bring peace and stability to the Middle East. Old conflicts will grow in importance while new ones will be created.
Combined with ISIS defeats elsewhere in Iraq and in neighbouring Syria, the loss of Fallujah will be a major blow to the Sunni Islamist terror group. Perhaps even more worrying for ISIS has been the recent Iraqi successes at Hit and Rutba. In both towns it is claimed Irqi government forces were aided by Sunni tribesmen who had turned against ISIS. If the group can no longer rely on the support of Iraqi Sunnis, previously hostile to the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, then it is indeed in deep trouble.
Optimists are talking about a rapid collapse of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq before the end of this year. The ISIS capital at Raqqa in Syria is already said to be under threat. Should the Iraqi recapture of Fallujah prove easier than expected, then there will be growing pressure to liberate Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, from ISIS control this year rather than wait until 2017 as previously planned. ISIS would certainly appear to be on the ropes, but it is unlikely to go down without a fight. Nevertheless, if its many enemies deliver the final knockout punch more quickly than expected, what will a post-ISIS Middle East look like?
No doubt many parties will rush to claim they played a major role in the defeat of ISIS. The United States and its allies will point to their two year bombing campaign against ISIS targets as a vital factor in ensuring victory. However, whatever the role of airpower, only ground forces can recapture towns and territory. The two principal victors will be the Shiites and the Kurds, both of whom will be looking to derive new advantages from their success.
In Syria the Shiite-linked victors will be the Alawite government of Bashir Assad, backed by Iran and Russia. In Iraq the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad will claim victory, once again with Iran as its chief backer. Despite its many sins, ISIS has been the most powerful Sunni militant group in the Middle East and its defeat by Shiite forces will give that side a major boost in the Sunni-Shiite struggle that increasingly dominates the region.
In addition, Saudi Arabia, the self-declared leader of Sunni Islam, has embarked on an internal reform programme that some see as a dangerous gamble. If it succeeds, it will bring about a major economic and social transformation of the kingdom. If it fails, the result could be internal disorder and even the fall of the House of Saud. Such a collapse would be a greater blow to Sunnis than the defeat of ISIS.
The other victors in the ground struggle against ISIS would be the Kurds. In both Syria and Iraq they have played a vital role in fighting ISIS, being particularly close to the United States and its Western allies. However, the long-term aim of the Kurds is to create their own state, and this goal makes their Western friends uneasy. The Kurds have been denied heavy weapons and even minor incidents, such as Canadian special forces personnel attaching Iraqi Kurdistan flags to their uniforms, have caused protests.
Yet if the Kurds are on the winning side against ISIS, they will certainly want to build upon their success. During the chaos caused by ISIS successes in the summer of 2014, the Kurds seized control of the Iraqi city of Kirkuk. If the Iraqi government recaptures Mosul from ISIS, it will surely want Kirkuk returned to its control as well. The Kurds are unlikely to agree to this. Which side would the West take in an Iraqi-Kurd conflict? Similarly, the Iraqi Kurds may increase their support for the revived Kurdish insurgency in south-east Turkey. What will the United States do if the Iraqi Kurds come into open conflict with Turkey, a major NATO ally?
The fall of ISIS would certainly be very welcome to the international community, but it is unlikely to bring peace and stability to the Middle East. Old conflicts will grow in importance while new ones will be created.
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