Libya and the Limits of Air Power

Almost a century ago, the use of aircraft in military combat was initiated during the Italian invasion of Libya, which was then part of the Ottoman Turkish empire.

On the first day of November 1911 Italian officer Lt. Giulio Gavotti dropped a small bomb from a German-built Etrich Taube aircraft. Its effects on the Ottoman Turkish troops on the ground in Libya remain unknown, but this first aerial bombing raid opened the age of military air power.

In 1912 the Ottoman government made peace with Italy and handed over Libya to become an Italian colony. However, the local Arabs decided to continue their resistance to infidel invasion. After the massive growth of air power during the First World War, Mussolini's fascists made a greater use of aircraft in Italian counter-insurgency operations in Libya during the 1920s. As well as ordinary munitions, the aircraft were also alleged to have dropped poison gas bombs on the Libyans.

In 1931 the principal Libyan resistance leader, Omar Mukhtar, was captured by the Italians and executed. By 1934 the last insurgents had been defeated and Italy finally had complete control of the country. Air power had played a significant role in the Italian victory, but the activities of soldiers on the ground were still more important.

The Italians used air power to subject the Libyan people to European imperialism. Today the Western powers claim to be using air power to free the Libyan people from the oppressive rule of Muammar Gadaffi.

The destructive power that can be inflicted by aircraft is now vastly greater than it was at the birth of military air power back in 1911. Nevertheless, it may be asked whether the impact of such power is likely to be any more decisive in Libya today than it was a century ago.

The NATO interpretation of the United Nations resolution allowing military action to protect Libyan civilians allows its aircraft to destroy Gadaffi's aircraft and ground weapons such as tanks and artillery. However, both British and French government ministers have openly talked of overthrowing the Gadaffi regime, while American officials have hinted that such an outcome is desirable. Regime change is not mentioned in the UN resolution, and there are considerable doubts whether it can be achieved by air power alone.

After some initial enthusiasm, the United States government now seems to want to take only a supporting role in the air operations in Libya. Air attacks will largely be left to other NATO countries, especially France and Britain. Yet the United States is the only world-class air power. If it declines to take a leading role in the air assault on Libya, the impact of that assault can only be weakened.

France can deploy significant air assets from both its air force and its navy, but Britain's air force is in a weakened condition due to misguided defence cuts and the same cuts have virtually destroyed the country's naval air component. In real terms Britain's air contribution in Libya will not be much greater than that of Canada and other lesser NATO military powers.

Even if the United States decides to reverse its policy and takes the leading role in air operations in Libya. can these operations achieve their stated goals? In 1999 NATO waged an air campaign against Yugoslavia to protect the oppressed people of Kosovo. It was supposed to bring the Yugoslavs to the negotiating table within days. Then the days turned into weeks and the weeks into months, but still the Yugoslavs remained defiant in face of the biggest air assault in Europe since the Second World War. Only the threat of a NATO land invasion of Kosovo brought Slobodan Milosevic to terms.

Will Libya be a repeat of Kosovo? It seems a distinct possibility. There have been the usual promises of no NATO 'boots on the ground' in Libya, but if the air campaign cannot defeat Gadaffi, what other course will be open if the removal of his regime remains the declared intention of the Western attackers? A stalemate which leads to a divided Libya is said to be unacceptable, but only ground forces can ensure the fall of the Gadaffi regime. The forces of the Libyan rebels are too weak to do this, so NATO troops must at some point go ashore in Libya.

Military air power was born in Libya in 1911, but almost a hundred years later it is still unable to win a war in that country all by itself. Only military intervention can bring down the Gadaffi regime. How will the Islamic world react to yet another Western invasion of a Muslim country? And how long will it take NATO to subdue Libya? It took the Italians almost a quarter of a century. NATO will no doubt expect a shorter campaign, but its apparently endless struggle in Afghanistan is not an encouraging precedent.