Recently the International Caliphate Conference was held in Jakarta, Indonesia. It was organised by Hizb ut-Tahrir ('Party of Liberation') and was said to be attended by 80-100,000 people. Hizb ut-Tahrir is an international Sunni pan-Islamic organisation whose aim is to unite all the Muslim countries of the world in a unitary Islamic state or caliphate, ruled by Islamic law and headed by an elected ruler, the caliph. Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 and today has an estimated one million members worldwide.
The caliph is traditionally the leader of the worldwide Islamic community and the title (which means 'successor') goes back to the period after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632. The first four caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali) believed themselves to be both the spiritual and political leaders of the Islamic community which had chosen them. However, in 661 the Umayyad family seized control of the Islamic state and made the office of caliph hereditary in the ruling dynasty.
In 750 the Abbasid family ousted the Umayyads and became the new line of caliphs. The Abbasid caliphate would last for centuries, but by the tenth century the unity of Islam had been shattered, new Muslim states had been created, and even rival caliphates had been set up. In North Africa the Fatimids set up a Shiite caliphate in opposition to the Sunni Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad and it lasted from 909 to 1171. One branch of the Umayyad family had fled to Spain when the Abbasids seized the caliphate. In 929 their descendants established their own caliphate in Cordoba and it endured until 1031.
In any case, during the tenth century the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad lost most of his political power and was largely preserved as a religious figurehead by competing court factions. Another rival caliphate was set up by the Almohad dynasty in North Africa and Spain, lasting from 1145 to 1269, but it received little recognition outside those areas.
The Abbasid caliphate ended in 1258 when Baghdad was destroyed by the Mongols, but a few survivors from the Abbasid family escaped to Cairo in Egypt. There the Mamluk sultans allowed them to establish a pale imitation of the old caliphate, but always under Mamluk control. This puppet caliphate was largely ignored by other Muslim states. Nevertheless Mamluk control of the three holiest Muslim cities - Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem - did much to support their claims to leadership in the Muslim world.
The conquest of the Mamluk empire by the Ottoman Turkish sultan Selim I in 1517 allowed the Ottomans to claim the title of caliph. However, it was not a title they made much use of before the late nineteenth century. Then, as Ottoman power began to wane, the sultan came to see that his position as titular leader of the world's Muslims might have political benefits.
Sultan Abdul Hamid II (reigned 1876-1909) used his position as caliph to call upon Muslims in the Russian empire to revolt during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. Sultan Mehmed V (reigned 1909-1918) similarly called upon the Muslim inhabitants of the Russian, French and British empires to rise up against their Christian rulers during the early months of the First World War. In neither case did the caliph's call receive much of a response, but the Russian,French and British governments were certainly worried that there might be revolts among their Muslim subjects. By exploiting his position as caliph the Ottoman sultan could at least cause alarm among his enemies.
For this reason there was considerable fear among the world's Muslims that after 1918 the victorious allied powers would seek to strip the Ottoman sultan of his position as caliph. The concern was particularly strong in British India where the Khilafat movement arose and posed the biggest Muslim threat to British rule since the Indian Mutiny of 1857.
However, it was not to be the allies who ended the caliphate but the Turks. They deposed the Ottoman sultan in 1922 and established a Turkish republic. Its leader, Kemal Ataturk, was determined to create a secular Turkish state and in 1924 he abolished the caliphate. For over a thousand years there had always been at least a nominal leader of the world's Muslims. Now that position was gone and consternation spread throughout the Islamic world. However, attempts to save the caliphate were to prove unsuccessful.
Shortly after the Turkish abolition decree, Hussein bin Ali, ruler of the Hejaz, which contained the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, proclaimed himself caliph, but his claim went unrecognised by the wider Muslim world. Soon afterwards the Hejaz was conquered by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud from central Arabia. The Saudi ruler made it clear that he would not claim the caliphate, while a Muslim conference held in Cairo in 1926 to discuss its revival got nowhere. Later some figures in the Muslim world thought of claiming the title of caliph, the most unlikely being the worldly King Farouk of Egypt, but as a new world order took shape after the Second World War, it seemed that the caliphate had been consigned to history.
Muslim organisations aiming to restore the caliphate, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, have grown in strength in recent decades, but their chances of success do not seem to have increased. When the Ottoman empire was at its zenith, it was the military power of the sultan that made him the leader of the Muslim world rather than his title of caliph. When Ottoman power was declining, the sultan's attempts to use his position as caliph as a political weapon could not hide the fact that his power was disappearing and few other Muslims wanted to die for his cause. Caliph is an empty title without real power to back it up.
A number of Islamist groups, including Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, have declared an interest in restoring the worldwide caliphate, but none has the power to achieve that aim. Although Hizb ut-Tahrir has been accused of terrorist links and is banned in some countries of the Middle East and Central Asia, its leaders claim to want a restoration of the caliphate by peaceful means. However, the Islamic world is divided into more than fifty countries and it seems unlikely that all those governments would ever surrender their powers to some Islamic super-state. For the foreseeable future it seems that the restoration of the caliphate must remain a dream.
Friday, August 24, 2007
Sunday, August 12, 2007
Turkish Fears and Kurdish Dreams: The Making of a New Iraq Crisis?
In 1991 the Ukraine became an independent country and Ukrainians ceased to be the largest ethnic group in the world without a state of their own. That unhappy distinction then passed to the Kurds, some 25-30 million people, who are currently spread across Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
Yet 1991 was not a year devoid of hope for the Kurds. After their failed uprising against Saddam Hussein, the Kurds of Iraq were given a degree of protection by the USA and Britain. This allowed Iraqi Kurdistan to achieve a semi-independent status. After the Kurdish assistance to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was recognised as a legitimate authority within the country by the 2005 Iraqi constitution.
Kurds have achieved a semi-autonomous status within Iraq, so why has such success brought almost 150,000 Turkish troops to the borders of Iraq with the apparent intention of invading Iraqi Kurdistan?
The majority of the world's Kurds live in south-east Turkey and make up around twenty per cent of that country's population. Since the republic of Turkey was established in 1923, its rulers have always acted ruthlessly to suppress any separatist tendencies among Turkish Kurds. Apart from participation in the Korean War (1950-53) and invading Cyprus in 1974, the combat experience of the Turkish army since 1923 has largely consisted of crushing Kurdish uprisings.
The most recent outbreak began in 1984 and was organised by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). During the 1990s Turkish troops carried out a number of incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan aimed at destroying PKK bases. However, it was only after the capture of the organisation's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999 that PKK activities in Turkey began to decline.
In recent years a revived PKK has once again become active in south-east Turkey. The Turkish army is now apparently preparing to return to its 1990s strategy of launching incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan to attack PKK bases. However, there is now talk of Turkey establishing a buffer zone on Iraqi soil to keep PKK forces away from the Kurdish areas of Turkey. Given the long, bloody and unhappy history of Israel's anti-terrorist buffer zone in southern Lebanon from 1978 to 2000, this does not seem a good idea.
However, Turkish nationalists are increasingly alarmed by the growing independence of the KRG in Iraq and the example it sets for the Kurds of Turkey. If the promised referendum in Kirkuk before the end of 2007 brings that city and its neighbouring oil fields into the area under KRG control, Iraqi Kurdistan will have great wealth as well as semi-independence. Some Turkish generals have already made it clear that if the KRG's military forces resist their operations against the PKK, they will be hapy to crush those forces as well.
Although most Iraqi Kurds are ready to put aside dreams of complete independence for the moment, Turkish fears of such dreams may well compel them to undertake an unwise military adventure in Iraq that can only further destabilise the region, seriously damage Turkish relations with the USA, and probably extinguish Turkish hopes of EU membership.
The re-election of the Justice and Development (AK) party government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey's July general election may have done something to reduce the likelihood of a Turkish invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan. The AK party has won support in the Kurdish areas of south-east Tukey; it seems ready to co-operate with the Kurdish deputies in the new parliament; and it has opened negotiations with the Baghdad government in hopes of finding a diplomatic solution to the problem of PKK bases in Iraq.
Nevertheless the large Turkish army assembled on Iraq's northern border cannot be maintained there indefinitely. If there is no sign of a real settlement that will end PKK attacks from Iraq, the Turkish generals may force the AK government to approve an attack before the onset of winter ends the prospect of large-scale military operations in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan this year.
Yet 1991 was not a year devoid of hope for the Kurds. After their failed uprising against Saddam Hussein, the Kurds of Iraq were given a degree of protection by the USA and Britain. This allowed Iraqi Kurdistan to achieve a semi-independent status. After the Kurdish assistance to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was recognised as a legitimate authority within the country by the 2005 Iraqi constitution.
Kurds have achieved a semi-autonomous status within Iraq, so why has such success brought almost 150,000 Turkish troops to the borders of Iraq with the apparent intention of invading Iraqi Kurdistan?
The majority of the world's Kurds live in south-east Turkey and make up around twenty per cent of that country's population. Since the republic of Turkey was established in 1923, its rulers have always acted ruthlessly to suppress any separatist tendencies among Turkish Kurds. Apart from participation in the Korean War (1950-53) and invading Cyprus in 1974, the combat experience of the Turkish army since 1923 has largely consisted of crushing Kurdish uprisings.
The most recent outbreak began in 1984 and was organised by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). During the 1990s Turkish troops carried out a number of incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan aimed at destroying PKK bases. However, it was only after the capture of the organisation's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999 that PKK activities in Turkey began to decline.
In recent years a revived PKK has once again become active in south-east Turkey. The Turkish army is now apparently preparing to return to its 1990s strategy of launching incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan to attack PKK bases. However, there is now talk of Turkey establishing a buffer zone on Iraqi soil to keep PKK forces away from the Kurdish areas of Turkey. Given the long, bloody and unhappy history of Israel's anti-terrorist buffer zone in southern Lebanon from 1978 to 2000, this does not seem a good idea.
However, Turkish nationalists are increasingly alarmed by the growing independence of the KRG in Iraq and the example it sets for the Kurds of Turkey. If the promised referendum in Kirkuk before the end of 2007 brings that city and its neighbouring oil fields into the area under KRG control, Iraqi Kurdistan will have great wealth as well as semi-independence. Some Turkish generals have already made it clear that if the KRG's military forces resist their operations against the PKK, they will be hapy to crush those forces as well.
Although most Iraqi Kurds are ready to put aside dreams of complete independence for the moment, Turkish fears of such dreams may well compel them to undertake an unwise military adventure in Iraq that can only further destabilise the region, seriously damage Turkish relations with the USA, and probably extinguish Turkish hopes of EU membership.
The re-election of the Justice and Development (AK) party government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey's July general election may have done something to reduce the likelihood of a Turkish invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan. The AK party has won support in the Kurdish areas of south-east Tukey; it seems ready to co-operate with the Kurdish deputies in the new parliament; and it has opened negotiations with the Baghdad government in hopes of finding a diplomatic solution to the problem of PKK bases in Iraq.
Nevertheless the large Turkish army assembled on Iraq's northern border cannot be maintained there indefinitely. If there is no sign of a real settlement that will end PKK attacks from Iraq, the Turkish generals may force the AK government to approve an attack before the onset of winter ends the prospect of large-scale military operations in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan this year.
Saturday, August 11, 2007
Christian-Muslim Conflict: Distant Wars and Local Echoes
[This piece was originally to be the prologue of my book 'Faith and Sword: A Short History of Christian-Muslim Conflict' (London, 2006), but was deleted before publication.]
This short book was originally intended to be an overview of the influence of sea power on Christian-Muslim conflict over the centuries. However, while still seeking to demonstrate the often forgotten importance of maritime activities and strategy in Christian-Muslim warfare, the story has been widened to include land warfare and, in more recent times, the impact of air power.
Traditionally the great Muslim empires of the last millenium have been seen primarily as land powers, yet in many areas Christian-Muslim conflict resolved itself into a battle for the control of seas. Throughout all the centuries since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 one area of constant Christian-Muslim confrontation has been the Mediterranean Sea. In the sixteenth century the Portuguese brought the oceanic naval power of Christian Europe to the Indian Ocean for the first time, and Christian-Muslim warfare was extended to that ocean and its offshoots, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Between the 1760s and the 1870s control of the Black Sea was the prize at stake in the wars between the growing Orthodox Christian empire of Russia and the declining Muslim empire of the Ottoman Turks.
Nevertheless one cannot deny that for centuries it was the military power of the Muslims on land which seemed to pose the greatest threat to the survival of Christian Europe. Between the eighth and the fifteenth centuries the Christians fought to expel the Muslim invaders from Spain and Portugal. Yet even before this threat had been finally removed from south-west Europe, a new Muslim military threat, the Ottoman Turks, was advancing across south-east Europe. That Muslim presence in Europe would not be removed until the first decades of the twentieth century.
Yet during the middle ages the Christians of Europe had delivered a counter-attack which struck at the heartlands of Islam. It was growing Christian maritime power in the Mediterranean that was one of the factors which allowed the crusaders to reach the Holy Land at the end of the eleventh century and take Jerusalem from the Muslims. The success of the First Crusade led to the creation of Christian states in Palestine and Syria which survived for almost two centuries before finally being destroyed by the Muslims. Although this Christian success was comparatively short-lived, memories of it lived on in European consciousness.
Indeed the struggle against Islam was one of the fundamental factors that shaped the Europe which emerged from the middle ages into the modern world. It was an influence that spread widely across Christendom, touching places far removed from the main areas of direct Christian-Muslim warfare. The final draft of this book was completed during a stay in Herefordshire, a largely agricultural county of England on the border with Wales. Such an area might seem remote from the battlefields where cross and crescent clashed, but even here links with that struggle can still be found.
North of the small town of Leominster is Croft Castle, which was for generations the home of the Crofts, a family who came originally from Normandy in France. According to family tradition an ancestor, Jasper de Croft, went on the First Crusade and was knighted by one of its leaders, Godfrey of Bouillon, after the crusaders took the city of Jerusalem from the Muslims in 1099.
South of Leominster, tucked away in a wooded valley, is Dinmore Manor. This estate was once a possession, known as a Commandery, of the Knights of the Hospital of St. John in Jerusalem. This religious military order, led by warrior monks, was tasked with the defence of the lands in Palestine and Syria which had been won for the Christians by the First Crusade. Landed estates in western Europe, such as Dinmore Manor, provided the money and men to support this distant struggle against the Muslims. Eventually the knights were driven out of the Holy Land, but they continued their war against Islam at sea, basing their galley fleet at the island of Rhodes. One of the last Commanders of Dinmore, Sir John Buck, was killed fighting the Ottoman Turks when they besieged Rhodes in 1522.
In Leominster itself, the town's war memorial includes the names of men of the Herefordshire Regiment who died in Palestine during the First World War while driving the Turks out of the Holy Land. Before Christmas 1917 the British had captured Jerusalem, becoming the first Christian conquerors of that holy city since the soldiers of the First Crusade in 1099. That the Christian-Muslim struggle for Jerusalem should leave such strong traces in a part of England so distant from the Holy Land is a measure of the long and intense nature of that conflict. Jerusalem was the greatest prize, and at Jerusalem this story can begin.
This short book was originally intended to be an overview of the influence of sea power on Christian-Muslim conflict over the centuries. However, while still seeking to demonstrate the often forgotten importance of maritime activities and strategy in Christian-Muslim warfare, the story has been widened to include land warfare and, in more recent times, the impact of air power.
Traditionally the great Muslim empires of the last millenium have been seen primarily as land powers, yet in many areas Christian-Muslim conflict resolved itself into a battle for the control of seas. Throughout all the centuries since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 one area of constant Christian-Muslim confrontation has been the Mediterranean Sea. In the sixteenth century the Portuguese brought the oceanic naval power of Christian Europe to the Indian Ocean for the first time, and Christian-Muslim warfare was extended to that ocean and its offshoots, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Between the 1760s and the 1870s control of the Black Sea was the prize at stake in the wars between the growing Orthodox Christian empire of Russia and the declining Muslim empire of the Ottoman Turks.
Nevertheless one cannot deny that for centuries it was the military power of the Muslims on land which seemed to pose the greatest threat to the survival of Christian Europe. Between the eighth and the fifteenth centuries the Christians fought to expel the Muslim invaders from Spain and Portugal. Yet even before this threat had been finally removed from south-west Europe, a new Muslim military threat, the Ottoman Turks, was advancing across south-east Europe. That Muslim presence in Europe would not be removed until the first decades of the twentieth century.
Yet during the middle ages the Christians of Europe had delivered a counter-attack which struck at the heartlands of Islam. It was growing Christian maritime power in the Mediterranean that was one of the factors which allowed the crusaders to reach the Holy Land at the end of the eleventh century and take Jerusalem from the Muslims. The success of the First Crusade led to the creation of Christian states in Palestine and Syria which survived for almost two centuries before finally being destroyed by the Muslims. Although this Christian success was comparatively short-lived, memories of it lived on in European consciousness.
Indeed the struggle against Islam was one of the fundamental factors that shaped the Europe which emerged from the middle ages into the modern world. It was an influence that spread widely across Christendom, touching places far removed from the main areas of direct Christian-Muslim warfare. The final draft of this book was completed during a stay in Herefordshire, a largely agricultural county of England on the border with Wales. Such an area might seem remote from the battlefields where cross and crescent clashed, but even here links with that struggle can still be found.
North of the small town of Leominster is Croft Castle, which was for generations the home of the Crofts, a family who came originally from Normandy in France. According to family tradition an ancestor, Jasper de Croft, went on the First Crusade and was knighted by one of its leaders, Godfrey of Bouillon, after the crusaders took the city of Jerusalem from the Muslims in 1099.
South of Leominster, tucked away in a wooded valley, is Dinmore Manor. This estate was once a possession, known as a Commandery, of the Knights of the Hospital of St. John in Jerusalem. This religious military order, led by warrior monks, was tasked with the defence of the lands in Palestine and Syria which had been won for the Christians by the First Crusade. Landed estates in western Europe, such as Dinmore Manor, provided the money and men to support this distant struggle against the Muslims. Eventually the knights were driven out of the Holy Land, but they continued their war against Islam at sea, basing their galley fleet at the island of Rhodes. One of the last Commanders of Dinmore, Sir John Buck, was killed fighting the Ottoman Turks when they besieged Rhodes in 1522.
In Leominster itself, the town's war memorial includes the names of men of the Herefordshire Regiment who died in Palestine during the First World War while driving the Turks out of the Holy Land. Before Christmas 1917 the British had captured Jerusalem, becoming the first Christian conquerors of that holy city since the soldiers of the First Crusade in 1099. That the Christian-Muslim struggle for Jerusalem should leave such strong traces in a part of England so distant from the Holy Land is a measure of the long and intense nature of that conflict. Jerusalem was the greatest prize, and at Jerusalem this story can begin.
Wednesday, August 8, 2007
Will the Iraqi Kurds Sacrifice the PKK?
A Turkish army stands on the northern border of Iraq. It is ready to invade Iraqi Kurdistan and destroy the bases of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose guerrillas have carried out numerous attacks in south-east Turkey. The PKK and the Iraqi Kurds have promised to resist any Turkish invasion.
The division between Turks and Kurds seems simple, but as in so many disputes in the Middle East, the reality is more complicated. The Turks invaded Iraqi Kurdistan in pursuit of the PKK on a number of occasions during the 1990s. The two principal incursions were in 1992 and 1997. On both occasions Iraqi Kurdish forces assisted the Turkish army in its attacks on the PKK.
It seems entirely possible that a new Turkish attack on PKK bases may once again enjoy local Kurdish support, or the Iraqi Kurds may suppress the PKK themselves, thus removing the need for any Turkish invasion. Both the United States and the government of Iraq undoubtedly hope the latter possibility will become reality.
After their failed uprising against Saddam Hussein in March 1991, Iraq's Kurds eventually received Anglo-American protection which allowed them to establish a safe area in the north of the country. In 1992 the main Kurdish nationalist parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani, set up the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
The new semi-independent Kurdish state was heavily dependent for its economic survival on trade routes through Turkey. As PKK attacks in Turkey increased during 1992, Ankara forced the KRG to impose restrictions on PKK activities. In retaliation the PKK declared a blockade of Iraqi Kurdistan in July and halted truck traffic by violent intimidation.
This action encouraged the Iraqi Kurds to join in Turkish plans to attack PKK bases in Iraq. In October and November 1992 the Turkish army crossed the border and KRG forces assisted them in their operations against the PKK. Soon most of the 5,000 PKK fighters had been killed, had fled to Iran, or had surrendered to the KRG, which refused to hand them over to the Turks.
The KRG's aid to the Turks angered many Kurdish nationalists, but the issue was soon forgotten as the KDP and the PUK fell out and by 1994 the two parties were at war. The United States tried to halt this Kurdish civil war, but other nations preferred to take sides, Turkey supporting the KDP and Iran the PUK. In 1996 the KDP even called in the help of Saddam Hussein's forces to drive the PUK back to the Iranian border.
With the Iraqi Kurds so bitterly divided, it seemed unsurprising that when Turkey launched another incursion into Iraq in May 1997 the KDP should assist Turkish troops against the PKK. To the KDP, the PKK were not brother Kurds but political rivals. Similarly, later in 1997 when the PUK launched an offensive against the KDP, Turkish air attacks helped to defeat it.
In the new Iraq created since 2003, the Kurds have sought to project an image of unity, with past disputes apparently forgotten. Jalal Talabani is now president of Iraq, while Massoud Barzani is president of the KRG. Feelings of Kurdish solidarity might seem to dictate that they should support the PKK against Turkey, but as already noted, Iraqi Kurds have been ready to assist the Turks against the PKK before. Also Iraqi Kurdistan is still very dependent on Turkey for its economic prosperity.
Iraqi Kurds know that in any serious military clash between them and the Turks the USA will be forced to back Turkey, the most important American ally in the Middle East after Israel. Iraqi Kurdistan has become the nearest thing to an independent state that the Kurdish nation has achieved in its modern history. It seems possible that rather than risk losing this state the Iraqi Kurds will sacrifice the PKK, preferably by suppressing its bases themselves to avoid another Turkish invasion of their territory.
The division between Turks and Kurds seems simple, but as in so many disputes in the Middle East, the reality is more complicated. The Turks invaded Iraqi Kurdistan in pursuit of the PKK on a number of occasions during the 1990s. The two principal incursions were in 1992 and 1997. On both occasions Iraqi Kurdish forces assisted the Turkish army in its attacks on the PKK.
It seems entirely possible that a new Turkish attack on PKK bases may once again enjoy local Kurdish support, or the Iraqi Kurds may suppress the PKK themselves, thus removing the need for any Turkish invasion. Both the United States and the government of Iraq undoubtedly hope the latter possibility will become reality.
After their failed uprising against Saddam Hussein in March 1991, Iraq's Kurds eventually received Anglo-American protection which allowed them to establish a safe area in the north of the country. In 1992 the main Kurdish nationalist parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani, set up the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
The new semi-independent Kurdish state was heavily dependent for its economic survival on trade routes through Turkey. As PKK attacks in Turkey increased during 1992, Ankara forced the KRG to impose restrictions on PKK activities. In retaliation the PKK declared a blockade of Iraqi Kurdistan in July and halted truck traffic by violent intimidation.
This action encouraged the Iraqi Kurds to join in Turkish plans to attack PKK bases in Iraq. In October and November 1992 the Turkish army crossed the border and KRG forces assisted them in their operations against the PKK. Soon most of the 5,000 PKK fighters had been killed, had fled to Iran, or had surrendered to the KRG, which refused to hand them over to the Turks.
The KRG's aid to the Turks angered many Kurdish nationalists, but the issue was soon forgotten as the KDP and the PUK fell out and by 1994 the two parties were at war. The United States tried to halt this Kurdish civil war, but other nations preferred to take sides, Turkey supporting the KDP and Iran the PUK. In 1996 the KDP even called in the help of Saddam Hussein's forces to drive the PUK back to the Iranian border.
With the Iraqi Kurds so bitterly divided, it seemed unsurprising that when Turkey launched another incursion into Iraq in May 1997 the KDP should assist Turkish troops against the PKK. To the KDP, the PKK were not brother Kurds but political rivals. Similarly, later in 1997 when the PUK launched an offensive against the KDP, Turkish air attacks helped to defeat it.
In the new Iraq created since 2003, the Kurds have sought to project an image of unity, with past disputes apparently forgotten. Jalal Talabani is now president of Iraq, while Massoud Barzani is president of the KRG. Feelings of Kurdish solidarity might seem to dictate that they should support the PKK against Turkey, but as already noted, Iraqi Kurds have been ready to assist the Turks against the PKK before. Also Iraqi Kurdistan is still very dependent on Turkey for its economic prosperity.
Iraqi Kurds know that in any serious military clash between them and the Turks the USA will be forced to back Turkey, the most important American ally in the Middle East after Israel. Iraqi Kurdistan has become the nearest thing to an independent state that the Kurdish nation has achieved in its modern history. It seems possible that rather than risk losing this state the Iraqi Kurds will sacrifice the PKK, preferably by suppressing its bases themselves to avoid another Turkish invasion of their territory.
Saturday, August 4, 2007
Will War Spread Across the Horn of Africa?
After the tragedy of 9/11 new American bases for the 'war on terror' were set up around the Middle East. One of the more surprising sites was an old French Foreign Legion barracks in the small republic of Djibouti. This became the home of Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, a unit of US Central Command. (In 2007-8 it will be transferred to the new US Africa Command.)
In fact this was an important strategic position. The United States possessed bases in the Persian Gulf, but it had previously had none in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden area. This region possesses a maritime choke point similar to the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf. This is Bab al Mandeb, the strait lying between Yemen to the north and Djibouti to the south, a maritime area where terrorist attacks could be made on shipping heading to and from the Suez Canal. The American warship USS Cole had already been attacked by al-Qaeda terrorists in Aden harbour in 2000, and a French tanker was also struck some time later off the coast of Yemen.
However, the terrorist danger was not just at sea. The area of responsibility of the US task force in Djibouti included all the countries of the Horn of Africa, including Kenya on its southern border. The US embassy in Kenya's capital Nairobi was one of the two American diplomatic missions in East Afica attacked by al-Qaeda in 1998.
The principal area of instability in the Horn of Africa is Somalia, a country which has not had a functioning central government since 1991. The common Western view of Somalia sees it as the lawless land of 'Black Hawk Down', the American military defeat in its capital Mogadishu in 1993. Yet the fact is that much of Somalia has enjoyed comparative peace since the central government collapsed sixteen years ago.
The north of the country is controlled by two autonomous states. In the actual Horn of Africa is Puntland, which declared autonomy in 1998, but is ready to rejoin a federal Somalia at some future date. In the north-west is Somaliland (covering the territory of the old colony of British Somaliland), which declared its independence in 1991. Although not recognised by any other country, Somaliland cherishes its independence and may be reluctant to join a reconstituted Somalia.
Somaliland and Puntland have been largely peaceful in recent years, although ports in the latter state have been used as bases for pirates. It is southern Somalia, especially in and around the capital Mogadishu, that has seen the most violence since 1991, with warfare between local clans who often receive arms and other support from foreign countries.
The United Nations approved the creation of a Somali Transitional Government (STG), initially outside the country, with the aim of restoring peace and unity to Somalia as soon as possible. By 2006 the STG had finally established itself in Somalia, holding a small area centred on the town of Baidoa near the border with Ethiopia.
Meanwhile the warring clans of southern Somalia had finally been subdued by the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). This Islamist body brought peace and order to Mogadishu and other areas for the first time in years. However, the UIC's similarity to the Taliban movement which took over Afghanistan in the 1990s alarmed the United States, especially as there were also claims that the UIC had links with al-Qaeda. Some of the 1998 embassy bombers were said to be hiding in southern Somalia.
When the UIC seemed about to move against the STG in Baidoa, the United States encouraged Ethiopia, its principal ally in the region, to intervene in Somalia, despite the long history of enmity between Somalis and Ethiopians. In December 2006 Ethiopian forces swept across southern Somalia, defeating the UIC and installing the STG in Mogadishu. The United States provided direct assistance by mounting air attacks, probably co-ordinated from Djibouti, on supposed al-Qaeda bases in southern Somalia.
After their victory the Ethiopians claimed they were anxious to withdraw from Somalia and hand over security to STG forces and a peace-keeping force from the African Union. Only a few troops for the latter force have arrived in Mogadishu and Ethiopian forces continue to battle Islamist and clan forces in the capital. Recent attempts to hold a national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu have been hindered by the continued fighting. Now the United Nations has joined the STG and the Ethiopians in blaming such trouble on arms being supplied to the rebels by Eritrea.
Similar allegations have been made against Eritrea in relation to the arming of Somali rebels in the Ogaden region of south-east Ethiopia. This has long been an area bitterly disputed between Somalia and Ethiopia. In 1977 Somalia invaded and 'liberated' the Ogaden, but in the following year the Ethiopians drove out the invaders and took back the province.
Despite this Ethiopian success, the majority of the Ogaden's population are ethnic Somalis and they continue to resent being ruled by the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa. The bloody raid by Ogaden Somali rebels on a Chinese oil company camp at Abole in April 2007 gave notice that the rebels continue to be an active and dangerous force. One reason the Ethiopians invaded Somalia was because they feared that the UIC would stir up the Ogaden Somalis, but this may be happening anyway.
The upsurge of fighting in the Ogaden may well be another stage in the spreading of conflict across the Horn of Africa which commentators have long feared. First Somalia, now the Ogaden. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of being active behind the scenes in both places. How long before the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which raged between 1998 and 2000, breaks out again? If Ethiopia has to fight on three fronts, how long will it be before that country calls for more American aid than can be provided by the task force in Djibouti?
In fact this was an important strategic position. The United States possessed bases in the Persian Gulf, but it had previously had none in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden area. This region possesses a maritime choke point similar to the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf. This is Bab al Mandeb, the strait lying between Yemen to the north and Djibouti to the south, a maritime area where terrorist attacks could be made on shipping heading to and from the Suez Canal. The American warship USS Cole had already been attacked by al-Qaeda terrorists in Aden harbour in 2000, and a French tanker was also struck some time later off the coast of Yemen.
However, the terrorist danger was not just at sea. The area of responsibility of the US task force in Djibouti included all the countries of the Horn of Africa, including Kenya on its southern border. The US embassy in Kenya's capital Nairobi was one of the two American diplomatic missions in East Afica attacked by al-Qaeda in 1998.
The principal area of instability in the Horn of Africa is Somalia, a country which has not had a functioning central government since 1991. The common Western view of Somalia sees it as the lawless land of 'Black Hawk Down', the American military defeat in its capital Mogadishu in 1993. Yet the fact is that much of Somalia has enjoyed comparative peace since the central government collapsed sixteen years ago.
The north of the country is controlled by two autonomous states. In the actual Horn of Africa is Puntland, which declared autonomy in 1998, but is ready to rejoin a federal Somalia at some future date. In the north-west is Somaliland (covering the territory of the old colony of British Somaliland), which declared its independence in 1991. Although not recognised by any other country, Somaliland cherishes its independence and may be reluctant to join a reconstituted Somalia.
Somaliland and Puntland have been largely peaceful in recent years, although ports in the latter state have been used as bases for pirates. It is southern Somalia, especially in and around the capital Mogadishu, that has seen the most violence since 1991, with warfare between local clans who often receive arms and other support from foreign countries.
The United Nations approved the creation of a Somali Transitional Government (STG), initially outside the country, with the aim of restoring peace and unity to Somalia as soon as possible. By 2006 the STG had finally established itself in Somalia, holding a small area centred on the town of Baidoa near the border with Ethiopia.
Meanwhile the warring clans of southern Somalia had finally been subdued by the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). This Islamist body brought peace and order to Mogadishu and other areas for the first time in years. However, the UIC's similarity to the Taliban movement which took over Afghanistan in the 1990s alarmed the United States, especially as there were also claims that the UIC had links with al-Qaeda. Some of the 1998 embassy bombers were said to be hiding in southern Somalia.
When the UIC seemed about to move against the STG in Baidoa, the United States encouraged Ethiopia, its principal ally in the region, to intervene in Somalia, despite the long history of enmity between Somalis and Ethiopians. In December 2006 Ethiopian forces swept across southern Somalia, defeating the UIC and installing the STG in Mogadishu. The United States provided direct assistance by mounting air attacks, probably co-ordinated from Djibouti, on supposed al-Qaeda bases in southern Somalia.
After their victory the Ethiopians claimed they were anxious to withdraw from Somalia and hand over security to STG forces and a peace-keeping force from the African Union. Only a few troops for the latter force have arrived in Mogadishu and Ethiopian forces continue to battle Islamist and clan forces in the capital. Recent attempts to hold a national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu have been hindered by the continued fighting. Now the United Nations has joined the STG and the Ethiopians in blaming such trouble on arms being supplied to the rebels by Eritrea.
Similar allegations have been made against Eritrea in relation to the arming of Somali rebels in the Ogaden region of south-east Ethiopia. This has long been an area bitterly disputed between Somalia and Ethiopia. In 1977 Somalia invaded and 'liberated' the Ogaden, but in the following year the Ethiopians drove out the invaders and took back the province.
Despite this Ethiopian success, the majority of the Ogaden's population are ethnic Somalis and they continue to resent being ruled by the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa. The bloody raid by Ogaden Somali rebels on a Chinese oil company camp at Abole in April 2007 gave notice that the rebels continue to be an active and dangerous force. One reason the Ethiopians invaded Somalia was because they feared that the UIC would stir up the Ogaden Somalis, but this may be happening anyway.
The upsurge of fighting in the Ogaden may well be another stage in the spreading of conflict across the Horn of Africa which commentators have long feared. First Somalia, now the Ogaden. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of being active behind the scenes in both places. How long before the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which raged between 1998 and 2000, breaks out again? If Ethiopia has to fight on three fronts, how long will it be before that country calls for more American aid than can be provided by the task force in Djibouti?
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