Yemen and the Somali Pirates

The government of the autonomous region of Puntland in north-east Somalia claims to be unable to curb the activities of the Somali pirates based there. Yet when a Yemeni vessel is seized by those pirates, the Puntland government is suddenly stirred to action.

In November 2008 the Yemeni cargo ship 'Adina' was captured by Somali pirates while carrying a cargo of steel from Al Mukalla, a port on the south coast of Yemen, to the island of Socotra. The Puntland authorities, usually so indifferent to captures of the vessels of other nations, immediately rushed to take action. Ali Abdi Aware, a Puntland minister, said: 'We will release the hijacked Yemen ship forcibly if they do not release it without a ransom because we have good relations with Yemen.'

Puntland security forces were put on alert, but after negotiations and strong pressure from the Puntland government, the 'Adina' was released in early December 2008. A ransom of US $2 million had originally been demanded for the ship, but no ransom was paid.

The fact is that both the government of Puntland and the Somali pirates who are based there would find life very difficult without good relations with Yemen. Officially the government of Yemen is opposed to Somali piracy, but in ports along the south coast of Yemen many people derive substantial economic benefit from aiding and abetting the pirates as well as supplying the rest of the population of Puntland.

Yemeni fishing boats have on occasion been seized by Somali pirates for use as 'mother ships' so that their fast pirate craft can be launched in more distant waters to capture merchant ships. However, in some cases there have been doubts about whether the Yemeni fishing boats were really victims, with suggestions that their 'capture' may have been arranged in advance so that Yemenis could share in the profits of piracy.

Indeed NATO sources claim ports along the eastern section of the south coast of Yemen, specifically Al Mukalla, Al Shishr, Sayhut, Nishtun and Al Ghaydah, serve as re-supply bases for Somali pirate 'mother ships' operating in the Gulf of Aden, where they make so many of their captures.

The most recent Somali pirate attack on a Yemeni ship took place less than ten miles from the south coast of Yemen. The tanker 'Qana' was seized on April 26 while returning from Al Mukalla to Aden. On the following day Yemeni special forces retook the vessel, killing three pirates and taking others prisoner.

From one point of view this operation might be seen as striking a blow against the pirates since it is the first Yemeni military action ever taken against them. However, on the other hand, the fact that the incident took place so close to Yemen's coast would seem to indicate that the Somali pirates are treating the area as if it was their own home waters and they can count on support from local people.

The Yemen/Somalia connection is increasingly integrated. When not hunting merchant ships to seize for ransom, Somali pirate 'mother ships' often take human cargo (refugees and economic migrants) from Somalia to Yemen and then return with arms, ammunition, and other supplies to support their pirate activities or sell to the people of Puntland.

There is now increasing concern that people on the south coast of Yemen may soon graduate from assisting the Somali pirates to joining them in their activities. Yemen's declining economy makes piracy, with its low risks and high financial rewards, look increasingly attractive. Added to the economic motive may be a political one as well.

The population of South Yemen has never been particularly happy with its union with North Yemen which has existed since 1990. Its attempt to break away in 1994 was brutally suppressed. Pro-independence demonstrations in South Yemen earlier this month would seem to show that this feeling is reviving. If South Yemen was to achieve independence, or even just autonomy on a scale to match Puntland's position within Somalia, then piracy might become attractive, promising valuable income for a new political entity.

At the moment Somali piracy is largely just a criminal activity with no proven links to terrorism. Indeed those groups most likely to be associated with terrorism in Somalia, the Islamist militants in the south and centre of the country, say they are opposed to piracy. They even claim to have carried out attacks on the pirates when the latter have seized ships owned in Muslim countries. How long this separation will continue is a matter for debate. Piracy is the most lucrative economic activity in Somalia and many political groups in the country will hope to get some share in its profits. There are already reports from the body monitoring the UN arms embargo in Somalia that the pirates are bringing arms from Yemen to supply the Islamist militants. However, so far this seems to be a purely commercial transaction and does not imply any commitment to the Islamist cause.

Nevertheless a closer link between Somali pirates and Somali Islamist militants cannot be ruled out. Such a link would be of serious concern to other countries. Of even greater concern would be if Yemeni seafarers took up piracy and then established links with Islamist terror networks. The profits of piracy might finance terrorists who could spread their activities from Yemen into the neighbouring countries of Saudi Arabia and Oman.

The need for concerted international action to stamp out Somali piracy is growing. It must be curbed before piracy can spread to South Yemen, which would extend the zone of instability currently restricted to Somalia into the south of the Arabian peninsula with potentially dangerous consequences for the whole region.

America in Iraq: Leaving or Not?

At the end of April Britain brought to a close its military involvement in Iraq which had lasted since the US-led invasion of that country in March 2003. The 3,800 British military personnel at Basra airport hauled down their flag and prepared to depart. Yet they handed over their base not to Iraqi forces but to 5,000 American troops newly deployed to the area.

This seems a strange development. The Basra area is one of the most peaceful regions of Iraq, fully under the control of the government in Baghdad. The United States has promised to withdraw most of its combat forces from Iraq, pulling out of the cities this summer. So why is a military base in peaceful Basra being handed over to American rather than Iraqi forces?

The answer would seem to be that some Americans, especially in the higher levels of US Central Command, are having second thoughts about withdrawing from Iraq. They intend to seize every opportunity to keep substantial US forces in the country, whatever the promises of President Barack Obama or the wishes of the Iraqi people.

General Petraeus, the new head of Central Command, likes to take credit for the supposed victory his 'surge' strategy achieved in Iraq. Yet his commanders in that country are now claiming that conditions are becoming insecure once again, and they imply that US withdrawal will have to be delayed or even postponed indefinitely.

In northern Iraq al-Qaeda terrorists, so recently said to be broken and on the run, appear to be staging a come-back, especially in and around the city of Mosul. The local US commander says that American forces may have to remain on duty in the area for the foreseeable future. This will no doubt be good news for the pro-American Kurds of northern Iraq, who are already fearful of attacks by the central government in Baghdad. However, other Iraqis may find a continued American presence less palatable.

Similarly, the Sunni Arabs who deserted the anti-American insurgency to join the Awakening movement during Petraeus' 'surge' operations are now beginning to have second thoughts about their decision. The United States is actively supporting the Shia-controlled government of Nuri al-Maliki in its continuing arrests of important Sunni leaders of the Awakening councils for their alleged past crimes. American promises of amnesty now ring hollow among the Sunni Arabs of Iraq and it seems more than likely that many former insurgents will return to making attacks on American and Iraqi government forces.

Originally the Americans had their doubts about Nuri al-Maliki, but now they are warming to him. He is a potential Iraqi strong man with, unusually, solid democratic credentials for his rule. The Americans are ready to back him against al-Qaeda remnants, Sunni former insurgents, and Shia rivals such as the openly anti-American Muqtada al-Sadr. The problem is that Nuri al-Maliki enjoys popular support precisely because he is seen as the man who is getting the Americans to leave Iraq. If he is seen as being an accomplice to their continued presence, the Iraqi prime minister will soon lose popular support.

Even if the Americans cannot use renewed security problems as an excuse to stay, their withdrawal agreement with the Iraqi government still gives them ample room to keep a military presence in the country. Under the agreement, the United states can keep 'residual' armed forces in Iraq, chiefly to train the Iraqi military. Yet some estimates of these 'residual' forces have gone as high as 35-50,000 personnel in half a dozen bases. This is hardly a token presence as it would amount to almost a third of the US military force in Iraq at its peak of deployment. The retention of such a large force in Iraq would be disquieting to both the Iraqi and American peoples after all the promises of complete US withdrawal from Iraq that have been made.

Despite a rising tide of violent incidents in both Baghdad and Mosul, the Iraqi government continues to insist that US forces will leave all Iraqi cities by 30 June and will withdraw from the whole country by the end of 2011. Whether this timetable will in fact be met must be open to increasing doubt.