Muslims Must Lead the Fight Against Islamist Terror

In November 1997 Islamist terrorists attacked foreign tourists visiting the ancient sites at Luxor, Egypt. More than sixty people were killed, mostly tourists, and then the terrorists committed suicide. Ordinary Egyptians were outraged at this crime. When the killers fled into nearby hills, it was significant that their first pursuers were local people not Egyptian security forces.

The Luxor massacre was a step too far for the Egyptian people and in its aftermath they largely rejected Islamist violence. In the five years before Luxor, Islamist terrorists killed more than 1,200 people in Egypt, many of them foreigners. After Luxor the Islamist terrorist movement in the country largely collapsed. Without some measure of popular support, the Islamists could no longer continue their campaign of violence.

In September 2001 Islamist terrorists launched their attacks in the United States using hijacked airliners as suicide weapons. Almost 3,000 people were killed. Despite the rejoicing of a small section of the Islamic world, the mass of the world's Muslims expressed their horror and disgust at these crimes. This widespread Muslim rejection of al-Qaeda and its actions was underlined by events in Afghanistan in the following months.

Osama bin Laden and his associate Ayman al-Zawahiri had hoped that in reaction to the events of 9/11 the United States would plunge into a war against their Taliban hosts in Afghanistan which would be a repeat of the Soviet-Afghan conflict of 1979-89. The Islamic world would rally to the support of Afghanistan, ready for another struggle against the infidel. Nothing like that happened. The world's Muslims would have nothing to do with the extremist criminals in Afghanistan.

Instead of a ten-year jihad, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were routed in a campaign lasting only a few months. Wisely the US-led coalition restricted its participation in the war to air attacks and the provision of special forces units on the ground. Most of the fighting against the Taliban and al-Qaeda was undertaken by their Afghan opponents and by tribal leaders who had found it prudent to change sides.

By early 2002 the Taliban and al-Qaeda seemed to have suffered a decisive defeat. Nor did their few supporters in the wider world have much impact. According to US State Department figures, the number of terrorist attacks around the world in 2002 was lower than in 2001 and, despite tragedies like the Bali bombing, the number of fatalities caused by such attacks had fallen substantially. Those extremists who wished to bring about a bloody 'clash of civilisations' between the West and the Islamic world seemed to have failed.

Then came the historic folly of the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Once it became clear that the swift American victory over Saddam Hussein would not be followed by peace but by an extended guerrilla war, Islamist extremists had the opportunity they had long sought. Thousands of Western troops were battling Muslims in the heart of the Islamic world, and these struggles were broadcast around the world every day. Despite the denunciations of Islamist terror by Muslim governments, increasing numbers of their people were ready to support the resistance struggle in Iraq.

By the end of 2004, the war in Iraq had begun to re-awaken the conflict in Afghanistan. Several years of comparative peace in that country had been wasted. Despite many promises, Western governments had failed to provide sufficient aid and assistance to bring stability and prosperity to Afghanistan. The influence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda began to revive and soon they were launching a new war from their bases in Pakistan. Many Afghans who had rejected their extremism in 2001 were now ready to join them.

Of course one cannot blame the strong revival of Islamist terrorism since 2003 solely on the actions of the West. As Osama bin Laden and his associates have made clear, they see many Muslim governments as being as bad as, if not worse than, the Western 'crusaders'. However, Osama bin Laden's endlessly repeated denunciations of 'crusader aggression' would be just meaningless ranting if the West had not taken military actions which gave them some plausibility.

No amount of Western sophistry could explain away the brutality depicted in the pictures of American military police ill-treating Muslim prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Images are always more powerful than words. Most Muslims will never actively support Islamist terrorism, but enough young men have been radicalised by Western military excesses in Iraq and Afghanistan to give a new lease of life to an extremist movement which seemed to be in terminal decline in 2002.

In their reactions to the Islamist terrorist atrocities of 1997 and 2001, Muslims have shown their instinctive hostility to such crimes. However, since 2003 the terrorists have been able to win support in some parts of the Islamic world by portraying the presence of Western military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as 'crusader aggression'. Resistance to such forces is said to be as much a duty for Muslims as was resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

Only a rapid reduction of this Western military presence can rob the extremists of one of their chief claims to wider Muslim support. Western governments must not see such a withdrawal as being a defeat. A lasting victory over Muslim extremism can only be achieved by other Muslims. The West may provide weapons, intelligence, logistics, and other valuable support, but Muslim governments must have the main role in suppressing Islamist terrorism.

At present Western military operations seem to be largely counter-productive, merely providing new recruits for the terrorists and alienating opinion in much of the Islamic world. It is time to give up the heavy-handed blundering that has characterised Western strategy since 2003 and attempt to formulate a more skilful and focused approach. In this new strategy Muslim countries must be more closely involved in both the planning and execution of anti-terrorist measures. Only then can the perpetrators of the atrocities of 1997 and 2001 be isolated and defeated, having lost all wider support in the Muslim community.

Turkey at the Crossroads: Will an Invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan Set a Dangerous Precedent?

One of the few things Turkey's moderate Islamist government of the Justice and Development (AK) party has in common with the secularist high command of the country's armed forces is a declared wish to take strong action against the terrorists of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The nationalist current is running strongly in Turkey and public hostlity to perceived enemies such as the Kurds and their American backers is both intense and widespread. The Turkish parliament passed a resolution giving the AK government approval to take military action against PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan by a massive majority. However, is this Turkish nationalist front really so monolithic?

One reason the PKK is desperate to provoke reckless Turkish military action that will rally all Kurds behind them is because their party is losing ground in the predominantly Kurdish areas of south-east Turkey. The AK government has made a significant effort to win over Kurdish opinion in that region by favourable treatment. This is not just a cynical exercise to win support in the European Union, which the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan is keen for Turkey to join. Erdogan wants to win over the Kurds with kindness, but the Turkish military has put him on the spot and forced him to take up a hard-line nationalist position.

Turkey's military high command tried to use scare tactics to discourage the electorate from returning the AK government to power in the July general election. They claimed there was an Islamist plot to overthrow Turkey's secular republic, but the electors were unimpressed, Erdogan returned to power, and an AK party candidate was appointed president. The military has now played the nationalist card, claiming the AK government is failing to stand up to the PKK terrorists. Reluctantly Erdogan has been forced to support the idea of a Turkish military incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan to destroy PKK bases.

Yet is the Turkish miltary high command itself really that enthusiastic about such an invasion? Past incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan, such as those of 1992 and 1997, undoubtedly did much damage to the PKK, but they could inflict no lasting defeat upon the insurgents. Those past Turkish incursions actually enjoyed the support of some Iraqi Kurd factions who were hostile to the PKK, but it seems unlikely that Kurdish ranks will be split this time. This will worry the Turkish generals as the last thing they want is to become bogged down in a prolonged guerrilla war, especially as this would restrict their chances of launching a coup against the AK government should its current revision of the Turkish constitution prove a clear threat to the secular state.

Thus both Turkish politicians and generals have reservations about an invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan, but the less bellicose alternative of economic sanctions against the Iraqi Kurds also presents problems. Most trade to and from Iraqi Kurdistan goes through Turkey, so an economic blockade would be a major blow. However, Turkish business interests have played a major part in the economic development of Iraqi Kurdistan and any such blockade would hit them as well. The Ankara government may refuse to recognise the semi-independent Kurdistan Regional Government, but on the ground Turkish companies have been happy to do business with the Iraqi Kurds. A short-lived military incursion would do less damage to such business links than a prolonged economic blockade. In any case, whatever the economic considerations, Erdogan and the generals seem to have painted themselves into a corner. Trapped by their nationalist rhetoric, they have increasingly left themselves with only one option: a military invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Such an invasion will put the USA in a very difficult position. The Kurds are the principal American ally within Iraq, but Turkey is America's most important military ally in the Middle East, after Israel. If armed conflict breaks out between the two sides, who will the USA support? To alienate the Kurds is to inject even more chaos into Iraq; to anger the Turks is to risk losing a vital ally at a time when a final showdown between the USA and Iran seems to be approaching. The Iranians would be delighted to join the Turks in action against the Iraqi Kurds and to seek to draw them away from the Americans.

Unless at the last minute the Iraqi Kurds decide to curb the PKK themselves, Turkish politicians and generals have taken such entrenched positions that they must launch some sort of military incursion in the near future. It will no doubt be a limited operation and the USA will seek to ignore it, restricting any criticism to diplomatic protests. Indeed Turkish action against PKK 'terrorist bases' in Iraq may provide a useful precedent for the Americans, who have long been promising to take action against 'terrorist bases' in Iran. Unfortunately while Turkish attacks on Iraqi Kurds are only likely to produce a short-lived crisis, American attacks on the Iranians will produce a conflict which may engulf the whole Middle East.