In 2009 Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi arrived in Rome for a state visit to Italy. Pinned to his uniform was a photograph of Omar Mukhtar, hero of the Libyan resistance to Italian imperialism. In 2011 the rebels fighting to overthrow Gaddafi named one of their military formations the 'Omar Mukhtar brigade'. Both sides in the current Libyan civil war claim Omar Mukhtar as their inspiration. He remains one of Libya's national heroes, the 'Lion of the Desert' who fought the Italian invaders for twenty years, until he was captured and executed by them in 1931.
The Italians had invaded Libya, then ruled by the Ottoman empire, in 1911. The Turks made peace in the following year and handed over the territory to Italy, but the native Muslim inhabitants refused to accept infidel rule. Their resistance struggle went on for more than two decades and Omar Mukhtar became its figurehead.
Today the victory of the NATO-backed Libyan rebels seems almost complete. Yet Muammar Gaddafi and his forces are still fighting, still resisting. Is it possible that he can go on resisting for years just as Omar Mukhtar did?
This seems unlikely since Gaddafi has few of the advantages which allowed Omar Mukhtar to carry on a guerrilla war for decades. These advantages were terrain, religious commitment, foreign support, and the distraction of his enemies.
Omar Mukhtar was a native of Cyrenaica, the north eastern region of Libya, and its difficult terrain provided hiding places for his guerrilla forces. Today Cyrenaica is completely hostile to Gaddafi and its principal city, Benghazi, served as the rebel capital until the liberation of Tripoli. It seems likely that Gaddafi will be driven out of his remaining strongholds near the Mediterranean coast and be forced southwards into the Sahara. There his forces will be even more vulnerable to NATO air attacks.
Omar Mukhtar was a member of the Senussi religious brotherhood, which enjoyed considerable support in North Africa and the wider Islamic world. Gaddafi has few supporters among the world's Muslims and he is regarded as a secular apostate by most Islamists, ranging from Al Qaeda to the House of Saud.
Omar Mukhtar's resistance struggle in Libya received the backing of neighbouring Egypt. Although the Egyptian government of the period was under British domination, the British had little interest in assisting their Italian imperial rivals. Gaddafi is not totally shunned by Libya's neighbours today. Algeria in particular is suspicious that the new NATO-backed Libyan regime is just a front for a revival of Western colonialism in North Africa. However, it seems unlikely that Algeria will give Gaddafi direct military assistance or provide him with a safe haven.
The initial Italian invasion led to the subjugation of most of Libya by 1913, but once Italy joined the First World War in 1915 the situation changed dramatically. Many Italian troops were withdrawn and the Libyan resistance took possession of most of the interior of the country. Even when Mussolini and his fascists came to power in Italy in 1922, Italian control of Libya was still largely restricted to a coastal strip. With no other distractions, Italian military conquest was renewed from 1925 onwards. However, it was only after General Rodolfo Graziani took charge in 1930 that Italian counter-insurgency efforts became truly effective. The rural inhabitants of Cyrenaica were driven into concentration camps; the Libya-Egypt border was sealed; and mobile columns, supported by aircraft, harassed the guerrillas relentlessly until Omar Mukhtar was captured and killed.
The First World War was a major distraction for the Italians. It gave the Libyan resistance a chance to regroup and reoccupy territory, setting back the Italian pacification of the country by perhaps a decade. Despite French president Sarkozy's remark that Syria may well be NATO's next target, it seems unlikely that the alliance will be distracted by a new war before it has finished its work in Libya. Gaddafi, unlike Omar Mukhtar, will not be given a chance to regroup his forces and regain ground. His defeat seems certain.
Yet only ten years ago commentators were making similar predictions about the Taliban in Afghanistan. Western military strategy in that country in late 2001 was very similar to the current strategy in Libya. The West would provide air power, while local forces, aided by a few Western special forces troops, would do most of the ground fighting against the enemy.
Unfortunately, the Taliban, supposedly crushed at the end of 2001, were to enjoy most of the advantages which allowed Omar Mukhtar to prolong his resistance in Libya. The Taliban found refuge in the rugged terrain of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; they continued to enjoy support within the wider Islamic world; many in the political and military establishment of neighbouring Pakistan assisted their cause; and their main Western enemy, the USA, was distracted by a new war in Iraq from 2003 onwards.
These factors allowed the Taliban to survive their apparently crushing defeat in 2001. For the reasons already noted, Muammar Gaddafi does not seem to have those advantages and it seems unlikely that he can stave off final defeat for much longer.
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
Friday, August 19, 2011
Endgame in Libya: Back to Western Colonialism?
As the fall of Muamar Gadaffi seems increasingly inevitable, thoughts are turning to what kind of government the Libyan opposition will put in his place. Also worthy of consideration is how far the new Libya will fall under the sort of Western control that existed in the country before Gadaffi's revolution in 1969.
The United States, Britain and France, along with their NATO and other allies, have gone to considerable expense, in treasure rather than blood, to support the Libyan opposition and remove Gadaffi, despite having no United Nations mandate for regime change. Whatever their high-minded claims to be only acting to protect the Libyan people, they will now look for political and economic returns on their investment.
In 1943 the Italian colony of Libya was overrun by the British army. A British military administration was installed in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, with the United States retaining use of various air bases. In the south of Libya, known as the Fezzan, French administrators were installed, running the area as an extension of France's existing North African colonies.
In 1949 the United Nations agreed that Libya should become an independent country, and in 1951 the kingdom of Libya came into being, ruled by King Idris. However, both Britain and the United States retained military bases in Libya.
Initially the bases brought much needed money into an impoverished country, but the situation changed after oil was discovered in Libya in 1959. With the French exit from Algeria in 1962, it seemed that Western colonialism in North Africa had come to an end. However, Western military bases remained in Libya until Gadaffi's bloodless coup in 1969.
In March 1970 the British gave up the RAF base at El Adem; in June the Americans left Wheelus air base; and in October Gadaffi expelled the last Italian settlers from Libya. For the next forty years Gadaffi would keep Libya firmly in the anti-Western camp in international affairs.
Now that Gadaffi seems on the verge of being consigned to the scrapheap of history, what spoils will be demanded by the victors? The Libyan opposition will set up a new government, but the NATO powers who backed the rebels will be the real victors.
Will the United States, Britain and France want new military bases in Libya? These would be useful to keep an eye on Egypt, where the new political setup after the fall of Mubarak still remains in flux. Canada has made its contribution to the NATO war effort against Gadaffi, and the Harper government has said it is looking to create a worldwide chain of Canadian military support bases. Might not Libya host one such base?
Military bases would probably be too provocative to certain sections of the Libyan opposition, especially the Islamists. Nevertheless it seems likely that the new, democratic Libya will quickly be overrun by Western civilian and military 'advisers', while Western oil companies and other businesses will be given economic opportunities in Libya that have largely been closed to them for the last forty years.
The new Libyan regime will have little choice but to give in to Western demands. After all, the West will only unfreeze Libya's financial assets held abroad if it gets a new Libyan government friendly to its interests. Whether this brave new world can be seen as a return to colonial exploitation by the West or as a boost for freedom and democracy in Libya depends on one's political viewpoint.
The United States, Britain and France, along with their NATO and other allies, have gone to considerable expense, in treasure rather than blood, to support the Libyan opposition and remove Gadaffi, despite having no United Nations mandate for regime change. Whatever their high-minded claims to be only acting to protect the Libyan people, they will now look for political and economic returns on their investment.
In 1943 the Italian colony of Libya was overrun by the British army. A British military administration was installed in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, with the United States retaining use of various air bases. In the south of Libya, known as the Fezzan, French administrators were installed, running the area as an extension of France's existing North African colonies.
In 1949 the United Nations agreed that Libya should become an independent country, and in 1951 the kingdom of Libya came into being, ruled by King Idris. However, both Britain and the United States retained military bases in Libya.
Initially the bases brought much needed money into an impoverished country, but the situation changed after oil was discovered in Libya in 1959. With the French exit from Algeria in 1962, it seemed that Western colonialism in North Africa had come to an end. However, Western military bases remained in Libya until Gadaffi's bloodless coup in 1969.
In March 1970 the British gave up the RAF base at El Adem; in June the Americans left Wheelus air base; and in October Gadaffi expelled the last Italian settlers from Libya. For the next forty years Gadaffi would keep Libya firmly in the anti-Western camp in international affairs.
Now that Gadaffi seems on the verge of being consigned to the scrapheap of history, what spoils will be demanded by the victors? The Libyan opposition will set up a new government, but the NATO powers who backed the rebels will be the real victors.
Will the United States, Britain and France want new military bases in Libya? These would be useful to keep an eye on Egypt, where the new political setup after the fall of Mubarak still remains in flux. Canada has made its contribution to the NATO war effort against Gadaffi, and the Harper government has said it is looking to create a worldwide chain of Canadian military support bases. Might not Libya host one such base?
Military bases would probably be too provocative to certain sections of the Libyan opposition, especially the Islamists. Nevertheless it seems likely that the new, democratic Libya will quickly be overrun by Western civilian and military 'advisers', while Western oil companies and other businesses will be given economic opportunities in Libya that have largely been closed to them for the last forty years.
The new Libyan regime will have little choice but to give in to Western demands. After all, the West will only unfreeze Libya's financial assets held abroad if it gets a new Libyan government friendly to its interests. Whether this brave new world can be seen as a return to colonial exploitation by the West or as a boost for freedom and democracy in Libya depends on one's political viewpoint.
Thursday, May 19, 2011
A Wise Withdrawal or Eternal War?
The Christian Knights of Malta described their maritime conflict with the Muslims in the Mediterranean Sea as the 'eternal war'. It lasted from the arrival of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem in Malta in 1530 until the island was seized by the French under Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798. If not quite 'eternal', a struggle lasting more than 250 years must certainly have seemed never-ending to successive generations of Christian knights and Muslim corsairs who engaged in the holy war at sea.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has embarked on an apparently never-ending struggle against Islamist terrorism. It is not an 'eternal war', merely a 'long war' according to American strategists. However, since they cannot say what a final conclusion of this conflict would look like, it seems their idea of 'long' may not be so very different from the 'eternal' struggle of the Knights of Malta. The knights could accept such an endless struggle because they regarded the clash between Christianity and Islam as a divinely sanctioned contest. A supposedly secular democracy like the United States cannot view the prospect of endless conflict in such a mystical way.
Despite the regular American denials that their struggle with Muslim terrorists is a war against Islam, few Muslims have any confidence in such assertions. Muslims are no different from the rest of humanity. They judge Americans by what they do, not by what they say. Almost 250,000 US military personnel are waging war within the Islamic world, yet no Muslim nation poses the slightest threat to the United States. Americans protest that they are only fighting a small minority of Muslim extremists, but those extremists could not exist if they did not receive at least tacit support from a significant proportion of the world's Muslims. They receive that support precisely because the USA and other Western powers have invaded the Islamic world on their mission of vengeance for 9/11.
Now that Osama bin Laden, the supposed evil genius behind the 9/11 atrocities, is dead, President Barack Hussein Obama has an ideal opportunity to change this situation. The killing of bin Laden gives him the opportunity to declare victory and bring the bulk of American military forces home from the Islamic world. That military presence has been one of the main reasons for Muslim hostility to America. The Arab revolt of 2011 shows that new forces, mostly not linked to Islamist extremism, are at work in the Muslim world. If most US forces are brought home and a reasonable settlement is agreed over the issue of Palestine, then the Islamist terrorists will have lost the principal grievances that have given them any wider credibility among Muslims.
President Obama must complete the promised US withdrawal from Iraq by the end of this year. He must also expedite the removal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. These two withdrawals will not mean the end of a US military presence in the greater Middle East, but it will be restricted to naval forces in the Gulf and elsewhere, which will be much less provocative to Muslims than boots on the ground in their own countries. As well as actual aircraft carriers, the United States will also still have its 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' the state of Israel to act as regional policeman on its behalf.
Not only would large-scale military withdrawals end local support for Islamist militants, but they would also benefit the steadily declining economy of the USA. Foreign wars have been a major cause of the US government's increasing indebtedness. Dollars spent on bombing Afghanistan would be better spent on improving health facilities for American citizens at home.
This policy of wise withdrawal would be of infinite benefit to the United States and its people, but it seems unlikely to happen. After Augustus Rome was an empire which still retained the trappings of a republic. Similarly, since Franklin D. Roosevelt was president, the USA has been an empire while still insisting that it remains a republic. Once the Roman eagle was planted on foreign territory, the emperor would lose prestige if it was removed. The Americans take a similar view, believing, like the Romans, that they are the guarantors of world order and that any step backwards can only undermine international security.
Other past empires have taken a similar view. In the sixteenth century the rulers of the Spanish empire refused to grant independence to their rebellious provinces in the Netherlands. They believed that any withdrawal would undermine the image of omnipotent Spanish power. For eighty years the Spanish fought to subdue the Dutch. However, in the mid-seventeenth century a bankrupt Spain finally had to accept the reality of Dutch independence. While Spain was bogged down in this long war, its rivals, such as England and France, grew steadily in power and influence. Today powers like Russia and China are not unhappy to see the USA squandering blood and treasure on conflicts in the Islamic world which can only sap its strength.
If the United States chooses to continue its wars in the Islamic world, its burdens and losses can only increase. The Sadrists have already threatened a new war against US forces in Iraq if they do not complete their withdrawal from that country by the end of 2011. The deadline for US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan is regularly extended, most recently to 2014, but many Americans seem to want a permanent occupation of the country. The death of Osama bin Laden is totally irrelevant to the war in Afghanistan. The Taliban have fought the infidel invaders of Afghanistan for the last ten years; they can continue that struggle for another ten years if necessary. Most alarmingly, the rapidly deteriorating relations between the USA and Pakistan may lead to open warfare between the Americans and the world's second most populous Muslim state.
Assassinations are always striking events, but whether they have much long-term significance is open to doubt. In 1584 an assassin killed William, prince of Orange (also called William the Silent), the principal leader of the Dutch rebels, after the Spanish offered a large financial reward for his murder. This event did nothing to end the Dutch revolt against Spanish rule, and the struggle between the two sides continued for decades. The death of Osama bin Laden is similarly unlikely to have much long-term impact on America's wars in the Muslim world.
President Obama has a simple choice. He can recognize the limits of US imperial power and withdraw most American military forces from the Islamic world. Or he can continue and extend the conflicts carried on by those forces, reinforcing the new 'eternal war' which can only end with the national bankruptcy of the USA.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has embarked on an apparently never-ending struggle against Islamist terrorism. It is not an 'eternal war', merely a 'long war' according to American strategists. However, since they cannot say what a final conclusion of this conflict would look like, it seems their idea of 'long' may not be so very different from the 'eternal' struggle of the Knights of Malta. The knights could accept such an endless struggle because they regarded the clash between Christianity and Islam as a divinely sanctioned contest. A supposedly secular democracy like the United States cannot view the prospect of endless conflict in such a mystical way.
Despite the regular American denials that their struggle with Muslim terrorists is a war against Islam, few Muslims have any confidence in such assertions. Muslims are no different from the rest of humanity. They judge Americans by what they do, not by what they say. Almost 250,000 US military personnel are waging war within the Islamic world, yet no Muslim nation poses the slightest threat to the United States. Americans protest that they are only fighting a small minority of Muslim extremists, but those extremists could not exist if they did not receive at least tacit support from a significant proportion of the world's Muslims. They receive that support precisely because the USA and other Western powers have invaded the Islamic world on their mission of vengeance for 9/11.
Now that Osama bin Laden, the supposed evil genius behind the 9/11 atrocities, is dead, President Barack Hussein Obama has an ideal opportunity to change this situation. The killing of bin Laden gives him the opportunity to declare victory and bring the bulk of American military forces home from the Islamic world. That military presence has been one of the main reasons for Muslim hostility to America. The Arab revolt of 2011 shows that new forces, mostly not linked to Islamist extremism, are at work in the Muslim world. If most US forces are brought home and a reasonable settlement is agreed over the issue of Palestine, then the Islamist terrorists will have lost the principal grievances that have given them any wider credibility among Muslims.
President Obama must complete the promised US withdrawal from Iraq by the end of this year. He must also expedite the removal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. These two withdrawals will not mean the end of a US military presence in the greater Middle East, but it will be restricted to naval forces in the Gulf and elsewhere, which will be much less provocative to Muslims than boots on the ground in their own countries. As well as actual aircraft carriers, the United States will also still have its 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' the state of Israel to act as regional policeman on its behalf.
Not only would large-scale military withdrawals end local support for Islamist militants, but they would also benefit the steadily declining economy of the USA. Foreign wars have been a major cause of the US government's increasing indebtedness. Dollars spent on bombing Afghanistan would be better spent on improving health facilities for American citizens at home.
This policy of wise withdrawal would be of infinite benefit to the United States and its people, but it seems unlikely to happen. After Augustus Rome was an empire which still retained the trappings of a republic. Similarly, since Franklin D. Roosevelt was president, the USA has been an empire while still insisting that it remains a republic. Once the Roman eagle was planted on foreign territory, the emperor would lose prestige if it was removed. The Americans take a similar view, believing, like the Romans, that they are the guarantors of world order and that any step backwards can only undermine international security.
Other past empires have taken a similar view. In the sixteenth century the rulers of the Spanish empire refused to grant independence to their rebellious provinces in the Netherlands. They believed that any withdrawal would undermine the image of omnipotent Spanish power. For eighty years the Spanish fought to subdue the Dutch. However, in the mid-seventeenth century a bankrupt Spain finally had to accept the reality of Dutch independence. While Spain was bogged down in this long war, its rivals, such as England and France, grew steadily in power and influence. Today powers like Russia and China are not unhappy to see the USA squandering blood and treasure on conflicts in the Islamic world which can only sap its strength.
If the United States chooses to continue its wars in the Islamic world, its burdens and losses can only increase. The Sadrists have already threatened a new war against US forces in Iraq if they do not complete their withdrawal from that country by the end of 2011. The deadline for US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan is regularly extended, most recently to 2014, but many Americans seem to want a permanent occupation of the country. The death of Osama bin Laden is totally irrelevant to the war in Afghanistan. The Taliban have fought the infidel invaders of Afghanistan for the last ten years; they can continue that struggle for another ten years if necessary. Most alarmingly, the rapidly deteriorating relations between the USA and Pakistan may lead to open warfare between the Americans and the world's second most populous Muslim state.
Assassinations are always striking events, but whether they have much long-term significance is open to doubt. In 1584 an assassin killed William, prince of Orange (also called William the Silent), the principal leader of the Dutch rebels, after the Spanish offered a large financial reward for his murder. This event did nothing to end the Dutch revolt against Spanish rule, and the struggle between the two sides continued for decades. The death of Osama bin Laden is similarly unlikely to have much long-term impact on America's wars in the Muslim world.
President Obama has a simple choice. He can recognize the limits of US imperial power and withdraw most American military forces from the Islamic world. Or he can continue and extend the conflicts carried on by those forces, reinforcing the new 'eternal war' which can only end with the national bankruptcy of the USA.
Tuesday, April 12, 2011
Libya and the Limits of Air Power
Almost a century ago, the use of aircraft in military combat was initiated during the Italian invasion of Libya, which was then part of the Ottoman Turkish empire.
On the first day of November 1911 Italian officer Lt. Giulio Gavotti dropped a small bomb from a German-built Etrich Taube aircraft. Its effects on the Ottoman Turkish troops on the ground in Libya remain unknown, but this first aerial bombing raid opened the age of military air power.
In 1912 the Ottoman government made peace with Italy and handed over Libya to become an Italian colony. However, the local Arabs decided to continue their resistance to infidel invasion. After the massive growth of air power during the First World War, Mussolini's fascists made a greater use of aircraft in Italian counter-insurgency operations in Libya during the 1920s. As well as ordinary munitions, the aircraft were also alleged to have dropped poison gas bombs on the Libyans.
In 1931 the principal Libyan resistance leader, Omar Mukhtar, was captured by the Italians and executed. By 1934 the last insurgents had been defeated and Italy finally had complete control of the country. Air power had played a significant role in the Italian victory, but the activities of soldiers on the ground were still more important.
The Italians used air power to subject the Libyan people to European imperialism. Today the Western powers claim to be using air power to free the Libyan people from the oppressive rule of Muammar Gadaffi.
The destructive power that can be inflicted by aircraft is now vastly greater than it was at the birth of military air power back in 1911. Nevertheless, it may be asked whether the impact of such power is likely to be any more decisive in Libya today than it was a century ago.
The NATO interpretation of the United Nations resolution allowing military action to protect Libyan civilians allows its aircraft to destroy Gadaffi's aircraft and ground weapons such as tanks and artillery. However, both British and French government ministers have openly talked of overthrowing the Gadaffi regime, while American officials have hinted that such an outcome is desirable. Regime change is not mentioned in the UN resolution, and there are considerable doubts whether it can be achieved by air power alone.
After some initial enthusiasm, the United States government now seems to want to take only a supporting role in the air operations in Libya. Air attacks will largely be left to other NATO countries, especially France and Britain. Yet the United States is the only world-class air power. If it declines to take a leading role in the air assault on Libya, the impact of that assault can only be weakened.
France can deploy significant air assets from both its air force and its navy, but Britain's air force is in a weakened condition due to misguided defence cuts and the same cuts have virtually destroyed the country's naval air component. In real terms Britain's air contribution in Libya will not be much greater than that of Canada and other lesser NATO military powers.
Even if the United States decides to reverse its policy and takes the leading role in air operations in Libya. can these operations achieve their stated goals? In 1999 NATO waged an air campaign against Yugoslavia to protect the oppressed people of Kosovo. It was supposed to bring the Yugoslavs to the negotiating table within days. Then the days turned into weeks and the weeks into months, but still the Yugoslavs remained defiant in face of the biggest air assault in Europe since the Second World War. Only the threat of a NATO land invasion of Kosovo brought Slobodan Milosevic to terms.
Will Libya be a repeat of Kosovo? It seems a distinct possibility. There have been the usual promises of no NATO 'boots on the ground' in Libya, but if the air campaign cannot defeat Gadaffi, what other course will be open if the removal of his regime remains the declared intention of the Western attackers? A stalemate which leads to a divided Libya is said to be unacceptable, but only ground forces can ensure the fall of the Gadaffi regime. The forces of the Libyan rebels are too weak to do this, so NATO troops must at some point go ashore in Libya.
Military air power was born in Libya in 1911, but almost a hundred years later it is still unable to win a war in that country all by itself. Only military intervention can bring down the Gadaffi regime. How will the Islamic world react to yet another Western invasion of a Muslim country? And how long will it take NATO to subdue Libya? It took the Italians almost a quarter of a century. NATO will no doubt expect a shorter campaign, but its apparently endless struggle in Afghanistan is not an encouraging precedent.
On the first day of November 1911 Italian officer Lt. Giulio Gavotti dropped a small bomb from a German-built Etrich Taube aircraft. Its effects on the Ottoman Turkish troops on the ground in Libya remain unknown, but this first aerial bombing raid opened the age of military air power.
In 1912 the Ottoman government made peace with Italy and handed over Libya to become an Italian colony. However, the local Arabs decided to continue their resistance to infidel invasion. After the massive growth of air power during the First World War, Mussolini's fascists made a greater use of aircraft in Italian counter-insurgency operations in Libya during the 1920s. As well as ordinary munitions, the aircraft were also alleged to have dropped poison gas bombs on the Libyans.
In 1931 the principal Libyan resistance leader, Omar Mukhtar, was captured by the Italians and executed. By 1934 the last insurgents had been defeated and Italy finally had complete control of the country. Air power had played a significant role in the Italian victory, but the activities of soldiers on the ground were still more important.
The Italians used air power to subject the Libyan people to European imperialism. Today the Western powers claim to be using air power to free the Libyan people from the oppressive rule of Muammar Gadaffi.
The destructive power that can be inflicted by aircraft is now vastly greater than it was at the birth of military air power back in 1911. Nevertheless, it may be asked whether the impact of such power is likely to be any more decisive in Libya today than it was a century ago.
The NATO interpretation of the United Nations resolution allowing military action to protect Libyan civilians allows its aircraft to destroy Gadaffi's aircraft and ground weapons such as tanks and artillery. However, both British and French government ministers have openly talked of overthrowing the Gadaffi regime, while American officials have hinted that such an outcome is desirable. Regime change is not mentioned in the UN resolution, and there are considerable doubts whether it can be achieved by air power alone.
After some initial enthusiasm, the United States government now seems to want to take only a supporting role in the air operations in Libya. Air attacks will largely be left to other NATO countries, especially France and Britain. Yet the United States is the only world-class air power. If it declines to take a leading role in the air assault on Libya, the impact of that assault can only be weakened.
France can deploy significant air assets from both its air force and its navy, but Britain's air force is in a weakened condition due to misguided defence cuts and the same cuts have virtually destroyed the country's naval air component. In real terms Britain's air contribution in Libya will not be much greater than that of Canada and other lesser NATO military powers.
Even if the United States decides to reverse its policy and takes the leading role in air operations in Libya. can these operations achieve their stated goals? In 1999 NATO waged an air campaign against Yugoslavia to protect the oppressed people of Kosovo. It was supposed to bring the Yugoslavs to the negotiating table within days. Then the days turned into weeks and the weeks into months, but still the Yugoslavs remained defiant in face of the biggest air assault in Europe since the Second World War. Only the threat of a NATO land invasion of Kosovo brought Slobodan Milosevic to terms.
Will Libya be a repeat of Kosovo? It seems a distinct possibility. There have been the usual promises of no NATO 'boots on the ground' in Libya, but if the air campaign cannot defeat Gadaffi, what other course will be open if the removal of his regime remains the declared intention of the Western attackers? A stalemate which leads to a divided Libya is said to be unacceptable, but only ground forces can ensure the fall of the Gadaffi regime. The forces of the Libyan rebels are too weak to do this, so NATO troops must at some point go ashore in Libya.
Military air power was born in Libya in 1911, but almost a hundred years later it is still unable to win a war in that country all by itself. Only military intervention can bring down the Gadaffi regime. How will the Islamic world react to yet another Western invasion of a Muslim country? And how long will it take NATO to subdue Libya? It took the Italians almost a quarter of a century. NATO will no doubt expect a shorter campaign, but its apparently endless struggle in Afghanistan is not an encouraging precedent.
Saturday, March 5, 2011
A New Arab World or 1848 Revisited?
As popular revolution continues to sweep the Arab world, commentators have searched for comparisons with earlier revolutionary outbreaks in history. One choice has been the revolutions of 1848 in Europe.
In a few short months in that year a wave of liberal and democratic revolution swept across western and central Europe, touching states in France, Germany, Italy, and Austria. In a few places rulers lost their thrones, such as King Louis Philippe in France, but in all the places touched by the revolutionary flame, the old regime had to make rapid concessions to the demands of the revolutionaries, even in reactionary Prussia and Austria.
However, just as the waves of the sea rapidly lose their force as they sweep across the beach, so the revolutionary fervour of 1848, seemingly so irresistible, soon began to dissipate. By 1850 most of the concessions which the revolutionaries had won from the old regime had been lost. The reactionaries were back in control almost everywhere. The revolutionaries of 1848 had lacked strong leadership, clear aims, and adequate military force. It proved all too easy for their enemies to exploit the divisions among them, whether political or racial.
France had been the first country to begin the revolutionary outbreak in 1848, but even in the summer of that year, the conservative elements among the new regime were shooting down the workers in Paris. Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great Napoleon, was made president of the new French republic, but within a few years he had seized power and turned himself into Emperor Napoleon III, although still claiming to be a 'liberal' emperor.
The state which seemed doomed by the impact of the 1848 revolutionary wave was the multi-national Austrian empire. Young emperor Franz Josef had only just entered into his inheritance, but now it seemed he would lose it all, as revolutions broke out in Vienna, Prague, Budapest, and in his Italian possessions. Yet he was to survive these upheavals thanks to the loyalty of most of the imperial army, the exploitation of racial divisions among the revolutionary groups, and the intervention of a foreign army sent by the arch reactionary Tsar Nicholas I of Russia to help the Austrians crush the most serious revolt in Hungary. By 1850 the Austrian empire was back under the control of the government of Franz Josef, and he would remain emperor until his death in 1916.
Of course a historical comparison between events today in the Arab world and those in Europe more than 150 years ago cannot be carried too far. Nevertheless it seems not unlikely that the Arab revolutions will produce more sound and fury than lasting political change. Although leaders like Ben Ali and Mubarak have been driven out, the military and most of the old regime politicians largely remain in control of states like Tunisia and Egypt. Even Muammar Gaddafi may emulate Franz Josef and emerge victorious from a seemingly impossible situation. The emperor was in large part saved by foreign intervention; Gaddafi may be saved by a failure of the international community to intervene in support of the revolutionaries in Libya.
If the current Arab revolutionary wave does collapse like that of 1848, what will this mean for the West? Trying to make up for their decades of support for Arab dictators, Westerners have been shrill in their praise for the popular uprisings in the Arab world, although these words have not been followed by any action. If the much-trumpeted 'new Arab world' fails to emerge and the old regime withdraws its concessions and largely resumes power, will not the Arab people be disillusioned and even more angry? Despite the claims of some alarmist commentators, radical Islamists have not featured greatly in the present revolutionary outbreaks. However, if the promises of freedom and democracy for the Arab masses are not met, then angry young Arabs are going to be much more receptive to the anti-Western message of Islamic militants.
Words and no action from the West may turn the new Arab revolutionaries against the United States and its allies, but will a restoration of the old regime do the West much good either? The Arab dictators consider, not unreasonably, that they have been deserted by their former Western supporters in their hour of need. If the groups that supported the dictators, chiefly the military and the conservative politicians, manage to retain power in most of the Arab countries disturbed by revolution, will they ever trust the West again? Once the tame vassals of the United States and its allies, they seem more likely to take a more independent line in the future on issues such as Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran.
For Arabs, the current revolutionary movement may not in the end achieve any major lasting political changes. However, for the West its relations with the Arab world cannot help being substantially altered whichever side eventually emerges victorious. Neither the old regime nor the new revolutionaries are likely to trust the West when its words of support remain just empty promises.
In a few short months in that year a wave of liberal and democratic revolution swept across western and central Europe, touching states in France, Germany, Italy, and Austria. In a few places rulers lost their thrones, such as King Louis Philippe in France, but in all the places touched by the revolutionary flame, the old regime had to make rapid concessions to the demands of the revolutionaries, even in reactionary Prussia and Austria.
However, just as the waves of the sea rapidly lose their force as they sweep across the beach, so the revolutionary fervour of 1848, seemingly so irresistible, soon began to dissipate. By 1850 most of the concessions which the revolutionaries had won from the old regime had been lost. The reactionaries were back in control almost everywhere. The revolutionaries of 1848 had lacked strong leadership, clear aims, and adequate military force. It proved all too easy for their enemies to exploit the divisions among them, whether political or racial.
France had been the first country to begin the revolutionary outbreak in 1848, but even in the summer of that year, the conservative elements among the new regime were shooting down the workers in Paris. Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great Napoleon, was made president of the new French republic, but within a few years he had seized power and turned himself into Emperor Napoleon III, although still claiming to be a 'liberal' emperor.
The state which seemed doomed by the impact of the 1848 revolutionary wave was the multi-national Austrian empire. Young emperor Franz Josef had only just entered into his inheritance, but now it seemed he would lose it all, as revolutions broke out in Vienna, Prague, Budapest, and in his Italian possessions. Yet he was to survive these upheavals thanks to the loyalty of most of the imperial army, the exploitation of racial divisions among the revolutionary groups, and the intervention of a foreign army sent by the arch reactionary Tsar Nicholas I of Russia to help the Austrians crush the most serious revolt in Hungary. By 1850 the Austrian empire was back under the control of the government of Franz Josef, and he would remain emperor until his death in 1916.
Of course a historical comparison between events today in the Arab world and those in Europe more than 150 years ago cannot be carried too far. Nevertheless it seems not unlikely that the Arab revolutions will produce more sound and fury than lasting political change. Although leaders like Ben Ali and Mubarak have been driven out, the military and most of the old regime politicians largely remain in control of states like Tunisia and Egypt. Even Muammar Gaddafi may emulate Franz Josef and emerge victorious from a seemingly impossible situation. The emperor was in large part saved by foreign intervention; Gaddafi may be saved by a failure of the international community to intervene in support of the revolutionaries in Libya.
If the current Arab revolutionary wave does collapse like that of 1848, what will this mean for the West? Trying to make up for their decades of support for Arab dictators, Westerners have been shrill in their praise for the popular uprisings in the Arab world, although these words have not been followed by any action. If the much-trumpeted 'new Arab world' fails to emerge and the old regime withdraws its concessions and largely resumes power, will not the Arab people be disillusioned and even more angry? Despite the claims of some alarmist commentators, radical Islamists have not featured greatly in the present revolutionary outbreaks. However, if the promises of freedom and democracy for the Arab masses are not met, then angry young Arabs are going to be much more receptive to the anti-Western message of Islamic militants.
Words and no action from the West may turn the new Arab revolutionaries against the United States and its allies, but will a restoration of the old regime do the West much good either? The Arab dictators consider, not unreasonably, that they have been deserted by their former Western supporters in their hour of need. If the groups that supported the dictators, chiefly the military and the conservative politicians, manage to retain power in most of the Arab countries disturbed by revolution, will they ever trust the West again? Once the tame vassals of the United States and its allies, they seem more likely to take a more independent line in the future on issues such as Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran.
For Arabs, the current revolutionary movement may not in the end achieve any major lasting political changes. However, for the West its relations with the Arab world cannot help being substantially altered whichever side eventually emerges victorious. Neither the old regime nor the new revolutionaries are likely to trust the West when its words of support remain just empty promises.
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Wars and Rumours of Wars: Iraq and Afghanistan Today; Iran and North Korea Tomorrow
Since the start of the twenty-first century, the world has been disturbed by both wars in the present and rumours of wars in the near future. The two principal wars, caused by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies, have been linked to the so-called 'war on terror', a war that is now clearly just a war on Islamic 'terror'.
One of the future wars is also loosely linked to the war on terror. Scarcely a month goes by without rumours that Israel and/or the USA is about to launch a military attack on Iran. These reports have been with us for years, but the assault has not yet taken place. Nevertheless there is little doubt the plans for war exist and the command has only to be given to send missiles and aircraft on their way. Iran has attacked no other country, but the United States and Israel claim the right to launch a pre-emptive attack upon it. Iran's supposed crimes are trying to develop nuclear weapons and aiding Islamic terrorism. There is some truth in the latter accusation, but the former one has still to be proved.
Under the Westphalian system of international relations which existed from 1648 to 2001 pre-emptive wars were regarded as illegal, but since 9/11 the United States has declared it will only recognise international law when it finds this convenient. The Westphalian system rested on a belief in the equal sovereignty of nations. The USA has made it clear it does not recognise the sovereignty of any other nation. Other nations must bend to its will or suffer the consequences. The rule of law is replaced by the rule of the strongest. This is hardly a recipe for international peace.
In the case of Iran, the United States can be sure of support for aggressive action not just from Israel but also from certain Muslim nations in the region. The rulers of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Arab states, all staunch Sunni Muslims, are keen to back an American/Israeli military assault on the Shia Muslims of Iran. Clearly the concept of Muslim solidarity is almost as laughable today as the notion of international law, with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference as irrelevant in world affairs as the United Nations.
With so many countries working for conflict with Iran, that rumour of war may eventually become a reality. One can only hope that such an assault on isolated, militarily weak Iran will be the swift and successful operation its advocates claim, but the law of unintended consequences may come into play here just as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. The second future war of which rumours have circulated for years may come to reality even sooner than the conflict with Iran and its consequences may be much more dangerous.
The notion of a pre-emptive strike by the USA on North Korea has been around almost as long as the much-discussed plan for an assault on Iran. The communist rulers of North Korea are held to be an even greater threat to the security of the world community than the ayatollahs of Iran. North Korea is considered to have some kind of nuclear weapon and the country's behaviour has been much more provocative than that of Iran. The sinking of the South Korean frigate earlier this year and the recent bombardment of a South Korean island show North Korea is an aggressive power whose conduct must provoke a reaction stronger than words from the United States at some point. America may unleash war on Iran at some point, but North Korea is unwilling to wait passively for a US pre-emptive strike. It is already prepared to risk war with America and its allies.
In contrast to the situation with Iran, America's allies are not thirsting to start a war with North Korea. Probably no nation on earth is better prepared for war than this communist dictatorship. Claims have been made that the North Korean people are starving and their economy is in ruins. Whether or not that is true, one can be sure that the country's military forces are well fed, well armed, and highly motivated. Any American military attack in response to a new North Korean provocation is bound to lead in turn to massive North Korean retaliation. Of course most of the victims of such retaliation will not be Americans. They will be South Koreans, and possibly Japanese.
Thus the governments of South Korea and Japan, despite their strident verbal condemnations of North Korea, are not enthusiastic about taking any significant military action against that country. They look to China to restrain its North Korean neighbour, and for the moment the United States seems prepared to go along with this policy. But is it a realistic policy? Such an approach is akin to expecting the USA to restrain Israel because it has close relations with that country. Far from being under its superpower sponsor's thumb, Israel has recently chosen to ignore American pleas to stop Jewish settlement on Palestinian land and so has ruined hopes of new Middle East peace negotiations. Despite this defiance, the United States will not punish Israel, and in similar fashion China will take no action against North Korea if it ignores Chinese advice.
Iran studiously avoids military clashes with its enemies in the Gulf; North Korea seems to go out of its way to provoke them. And any military clash in the Korean peninsula has the potential to lead to rapid escalation and open war between the opposing sides. North Korea is confident that no matter how much it suffers in such a conflict, it can inflict massive damage on South Korea, and possibly on Japan as well. In addition, should an errant American cruise missile fail to hit its North Korean target and land in China instead, then the situation in the region would become even more explosive.
Assuming neither North Korea nor the United States resort to the use of nuclear weapons, a conventional war would resume in Korea and it would in some ways resemble the conflict of 1950-53 which ended in an uneasy truce. The USA would again have almost complete command of the sea and the air, but on land America would find it difficult once again to achieve a decisive victory over North Korea. American forces in South Korea currently number around 30,000 personnel. If a large scale conventional war broke out, such forces would need to increase to at least 300,000 personnel. If it is assumed that the re-introduction of the draft in the USA is politically unacceptable, then the Americans could only find such a force by removing their last troops from Iraq, stripping their garrison in Germany, and effectively closing down their war in Afghanistan. South Korea would provide the bulk of the allied forces to assist America in the war against North Korea, but no doubt countries such as Britain, Canada, Australia, and Turkey, which provided contingents during the 1950-53 Korean war, might be expected to send forces once more. Despite its 'peace' constitution, Japan could hardly avoid giving military aid to the United States, given that it already hosts American naval, marine, and air force bases.
Even if the United States and its allies assembled sufficient manpower and firepower to inflict serious damage on the North Korean war machine, the USA would eventually face the same dilemma it did in 1950. Should it invade North Korea with the intention of liberating the country from communist rule? In 1950 the Chinese made it clear that although they would accept the defeat of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, they would take action if the Americans attempted to occupy the north. General Macarthur ignored the Chinese warning, entered North Korea, and was then driven out by an army of Chinese 'volunteers'.
How would today's China react to an invasion of North Korea by the United States and its allies? Perhaps not with direct military intervention, but probably by providing sufficient supplies to sustain North Korean resistance. And how would the USA react to that? In 1950 General Macarthur reacted to Chinese military intervention by demanding American atomic bomb attacks on China. He did not get them and President Truman finally decided to sack the general. In 1950 China did not have any nuclear weapons. It does now and they have a global reach. Whatever aid China gave to North Korea, it seems unlikely the United States would risk provoking World War III by taking any military action against China.
Although the assault on Iran which American conservatives and Israeli hardliners have worked for over the last few years would undoubtedly produce a major international crisis, such a crisis would be as nothing compared to the outbreak of a major war in the Korean peninsula. If this rumour of war became a reality, the whole world might be in danger from the ever-escalating consequences of such a conflict. Renewed diplomacy is the only way to avoid this outcome. The United States must agree to a meeting of the six power conference on Korea as soon as possible, making no pre-conditions and avoiding any further military escalation. North Korea may be a rogue state, but if it is driven into a corner, it may, like a mad dog, strike out in all directions with terrible consequences for the region and the world.
One of the future wars is also loosely linked to the war on terror. Scarcely a month goes by without rumours that Israel and/or the USA is about to launch a military attack on Iran. These reports have been with us for years, but the assault has not yet taken place. Nevertheless there is little doubt the plans for war exist and the command has only to be given to send missiles and aircraft on their way. Iran has attacked no other country, but the United States and Israel claim the right to launch a pre-emptive attack upon it. Iran's supposed crimes are trying to develop nuclear weapons and aiding Islamic terrorism. There is some truth in the latter accusation, but the former one has still to be proved.
Under the Westphalian system of international relations which existed from 1648 to 2001 pre-emptive wars were regarded as illegal, but since 9/11 the United States has declared it will only recognise international law when it finds this convenient. The Westphalian system rested on a belief in the equal sovereignty of nations. The USA has made it clear it does not recognise the sovereignty of any other nation. Other nations must bend to its will or suffer the consequences. The rule of law is replaced by the rule of the strongest. This is hardly a recipe for international peace.
In the case of Iran, the United States can be sure of support for aggressive action not just from Israel but also from certain Muslim nations in the region. The rulers of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Arab states, all staunch Sunni Muslims, are keen to back an American/Israeli military assault on the Shia Muslims of Iran. Clearly the concept of Muslim solidarity is almost as laughable today as the notion of international law, with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference as irrelevant in world affairs as the United Nations.
With so many countries working for conflict with Iran, that rumour of war may eventually become a reality. One can only hope that such an assault on isolated, militarily weak Iran will be the swift and successful operation its advocates claim, but the law of unintended consequences may come into play here just as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. The second future war of which rumours have circulated for years may come to reality even sooner than the conflict with Iran and its consequences may be much more dangerous.
The notion of a pre-emptive strike by the USA on North Korea has been around almost as long as the much-discussed plan for an assault on Iran. The communist rulers of North Korea are held to be an even greater threat to the security of the world community than the ayatollahs of Iran. North Korea is considered to have some kind of nuclear weapon and the country's behaviour has been much more provocative than that of Iran. The sinking of the South Korean frigate earlier this year and the recent bombardment of a South Korean island show North Korea is an aggressive power whose conduct must provoke a reaction stronger than words from the United States at some point. America may unleash war on Iran at some point, but North Korea is unwilling to wait passively for a US pre-emptive strike. It is already prepared to risk war with America and its allies.
In contrast to the situation with Iran, America's allies are not thirsting to start a war with North Korea. Probably no nation on earth is better prepared for war than this communist dictatorship. Claims have been made that the North Korean people are starving and their economy is in ruins. Whether or not that is true, one can be sure that the country's military forces are well fed, well armed, and highly motivated. Any American military attack in response to a new North Korean provocation is bound to lead in turn to massive North Korean retaliation. Of course most of the victims of such retaliation will not be Americans. They will be South Koreans, and possibly Japanese.
Thus the governments of South Korea and Japan, despite their strident verbal condemnations of North Korea, are not enthusiastic about taking any significant military action against that country. They look to China to restrain its North Korean neighbour, and for the moment the United States seems prepared to go along with this policy. But is it a realistic policy? Such an approach is akin to expecting the USA to restrain Israel because it has close relations with that country. Far from being under its superpower sponsor's thumb, Israel has recently chosen to ignore American pleas to stop Jewish settlement on Palestinian land and so has ruined hopes of new Middle East peace negotiations. Despite this defiance, the United States will not punish Israel, and in similar fashion China will take no action against North Korea if it ignores Chinese advice.
Iran studiously avoids military clashes with its enemies in the Gulf; North Korea seems to go out of its way to provoke them. And any military clash in the Korean peninsula has the potential to lead to rapid escalation and open war between the opposing sides. North Korea is confident that no matter how much it suffers in such a conflict, it can inflict massive damage on South Korea, and possibly on Japan as well. In addition, should an errant American cruise missile fail to hit its North Korean target and land in China instead, then the situation in the region would become even more explosive.
Assuming neither North Korea nor the United States resort to the use of nuclear weapons, a conventional war would resume in Korea and it would in some ways resemble the conflict of 1950-53 which ended in an uneasy truce. The USA would again have almost complete command of the sea and the air, but on land America would find it difficult once again to achieve a decisive victory over North Korea. American forces in South Korea currently number around 30,000 personnel. If a large scale conventional war broke out, such forces would need to increase to at least 300,000 personnel. If it is assumed that the re-introduction of the draft in the USA is politically unacceptable, then the Americans could only find such a force by removing their last troops from Iraq, stripping their garrison in Germany, and effectively closing down their war in Afghanistan. South Korea would provide the bulk of the allied forces to assist America in the war against North Korea, but no doubt countries such as Britain, Canada, Australia, and Turkey, which provided contingents during the 1950-53 Korean war, might be expected to send forces once more. Despite its 'peace' constitution, Japan could hardly avoid giving military aid to the United States, given that it already hosts American naval, marine, and air force bases.
Even if the United States and its allies assembled sufficient manpower and firepower to inflict serious damage on the North Korean war machine, the USA would eventually face the same dilemma it did in 1950. Should it invade North Korea with the intention of liberating the country from communist rule? In 1950 the Chinese made it clear that although they would accept the defeat of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, they would take action if the Americans attempted to occupy the north. General Macarthur ignored the Chinese warning, entered North Korea, and was then driven out by an army of Chinese 'volunteers'.
How would today's China react to an invasion of North Korea by the United States and its allies? Perhaps not with direct military intervention, but probably by providing sufficient supplies to sustain North Korean resistance. And how would the USA react to that? In 1950 General Macarthur reacted to Chinese military intervention by demanding American atomic bomb attacks on China. He did not get them and President Truman finally decided to sack the general. In 1950 China did not have any nuclear weapons. It does now and they have a global reach. Whatever aid China gave to North Korea, it seems unlikely the United States would risk provoking World War III by taking any military action against China.
Although the assault on Iran which American conservatives and Israeli hardliners have worked for over the last few years would undoubtedly produce a major international crisis, such a crisis would be as nothing compared to the outbreak of a major war in the Korean peninsula. If this rumour of war became a reality, the whole world might be in danger from the ever-escalating consequences of such a conflict. Renewed diplomacy is the only way to avoid this outcome. The United States must agree to a meeting of the six power conference on Korea as soon as possible, making no pre-conditions and avoiding any further military escalation. North Korea may be a rogue state, but if it is driven into a corner, it may, like a mad dog, strike out in all directions with terrible consequences for the region and the world.
Thursday, November 18, 2010
Captives in the New Barbary
The release of the British couple Paul and Rachel Chandler by the Somali pirates is to be welcomed, even at the cost of an estimated US $750,000 ransom. Their year long ordeal has been traumatic for them, but it has also been well-publicised in the Western media, a factor which no doubt assisted in their final release.
What of the other captives in the hands of the Somali pirates? Currently there are at least 435 seafarers from various nations held by the pirates. The largest group are around eighty sailors from the Philippines, a poor nation which supplies a disproportionately large number of crew personnel to the world's merchant ships. Their plight is hardly known outside their home country, a nation which has neither the military nor the political stature in the world community to exert serious pressure for their release.
Some commentators have called the home ports of the Somali pirates a 'new Barbary', referring to the Barbary coast of North Africa which was the base of pirates in earlier centuries. Between 1500 and 1830 the Muslim corsairs from the Barbary states terrorised the Mediterranean Sea, taking Christian ships and captives. At the peak of their activities in the first half of the seventeenth century, the chief corsair port of Algiers held at least 25,000 Christian captives.
However, there are important differences between the Barbary corsairs of old and today's Somali pirates. The Barbary corsairs were more interested in captives than in the ships and cargos they captured. Their captives provided much-needed labour in the local economy or could be ransomed back to Christian countries at high prices. The modern Somali pirates are more interested in collecting large ransoms for seized ships and cargos than for individual captives, except in cases like the Chandlers. Captives are only a useful bargaining tool for the Somali pirates if threats to ill-treat them can stimulate shipowners to a more rapid conclusion of ransom negotiations for the return of their ships.
Also, while the Barbary corsairs claimed holy war, the jihad at sea, as a justification for seizing Christian ships and captives, the pirates of the new Barbary in Somalia are purely mercenary criminals. Muslims are among their captives and Islamic militants in Somalia claim to be bitter enemies of the pirates.
The numerous international naval forces cruising off Somalia's coast have made much of their reduction in the number of attacks made by the Somali pirates, which have fallen by half comparing 2010 to 2009. Yet comparing the first nine months of 2010 to those of 2009, the number of ships taken by the Somali pirates has actually increased, from 34 to 40. Taking more ships in fewer attacks would seem to indicate that pirate productivity is actually increasing.
Not only are more ships being taken, but also more captives. In all of 2009 some 867 seafarers were kidnapped by the Somali pirates. Already in 2010 some 790 seafarers have been made prisoner, so the total figure will probably exceed that for 2009 by the end of the year. In the days of the Barbary corsairs, ransoming captives was a major activity for Christian countries, far more important than getting compensation for lost ships and cargos. Today the captives held by the Somali pirates are, except in cases like the Chandlers, largely forgotten.
Naval patrols can do nothing to help the captives held in the new Barbary. Somali piracy can only be ended by creating a more stable political situation within Somalia, which has been without a functioning national government since 1991, and this requires action on land rather than at sea.
What of the other captives in the hands of the Somali pirates? Currently there are at least 435 seafarers from various nations held by the pirates. The largest group are around eighty sailors from the Philippines, a poor nation which supplies a disproportionately large number of crew personnel to the world's merchant ships. Their plight is hardly known outside their home country, a nation which has neither the military nor the political stature in the world community to exert serious pressure for their release.
Some commentators have called the home ports of the Somali pirates a 'new Barbary', referring to the Barbary coast of North Africa which was the base of pirates in earlier centuries. Between 1500 and 1830 the Muslim corsairs from the Barbary states terrorised the Mediterranean Sea, taking Christian ships and captives. At the peak of their activities in the first half of the seventeenth century, the chief corsair port of Algiers held at least 25,000 Christian captives.
However, there are important differences between the Barbary corsairs of old and today's Somali pirates. The Barbary corsairs were more interested in captives than in the ships and cargos they captured. Their captives provided much-needed labour in the local economy or could be ransomed back to Christian countries at high prices. The modern Somali pirates are more interested in collecting large ransoms for seized ships and cargos than for individual captives, except in cases like the Chandlers. Captives are only a useful bargaining tool for the Somali pirates if threats to ill-treat them can stimulate shipowners to a more rapid conclusion of ransom negotiations for the return of their ships.
Also, while the Barbary corsairs claimed holy war, the jihad at sea, as a justification for seizing Christian ships and captives, the pirates of the new Barbary in Somalia are purely mercenary criminals. Muslims are among their captives and Islamic militants in Somalia claim to be bitter enemies of the pirates.
The numerous international naval forces cruising off Somalia's coast have made much of their reduction in the number of attacks made by the Somali pirates, which have fallen by half comparing 2010 to 2009. Yet comparing the first nine months of 2010 to those of 2009, the number of ships taken by the Somali pirates has actually increased, from 34 to 40. Taking more ships in fewer attacks would seem to indicate that pirate productivity is actually increasing.
Not only are more ships being taken, but also more captives. In all of 2009 some 867 seafarers were kidnapped by the Somali pirates. Already in 2010 some 790 seafarers have been made prisoner, so the total figure will probably exceed that for 2009 by the end of the year. In the days of the Barbary corsairs, ransoming captives was a major activity for Christian countries, far more important than getting compensation for lost ships and cargos. Today the captives held by the Somali pirates are, except in cases like the Chandlers, largely forgotten.
Naval patrols can do nothing to help the captives held in the new Barbary. Somali piracy can only be ended by creating a more stable political situation within Somalia, which has been without a functioning national government since 1991, and this requires action on land rather than at sea.
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