Westerners believed that the centuries-old struggle between Christianity and Islam ended with their victory at the end of the First World War. Events since the tragedy of 9/11 have now revived in a new form this ancient conflict which was thought to have been settled. In a somewhat similar fashion, Sunni Muslims, the majority in the Muslim world, long believed that the struggle between them and the Shia minority in Islam had been decided in their favour during the first half of the seventeenth century. However, since 1979, and even more so since 2001, Muslims have had to face the fact that the old clash between Sunnis and Shias may be reviving in a new and threatening fashion.
When the Safavid dynasty began to impose Shia Islam on the inhabitants of Iran at the start of the sixteenth century, they were creating the most powerful Shia state since the collapse of the Fatimid empire three hundred years earlier. The Ottoman Turkish sultans, believing themselves to be the leaders of orthodox Islam, decided to crush their new heretic neighbours, but it proved to be a long and difficult struggle.
The Ottoman-Safavid wars lasted from 1514 to 1639 and the area which is now Iraq was an important battleground, where the many local Shias preferred Iranian rule to that of the Sunni Ottoman sultans. Suleiman the Magnificent captured Baghdad from the Iranians in 1534, but the latter retook the city early in the seventeenth century. Sultan Murad IV recovered Baghdad in 1638 and forced the Safavid ruler to make peace in the following year. This treaty marked the end of the long Ottoman-Safavid wars and the Sunni Ottomans had finally gained the upper hand over their Shia opponents. The frontier between the two states would remain largely unchanged until the twentieth century.
To underline Sunni success, Iran, the only Shia state in the world, went into steady decline over the next two centuries. It was no longer a threat to its neighbours and it only narrowly avoided being destroyed by the Russian and British empires. Iran began to revive under the Pahlavi dynasty in the mid-twentieth century, but the Pahlavi rulers were dedicated Westernizers with little interest in religion. Only after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran did Shia religious fundamentalism once again appear a threat to its neighbours. The Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 did much to neutralize this threat. Most Sunni Muslims, especially in Arab countries, supported Saddam Hussein in his struggle against Shia Iran.
By 2001 the threat from Shia Iran seemed to have been contained, and the country faced bitter enemies on two sides: Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. As a consequence of 9/11, and at no cost to the Iranians, the United States removed both these threats over the next few years. Hezbollah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon, fought Israel to a stalemate in the summer war of 2006, further enhancing the status of Shias in the Islamic world. These events, along with its growing nuclear ambitions, have allowed Shia Iran to pose as a regional superpower in the Middle East, a status it last enjoyed in the early seventeenth century.
Now the talk is of a Shia revival threatening not just the West but all of Sunni Islam. A 'Shia crescent' is said to be spreading across the Middle East, alarming all Sunni Arab countries. How will they respond to this revival of the Sunni/Shia conflict which Ottoman victory seemed to have ended nearly four centuries ago?
Muslim states were ready to join the American-led coalition against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. Will Sunni Arab countries like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia be ready to join the United States and its allies in a new struggle against Shia Iran? The recent American decision to make huge arms sales to the Arab Gulf states to ensure their security in face of the supposed Iranian threat might seem to indicate a deepening of the Sunni/Shia split.
The dangers inherent in that split have even caused Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's second in command, to stress the need for unity among Muslims. Al-Qaeda's leaders were previously well known for their hostility to Shias, but now apparently they have seen the error of their ways.
The split between Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth century Reformation destroyed the unity of Christendom. Will a further deepening of the antipathy between Sunnis and Shias create a fatal division within the Islamic world? Since the 1960s Muslims have made great efforts to build pan-Islamic international bodies, such as the Organizaton of the Islamic Conference. Will they now allow themselves to be divided once more? They would do well to rememer that the steady decline of Islamic power in the world from 1700 onwards was not just due to Western technological superiority, but also to chronic divisions within the Islamic world.
Monday, July 30, 2007
A Tale of Three Revolts
Historical comparisons can both inform and mislead. On one level the present insurgency in Iraq against predominantly American and British forces has similarities with the 1920 Iraq revolt against the British and the 1899-1902 Philippines insurgency against the United States.
In 1898 the Americans landed in the Philippines and claimed to be liberating the inhabitants from oppressive Spanish rule. In 1917-18 the British freed Iraq from Ottoman Turkish rule and promised independence to the Arabs. In 2003 the Anglo-American forces overthrew Saddam Hussein and promised freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people. In all three cases significant sections of the liberated populations soon had reason to question the motives of their liberators and to rise in revolt against them.
Filipino nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo believed they had been promised independence by the United States and fought the Americans for three years in an attempt to win it. Unfortunately the rebels initially fought conventional battles with the American army in which they were defeated with heavy losses. Turning to guerrilla warfare, Aguinaldo's men had more success, but they were eventually worn down by a twin-track American strategy, combining military operations with medical and social improvement programmes to win support among the mass of the population. Disclaiming the label of imperialists, the Americans claimed to be acting as trustees in the Philippines, merely educating the Filipinos for eventual independence. This was achieved after the Second World War, but the United States retained major military bases and significant political influence in the Philippines until the early 1990s.
In Iraq after the First World War discontent among the urban political elites with British failure to honour wartime promises of independence was upstaged by rural tribal revolts in the summer of 1920. The largely Shiite rebels inflicted some early reverses on the British, but reinforements soon poured in from India and elsewhere. Within three months General Haldane's army of over 100,000 British and Indian troops had broken the back of the revolt. Nevertheless the outbreak forced the British to achieve an early political settlement with the largely Sunni Iraqi elites, installing a national government under King Feisal. Officially Iraq was not a British colony, but a mandated territory the British ruled under the authority of the League of Nations and it was to move rapidly to independence. This was granted in 1932, but the British retained important military bases in Iraq and much political influence in the country. During the Second World War Britain invaded Iraq to remove a pro-Axis government in 1941, and British influence in the country did not finally end until the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.
So will these historical Filipino and Iraqi scenarios be repeated in Iraq? An initial insurgency is defeated; a local government is put together and eventually granted independence; and the intervening power retains military bases and political influence in the country that may last for decades. Such developments do not seem impossible in current Iraqi conditions, but one must not endow historical comparisons with an air of inevitability. The present insurgency in Iraq has its own unique features which may lead to a different outcome.
Both the ealier revolts took place in a time when direct military interventions by major powers in the affairs of smaller states were still widely considered acceptable. The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was crticised by countries large and small around the globe, leaving the question of its legitimacy still open to intense debate. The earlier Filipino and Iraqi rebels had little or no support from outside their own countries, nor did their struggles attract much attention in the international media of their period. Iraqi insurgents today receive much aid from abroad and their activities attract daily attention in media around the world.
The novel features of the new insurgency may require a more sophisticated strategy to defeat them, but valuable lessons in quelling rebellions can still be gleaned from the earlier revolts. The American army of the early twentieth century combined anti-guerrilla operations with successful efforts to improve living conditions among the Filipino population. More than four years after the invasion of Iraq, much of its population still endures a lower standard of living than under Saddam Hussein, while millions have simply fled the country. Establishing security and improving the lot of the population should go hand in hand.
The British suppressed the 1920 Iraq revolt comparatively quickly with a massive use of force, but they knew that an immediate political settlement was needed to prevent further outbreaks. The present 'surge' operations are aimed at stabilising the security situation so that the Iraqi government can win over the Sunni minority with political concessions. In this way the insurgency may be ended. Unfortunately, whatever the military successes of the reinforced US forces, the present Shiite government appears unwilling to make the concessions needed to bring the Sunnis into the Iraqi political process.
History can show us parallels to current events, but it cannot predict future outcomes. If and when the current insurgency in Iraq is defeated, future political developments in that country may well mirror those which followed the defeat of the Filipino rebels and the 1920 Iraqi insurgents, but such developments cannot be taken for granted.
In 1898 the Americans landed in the Philippines and claimed to be liberating the inhabitants from oppressive Spanish rule. In 1917-18 the British freed Iraq from Ottoman Turkish rule and promised independence to the Arabs. In 2003 the Anglo-American forces overthrew Saddam Hussein and promised freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people. In all three cases significant sections of the liberated populations soon had reason to question the motives of their liberators and to rise in revolt against them.
Filipino nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo believed they had been promised independence by the United States and fought the Americans for three years in an attempt to win it. Unfortunately the rebels initially fought conventional battles with the American army in which they were defeated with heavy losses. Turning to guerrilla warfare, Aguinaldo's men had more success, but they were eventually worn down by a twin-track American strategy, combining military operations with medical and social improvement programmes to win support among the mass of the population. Disclaiming the label of imperialists, the Americans claimed to be acting as trustees in the Philippines, merely educating the Filipinos for eventual independence. This was achieved after the Second World War, but the United States retained major military bases and significant political influence in the Philippines until the early 1990s.
In Iraq after the First World War discontent among the urban political elites with British failure to honour wartime promises of independence was upstaged by rural tribal revolts in the summer of 1920. The largely Shiite rebels inflicted some early reverses on the British, but reinforements soon poured in from India and elsewhere. Within three months General Haldane's army of over 100,000 British and Indian troops had broken the back of the revolt. Nevertheless the outbreak forced the British to achieve an early political settlement with the largely Sunni Iraqi elites, installing a national government under King Feisal. Officially Iraq was not a British colony, but a mandated territory the British ruled under the authority of the League of Nations and it was to move rapidly to independence. This was granted in 1932, but the British retained important military bases in Iraq and much political influence in the country. During the Second World War Britain invaded Iraq to remove a pro-Axis government in 1941, and British influence in the country did not finally end until the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.
So will these historical Filipino and Iraqi scenarios be repeated in Iraq? An initial insurgency is defeated; a local government is put together and eventually granted independence; and the intervening power retains military bases and political influence in the country that may last for decades. Such developments do not seem impossible in current Iraqi conditions, but one must not endow historical comparisons with an air of inevitability. The present insurgency in Iraq has its own unique features which may lead to a different outcome.
Both the ealier revolts took place in a time when direct military interventions by major powers in the affairs of smaller states were still widely considered acceptable. The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was crticised by countries large and small around the globe, leaving the question of its legitimacy still open to intense debate. The earlier Filipino and Iraqi rebels had little or no support from outside their own countries, nor did their struggles attract much attention in the international media of their period. Iraqi insurgents today receive much aid from abroad and their activities attract daily attention in media around the world.
The novel features of the new insurgency may require a more sophisticated strategy to defeat them, but valuable lessons in quelling rebellions can still be gleaned from the earlier revolts. The American army of the early twentieth century combined anti-guerrilla operations with successful efforts to improve living conditions among the Filipino population. More than four years after the invasion of Iraq, much of its population still endures a lower standard of living than under Saddam Hussein, while millions have simply fled the country. Establishing security and improving the lot of the population should go hand in hand.
The British suppressed the 1920 Iraq revolt comparatively quickly with a massive use of force, but they knew that an immediate political settlement was needed to prevent further outbreaks. The present 'surge' operations are aimed at stabilising the security situation so that the Iraqi government can win over the Sunni minority with political concessions. In this way the insurgency may be ended. Unfortunately, whatever the military successes of the reinforced US forces, the present Shiite government appears unwilling to make the concessions needed to bring the Sunnis into the Iraqi political process.
History can show us parallels to current events, but it cannot predict future outcomes. If and when the current insurgency in Iraq is defeated, future political developments in that country may well mirror those which followed the defeat of the Filipino rebels and the 1920 Iraqi insurgents, but such developments cannot be taken for granted.
Thursday, July 26, 2007
Wars: Long and Longer
Nearly eighteen months have now passed since the Bush administration sought to re-brand its 'global war on terror' as 'the long war'. In February 2006 the US Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review Report included a section on 'Fighting The Long War'. Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, sought to present the war on terrorism as 'a generational conflict akin to the Cold War', which lasted for forty-six years (1945-1991).
Mr. Rumsfeld was sacrificed later in 2006 by President Bush as the scapegoat for American failure to make significant progress in the Iraq war, but the wider war against terrorism goes on and the US authorities continue to present it as a struggle that will last for decades.
The international media have never really taken to the new brand name, still preferring 'war on terror' to 'the long war'. In any case, in the context of struggles between the Christian West and the Islamic world, the latter title is already taken. The conflict between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Ottoman Turkish sultan between 1593 and 1606 in the Croatian and Hungarian borderlands is known to historians as the Long War. Yet this largely indecisive thirteen year struggle scarcely deserves such a title when compared with other Christian-Muslim conflicts over the centuries.
Undoubtedly the longest such conflict was the 800 year struggle between the Byzantine Empire and its Muslim ebemies. It began with the Arab invasions in the seventh century and ended in 1453 when the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II stormed Constantinople and killed the last Byzantine emperor. Only a little shorter in duration was the 'Reconquista', the Christian struggle to liberate Spain and Portugal from their Muslim conquerors. Beginning in the rugged mountains of north-western Spain around 720, the conflict did not end until Ferdinand and Isabella, the 'Catholic Monarchs', accepted the surrender of the Muslims of Granada in 1492.
The most famous Christian-Muslim conflict, the Crusades, and the related struggles of the Christian states set up in the Holy Land, barely encompassed two centuiries, ending with the fall of Acre in 1291. In more recent times, the wars between the rising Orthodox Christian empire of Russia and the declining Muslim empire of the Ottoman Turks lasted from the mid-seventeenth century to the early twentieth century. The Russians appeared to triumph, but the empires of both the tsar and the sultan were brought down by their participation in the First World War.
It might be objected that these centuries-long struggles were not continuous, with long periods of truce or declared peace separating outbreaks of hostilities, but the same could be said of the most famous numerically designated wars. The medieval Hundred Years War between England and France was not a continuous struggle, nor was the Eighty Years War in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when the Dutch successfully struggled to break free from Spanish imperial rule. Similarly the Thirty Years War, the bloody climax of Catholic-Protestant enmity in Europe, is divided into distinct phases, with some periods of peace.
To designate a war that has only been in progress since September 2001 as 'long' seems a little presumptuous when judged against earlier conflicts. In any case most wars receive their enduring historical names long after the event. The only thing that is certain about the presnt conflict is that its end is still not in sight.
Mr. Rumsfeld was sacrificed later in 2006 by President Bush as the scapegoat for American failure to make significant progress in the Iraq war, but the wider war against terrorism goes on and the US authorities continue to present it as a struggle that will last for decades.
The international media have never really taken to the new brand name, still preferring 'war on terror' to 'the long war'. In any case, in the context of struggles between the Christian West and the Islamic world, the latter title is already taken. The conflict between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Ottoman Turkish sultan between 1593 and 1606 in the Croatian and Hungarian borderlands is known to historians as the Long War. Yet this largely indecisive thirteen year struggle scarcely deserves such a title when compared with other Christian-Muslim conflicts over the centuries.
Undoubtedly the longest such conflict was the 800 year struggle between the Byzantine Empire and its Muslim ebemies. It began with the Arab invasions in the seventh century and ended in 1453 when the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II stormed Constantinople and killed the last Byzantine emperor. Only a little shorter in duration was the 'Reconquista', the Christian struggle to liberate Spain and Portugal from their Muslim conquerors. Beginning in the rugged mountains of north-western Spain around 720, the conflict did not end until Ferdinand and Isabella, the 'Catholic Monarchs', accepted the surrender of the Muslims of Granada in 1492.
The most famous Christian-Muslim conflict, the Crusades, and the related struggles of the Christian states set up in the Holy Land, barely encompassed two centuiries, ending with the fall of Acre in 1291. In more recent times, the wars between the rising Orthodox Christian empire of Russia and the declining Muslim empire of the Ottoman Turks lasted from the mid-seventeenth century to the early twentieth century. The Russians appeared to triumph, but the empires of both the tsar and the sultan were brought down by their participation in the First World War.
It might be objected that these centuries-long struggles were not continuous, with long periods of truce or declared peace separating outbreaks of hostilities, but the same could be said of the most famous numerically designated wars. The medieval Hundred Years War between England and France was not a continuous struggle, nor was the Eighty Years War in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when the Dutch successfully struggled to break free from Spanish imperial rule. Similarly the Thirty Years War, the bloody climax of Catholic-Protestant enmity in Europe, is divided into distinct phases, with some periods of peace.
To designate a war that has only been in progress since September 2001 as 'long' seems a little presumptuous when judged against earlier conflicts. In any case most wars receive their enduring historical names long after the event. The only thing that is certain about the presnt conflict is that its end is still not in sight.
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
US Bases in Iraq: Bastions of Strength or Hostages to Fortune?
As the US-led 'surge' operations reach full strength in Iraq, some American military planners continue to look for a successful outcome, whatever the doubts of politicians and public opinion at home.
Their scenario is that a US-approved Iraqi government holds the country together; violence is reduced to a low level; and Iraqi forces take over internal security duties so that US forces can withdraw to their own bases within the country. Iraq will become the new South Korea. A US garrison will safeguard the country from outside attack, while local resentment at its continued presence is kept to a minimum.
The current base strategy seems likely to involve a minimum of 30-40,000 US military personnel remaining in Iraq indefinitely. They would be located in four or five major bases, with Balad, al-Asad, Tallil and Taji the most likely sites, plus a further base in the north of the country.
Iraqi Kurdistan might seem the ideal place for the northern base, given that it is the only part of Iraq in which Americans enjoy widespread popular support. However, putting a US base there might be seen as implying support for the semi-independent Kurdistan Regional Government, which would anger neighbouring countries such as Turkey.
The overall US headquarters in Iraq would most likely be established in the vast new American embassy in the Green Zone of Baghdad. Other US headquarters in the region, such as the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and CENTCOM in Qatar, might also be moved to Baghdad.
From such a network of bases US forces could support Iraqi internal security operations; defend the country from external attack, e.g. by Iran; and launch power projection missions to deal with other trouble spots in the wider Middle East region.
Such is the strategy, but it is nothing new. Britain, the last imperial power in the area, tried a similar base strategy in both Iraq and Egypt, but in neither case could it be considered a success.
In 1932 Britain granted independence to Iraq, but maintained a military presence in the country at the Royal Air Force bases of Habbaniyah and Shaibah. Aircraft from there continued to assist Iraqi forces in internal security operations and stood ready for deployment to other parts of the Middle East.
However, when a major military crisis finally arose, the RAF bases in Iraq turned into liabilities rather than assets. In 1941 the pro-fascist Rashid Ali government came to power in Iraq, besieged Habbaniyah, and threatened Shaibah. The bases were only saved when British forces from India and Transjordan invaded Iraq and occupied the country.
Similarly, by the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Britain agreed to withdraw its forces in Egypt back to a military base along the Suez Canal. The Second World War delayed this redeployment until 1946, but the new Suez Canal Zone was to prove no bastion of strength for the British.
With the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, the Suez Canal Zone ceased to be of such vital importance for British imperial communications. Instead the Suez Canal Zone became the headquarters for all British forces in the Middle East. With airfields, barracks, workshops, and storehouses, it was a major military base, but its vulnerability was soon revealed.
After its humiliating defeat by Israel in 1948-9, the Egyptian government sought to strengthen its Arab nationalist credentials by tacitly supporting guerrilla attacks on British forces in the Suez Canal Zone. Britain was forced to send thousands of extra troops to defend the base, but clashes continued at the start of the 1950s.
King Farouk's government denounced the 1936 treaty in 1951, but the British refused to give up their base, despite the high cost of holding on to it. Egyptian army officers, led by Colonel Nasser, seized power in Cairo in 1952, and attacks on the British base declined as negotiations took place. Finally the British reached agreement with Nasser in 1954 to give up their base. The last British troops left the Suez Canal Zone in the summer of 1956, only to return for a short period later in the year during the ill-starred Angl0-French-Israeli attack on Egypt.
The British had hoped their 'withdraw to bases' strategy would allow them to keep a presence in the Middle East and be ready for military intervention in the region. In fact such bases only turned out to be expensive burdens that did little to enhance British power in the area and provoked continued local hostility.
It seems unlikely that a similar base strategy by the Americans in Iraq would lead to a happier outcome. US bases in Iraq would not be strong points from which to project power into the wider Middle East region, but would instead become hostages to fortune, potentially beleagured outposts in still hostile territory.
Their scenario is that a US-approved Iraqi government holds the country together; violence is reduced to a low level; and Iraqi forces take over internal security duties so that US forces can withdraw to their own bases within the country. Iraq will become the new South Korea. A US garrison will safeguard the country from outside attack, while local resentment at its continued presence is kept to a minimum.
The current base strategy seems likely to involve a minimum of 30-40,000 US military personnel remaining in Iraq indefinitely. They would be located in four or five major bases, with Balad, al-Asad, Tallil and Taji the most likely sites, plus a further base in the north of the country.
Iraqi Kurdistan might seem the ideal place for the northern base, given that it is the only part of Iraq in which Americans enjoy widespread popular support. However, putting a US base there might be seen as implying support for the semi-independent Kurdistan Regional Government, which would anger neighbouring countries such as Turkey.
The overall US headquarters in Iraq would most likely be established in the vast new American embassy in the Green Zone of Baghdad. Other US headquarters in the region, such as the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and CENTCOM in Qatar, might also be moved to Baghdad.
From such a network of bases US forces could support Iraqi internal security operations; defend the country from external attack, e.g. by Iran; and launch power projection missions to deal with other trouble spots in the wider Middle East region.
Such is the strategy, but it is nothing new. Britain, the last imperial power in the area, tried a similar base strategy in both Iraq and Egypt, but in neither case could it be considered a success.
In 1932 Britain granted independence to Iraq, but maintained a military presence in the country at the Royal Air Force bases of Habbaniyah and Shaibah. Aircraft from there continued to assist Iraqi forces in internal security operations and stood ready for deployment to other parts of the Middle East.
However, when a major military crisis finally arose, the RAF bases in Iraq turned into liabilities rather than assets. In 1941 the pro-fascist Rashid Ali government came to power in Iraq, besieged Habbaniyah, and threatened Shaibah. The bases were only saved when British forces from India and Transjordan invaded Iraq and occupied the country.
Similarly, by the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Britain agreed to withdraw its forces in Egypt back to a military base along the Suez Canal. The Second World War delayed this redeployment until 1946, but the new Suez Canal Zone was to prove no bastion of strength for the British.
With the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, the Suez Canal Zone ceased to be of such vital importance for British imperial communications. Instead the Suez Canal Zone became the headquarters for all British forces in the Middle East. With airfields, barracks, workshops, and storehouses, it was a major military base, but its vulnerability was soon revealed.
After its humiliating defeat by Israel in 1948-9, the Egyptian government sought to strengthen its Arab nationalist credentials by tacitly supporting guerrilla attacks on British forces in the Suez Canal Zone. Britain was forced to send thousands of extra troops to defend the base, but clashes continued at the start of the 1950s.
King Farouk's government denounced the 1936 treaty in 1951, but the British refused to give up their base, despite the high cost of holding on to it. Egyptian army officers, led by Colonel Nasser, seized power in Cairo in 1952, and attacks on the British base declined as negotiations took place. Finally the British reached agreement with Nasser in 1954 to give up their base. The last British troops left the Suez Canal Zone in the summer of 1956, only to return for a short period later in the year during the ill-starred Angl0-French-Israeli attack on Egypt.
The British had hoped their 'withdraw to bases' strategy would allow them to keep a presence in the Middle East and be ready for military intervention in the region. In fact such bases only turned out to be expensive burdens that did little to enhance British power in the area and provoked continued local hostility.
It seems unlikely that a similar base strategy by the Americans in Iraq would lead to a happier outcome. US bases in Iraq would not be strong points from which to project power into the wider Middle East region, but would instead become hostages to fortune, potentially beleagured outposts in still hostile territory.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)