As the US-led 'surge' operations reach full strength in Iraq, some American military planners continue to look for a successful outcome, whatever the doubts of politicians and public opinion at home.
Their scenario is that a US-approved Iraqi government holds the country together; violence is reduced to a low level; and Iraqi forces take over internal security duties so that US forces can withdraw to their own bases within the country. Iraq will become the new South Korea. A US garrison will safeguard the country from outside attack, while local resentment at its continued presence is kept to a minimum.
The current base strategy seems likely to involve a minimum of 30-40,000 US military personnel remaining in Iraq indefinitely. They would be located in four or five major bases, with Balad, al-Asad, Tallil and Taji the most likely sites, plus a further base in the north of the country.
Iraqi Kurdistan might seem the ideal place for the northern base, given that it is the only part of Iraq in which Americans enjoy widespread popular support. However, putting a US base there might be seen as implying support for the semi-independent Kurdistan Regional Government, which would anger neighbouring countries such as Turkey.
The overall US headquarters in Iraq would most likely be established in the vast new American embassy in the Green Zone of Baghdad. Other US headquarters in the region, such as the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and CENTCOM in Qatar, might also be moved to Baghdad.
From such a network of bases US forces could support Iraqi internal security operations; defend the country from external attack, e.g. by Iran; and launch power projection missions to deal with other trouble spots in the wider Middle East region.
Such is the strategy, but it is nothing new. Britain, the last imperial power in the area, tried a similar base strategy in both Iraq and Egypt, but in neither case could it be considered a success.
In 1932 Britain granted independence to Iraq, but maintained a military presence in the country at the Royal Air Force bases of Habbaniyah and Shaibah. Aircraft from there continued to assist Iraqi forces in internal security operations and stood ready for deployment to other parts of the Middle East.
However, when a major military crisis finally arose, the RAF bases in Iraq turned into liabilities rather than assets. In 1941 the pro-fascist Rashid Ali government came to power in Iraq, besieged Habbaniyah, and threatened Shaibah. The bases were only saved when British forces from India and Transjordan invaded Iraq and occupied the country.
Similarly, by the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Britain agreed to withdraw its forces in Egypt back to a military base along the Suez Canal. The Second World War delayed this redeployment until 1946, but the new Suez Canal Zone was to prove no bastion of strength for the British.
With the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, the Suez Canal Zone ceased to be of such vital importance for British imperial communications. Instead the Suez Canal Zone became the headquarters for all British forces in the Middle East. With airfields, barracks, workshops, and storehouses, it was a major military base, but its vulnerability was soon revealed.
After its humiliating defeat by Israel in 1948-9, the Egyptian government sought to strengthen its Arab nationalist credentials by tacitly supporting guerrilla attacks on British forces in the Suez Canal Zone. Britain was forced to send thousands of extra troops to defend the base, but clashes continued at the start of the 1950s.
King Farouk's government denounced the 1936 treaty in 1951, but the British refused to give up their base, despite the high cost of holding on to it. Egyptian army officers, led by Colonel Nasser, seized power in Cairo in 1952, and attacks on the British base declined as negotiations took place. Finally the British reached agreement with Nasser in 1954 to give up their base. The last British troops left the Suez Canal Zone in the summer of 1956, only to return for a short period later in the year during the ill-starred Angl0-French-Israeli attack on Egypt.
The British had hoped their 'withdraw to bases' strategy would allow them to keep a presence in the Middle East and be ready for military intervention in the region. In fact such bases only turned out to be expensive burdens that did little to enhance British power in the area and provoked continued local hostility.
It seems unlikely that a similar base strategy by the Americans in Iraq would lead to a happier outcome. US bases in Iraq would not be strong points from which to project power into the wider Middle East region, but would instead become hostages to fortune, potentially beleagured outposts in still hostile territory.
