Since the start of the twenty-first century, the world has been disturbed by both wars in the present and rumours of wars in the near future. The two principal wars, caused by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies, have been linked to the so-called 'war on terror', a war that is now clearly just a war on Islamic 'terror'.
One of the future wars is also loosely linked to the war on terror. Scarcely a month goes by without rumours that Israel and/or the USA is about to launch a military attack on Iran. These reports have been with us for years, but the assault has not yet taken place. Nevertheless there is little doubt the plans for war exist and the command has only to be given to send missiles and aircraft on their way. Iran has attacked no other country, but the United States and Israel claim the right to launch a pre-emptive attack upon it. Iran's supposed crimes are trying to develop nuclear weapons and aiding Islamic terrorism. There is some truth in the latter accusation, but the former one has still to be proved.
Under the Westphalian system of international relations which existed from 1648 to 2001 pre-emptive wars were regarded as illegal, but since 9/11 the United States has declared it will only recognise international law when it finds this convenient. The Westphalian system rested on a belief in the equal sovereignty of nations. The USA has made it clear it does not recognise the sovereignty of any other nation. Other nations must bend to its will or suffer the consequences. The rule of law is replaced by the rule of the strongest. This is hardly a recipe for international peace.
In the case of Iran, the United States can be sure of support for aggressive action not just from Israel but also from certain Muslim nations in the region. The rulers of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Arab states, all staunch Sunni Muslims, are keen to back an American/Israeli military assault on the Shia Muslims of Iran. Clearly the concept of Muslim solidarity is almost as laughable today as the notion of international law, with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference as irrelevant in world affairs as the United Nations.
With so many countries working for conflict with Iran, that rumour of war may eventually become a reality. One can only hope that such an assault on isolated, militarily weak Iran will be the swift and successful operation its advocates claim, but the law of unintended consequences may come into play here just as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. The second future war of which rumours have circulated for years may come to reality even sooner than the conflict with Iran and its consequences may be much more dangerous.
The notion of a pre-emptive strike by the USA on North Korea has been around almost as long as the much-discussed plan for an assault on Iran. The communist rulers of North Korea are held to be an even greater threat to the security of the world community than the ayatollahs of Iran. North Korea is considered to have some kind of nuclear weapon and the country's behaviour has been much more provocative than that of Iran. The sinking of the South Korean frigate earlier this year and the recent bombardment of a South Korean island show North Korea is an aggressive power whose conduct must provoke a reaction stronger than words from the United States at some point. America may unleash war on Iran at some point, but North Korea is unwilling to wait passively for a US pre-emptive strike. It is already prepared to risk war with America and its allies.
In contrast to the situation with Iran, America's allies are not thirsting to start a war with North Korea. Probably no nation on earth is better prepared for war than this communist dictatorship. Claims have been made that the North Korean people are starving and their economy is in ruins. Whether or not that is true, one can be sure that the country's military forces are well fed, well armed, and highly motivated. Any American military attack in response to a new North Korean provocation is bound to lead in turn to massive North Korean retaliation. Of course most of the victims of such retaliation will not be Americans. They will be South Koreans, and possibly Japanese.
Thus the governments of South Korea and Japan, despite their strident verbal condemnations of North Korea, are not enthusiastic about taking any significant military action against that country. They look to China to restrain its North Korean neighbour, and for the moment the United States seems prepared to go along with this policy. But is it a realistic policy? Such an approach is akin to expecting the USA to restrain Israel because it has close relations with that country. Far from being under its superpower sponsor's thumb, Israel has recently chosen to ignore American pleas to stop Jewish settlement on Palestinian land and so has ruined hopes of new Middle East peace negotiations. Despite this defiance, the United States will not punish Israel, and in similar fashion China will take no action against North Korea if it ignores Chinese advice.
Iran studiously avoids military clashes with its enemies in the Gulf; North Korea seems to go out of its way to provoke them. And any military clash in the Korean peninsula has the potential to lead to rapid escalation and open war between the opposing sides. North Korea is confident that no matter how much it suffers in such a conflict, it can inflict massive damage on South Korea, and possibly on Japan as well. In addition, should an errant American cruise missile fail to hit its North Korean target and land in China instead, then the situation in the region would become even more explosive.
Assuming neither North Korea nor the United States resort to the use of nuclear weapons, a conventional war would resume in Korea and it would in some ways resemble the conflict of 1950-53 which ended in an uneasy truce. The USA would again have almost complete command of the sea and the air, but on land America would find it difficult once again to achieve a decisive victory over North Korea. American forces in South Korea currently number around 30,000 personnel. If a large scale conventional war broke out, such forces would need to increase to at least 300,000 personnel. If it is assumed that the re-introduction of the draft in the USA is politically unacceptable, then the Americans could only find such a force by removing their last troops from Iraq, stripping their garrison in Germany, and effectively closing down their war in Afghanistan. South Korea would provide the bulk of the allied forces to assist America in the war against North Korea, but no doubt countries such as Britain, Canada, Australia, and Turkey, which provided contingents during the 1950-53 Korean war, might be expected to send forces once more. Despite its 'peace' constitution, Japan could hardly avoid giving military aid to the United States, given that it already hosts American naval, marine, and air force bases.
Even if the United States and its allies assembled sufficient manpower and firepower to inflict serious damage on the North Korean war machine, the USA would eventually face the same dilemma it did in 1950. Should it invade North Korea with the intention of liberating the country from communist rule? In 1950 the Chinese made it clear that although they would accept the defeat of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, they would take action if the Americans attempted to occupy the north. General Macarthur ignored the Chinese warning, entered North Korea, and was then driven out by an army of Chinese 'volunteers'.
How would today's China react to an invasion of North Korea by the United States and its allies? Perhaps not with direct military intervention, but probably by providing sufficient supplies to sustain North Korean resistance. And how would the USA react to that? In 1950 General Macarthur reacted to Chinese military intervention by demanding American atomic bomb attacks on China. He did not get them and President Truman finally decided to sack the general. In 1950 China did not have any nuclear weapons. It does now and they have a global reach. Whatever aid China gave to North Korea, it seems unlikely the United States would risk provoking World War III by taking any military action against China.
Although the assault on Iran which American conservatives and Israeli hardliners have worked for over the last few years would undoubtedly produce a major international crisis, such a crisis would be as nothing compared to the outbreak of a major war in the Korean peninsula. If this rumour of war became a reality, the whole world might be in danger from the ever-escalating consequences of such a conflict. Renewed diplomacy is the only way to avoid this outcome. The United States must agree to a meeting of the six power conference on Korea as soon as possible, making no pre-conditions and avoiding any further military escalation. North Korea may be a rogue state, but if it is driven into a corner, it may, like a mad dog, strike out in all directions with terrible consequences for the region and the world.
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Thursday, November 18, 2010
Captives in the New Barbary
The release of the British couple Paul and Rachel Chandler by the Somali pirates is to be welcomed, even at the cost of an estimated US $750,000 ransom. Their year long ordeal has been traumatic for them, but it has also been well-publicised in the Western media, a factor which no doubt assisted in their final release.
What of the other captives in the hands of the Somali pirates? Currently there are at least 435 seafarers from various nations held by the pirates. The largest group are around eighty sailors from the Philippines, a poor nation which supplies a disproportionately large number of crew personnel to the world's merchant ships. Their plight is hardly known outside their home country, a nation which has neither the military nor the political stature in the world community to exert serious pressure for their release.
Some commentators have called the home ports of the Somali pirates a 'new Barbary', referring to the Barbary coast of North Africa which was the base of pirates in earlier centuries. Between 1500 and 1830 the Muslim corsairs from the Barbary states terrorised the Mediterranean Sea, taking Christian ships and captives. At the peak of their activities in the first half of the seventeenth century, the chief corsair port of Algiers held at least 25,000 Christian captives.
However, there are important differences between the Barbary corsairs of old and today's Somali pirates. The Barbary corsairs were more interested in captives than in the ships and cargos they captured. Their captives provided much-needed labour in the local economy or could be ransomed back to Christian countries at high prices. The modern Somali pirates are more interested in collecting large ransoms for seized ships and cargos than for individual captives, except in cases like the Chandlers. Captives are only a useful bargaining tool for the Somali pirates if threats to ill-treat them can stimulate shipowners to a more rapid conclusion of ransom negotiations for the return of their ships.
Also, while the Barbary corsairs claimed holy war, the jihad at sea, as a justification for seizing Christian ships and captives, the pirates of the new Barbary in Somalia are purely mercenary criminals. Muslims are among their captives and Islamic militants in Somalia claim to be bitter enemies of the pirates.
The numerous international naval forces cruising off Somalia's coast have made much of their reduction in the number of attacks made by the Somali pirates, which have fallen by half comparing 2010 to 2009. Yet comparing the first nine months of 2010 to those of 2009, the number of ships taken by the Somali pirates has actually increased, from 34 to 40. Taking more ships in fewer attacks would seem to indicate that pirate productivity is actually increasing.
Not only are more ships being taken, but also more captives. In all of 2009 some 867 seafarers were kidnapped by the Somali pirates. Already in 2010 some 790 seafarers have been made prisoner, so the total figure will probably exceed that for 2009 by the end of the year. In the days of the Barbary corsairs, ransoming captives was a major activity for Christian countries, far more important than getting compensation for lost ships and cargos. Today the captives held by the Somali pirates are, except in cases like the Chandlers, largely forgotten.
Naval patrols can do nothing to help the captives held in the new Barbary. Somali piracy can only be ended by creating a more stable political situation within Somalia, which has been without a functioning national government since 1991, and this requires action on land rather than at sea.
What of the other captives in the hands of the Somali pirates? Currently there are at least 435 seafarers from various nations held by the pirates. The largest group are around eighty sailors from the Philippines, a poor nation which supplies a disproportionately large number of crew personnel to the world's merchant ships. Their plight is hardly known outside their home country, a nation which has neither the military nor the political stature in the world community to exert serious pressure for their release.
Some commentators have called the home ports of the Somali pirates a 'new Barbary', referring to the Barbary coast of North Africa which was the base of pirates in earlier centuries. Between 1500 and 1830 the Muslim corsairs from the Barbary states terrorised the Mediterranean Sea, taking Christian ships and captives. At the peak of their activities in the first half of the seventeenth century, the chief corsair port of Algiers held at least 25,000 Christian captives.
However, there are important differences between the Barbary corsairs of old and today's Somali pirates. The Barbary corsairs were more interested in captives than in the ships and cargos they captured. Their captives provided much-needed labour in the local economy or could be ransomed back to Christian countries at high prices. The modern Somali pirates are more interested in collecting large ransoms for seized ships and cargos than for individual captives, except in cases like the Chandlers. Captives are only a useful bargaining tool for the Somali pirates if threats to ill-treat them can stimulate shipowners to a more rapid conclusion of ransom negotiations for the return of their ships.
Also, while the Barbary corsairs claimed holy war, the jihad at sea, as a justification for seizing Christian ships and captives, the pirates of the new Barbary in Somalia are purely mercenary criminals. Muslims are among their captives and Islamic militants in Somalia claim to be bitter enemies of the pirates.
The numerous international naval forces cruising off Somalia's coast have made much of their reduction in the number of attacks made by the Somali pirates, which have fallen by half comparing 2010 to 2009. Yet comparing the first nine months of 2010 to those of 2009, the number of ships taken by the Somali pirates has actually increased, from 34 to 40. Taking more ships in fewer attacks would seem to indicate that pirate productivity is actually increasing.
Not only are more ships being taken, but also more captives. In all of 2009 some 867 seafarers were kidnapped by the Somali pirates. Already in 2010 some 790 seafarers have been made prisoner, so the total figure will probably exceed that for 2009 by the end of the year. In the days of the Barbary corsairs, ransoming captives was a major activity for Christian countries, far more important than getting compensation for lost ships and cargos. Today the captives held by the Somali pirates are, except in cases like the Chandlers, largely forgotten.
Naval patrols can do nothing to help the captives held in the new Barbary. Somali piracy can only be ended by creating a more stable political situation within Somalia, which has been without a functioning national government since 1991, and this requires action on land rather than at sea.
Monday, July 12, 2010
A New Somalia? Time to Face Reality
Somali president Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed chose to mark the recent fiftieth anniversary of his country's independence with a striking gesture. Picking up an AK47 assault rifle, the president jumped on a tank and went to join his men fighting Islamist insurgents. He did not have far to go. The frontline is only a few blocks from his office in downtown Mogadishu.
The United Nations-approved Transitional Federal Government (TFG) controls only a small part of Somalia's capital. Yet the international community persists in seeing this powerless administration as the only body capable of bringing peace and stability to the country, building a new Somalia.
Most of southern and central Somalia, including most of Mogadishu, remains under the control of Islamist militants. The principal groups are Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabab, with the latter having openly declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda. In the north of the country, however, are two states, Puntland and Somaliland, which have achieved a degree of stability unknown in the rest of Somalia.
Puntland has its own government, but it has promised to rejoin a united, federal Somalia if and when it is created. The area is the principal base for the infamous Somali pirates, but the Puntland government has made efforts to curb their activities. This has been done in spite of the fact that the annual income of the Somali pirates (at least US $50 million in 2009) vastly exceeeds that of the Puntland administration. The pirates rule the Indian Ocean coast of Puntland, but the local government has had some success in reducing their use of the region's coast along the Gulf of Aden.
West of Puntland is the self-declared independent state of Somaliland, which has enjoyed comparative peace since the collapse of Somalia's central government in 1991. Neither pirates nor Islamist militants have a foothold in Somaliland where the local government has achieved a high level of order and stability. Recently a democratic election has taken place and led to the victory of the opposition party. International observers declared the election largely free and fair. No other part of Somalia has witnessed such an election for decades.
Thus, contrary to the picture of war-torn Somalia usually presented in the Western media, the north of the country consists of two states enjoying a measure of stability. Neither Somaliland nor Puntland is hostile to the United States and its allies, unlike the Islamist insurgents who plague southern Somalia, and both states have at various times appealed for support from the international community. Anyone hoping to restore a functioning national government embracing the whole of Somalia would want to use Somaliland and Puntland as basic building blocks to achieve that aim.
However, rather than use existing governments, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union seem determined to pursue the fantasy of re-creating a national government of Somalia from scratch. In this fairy tale the national government, once established in the capital Mogadishu, will use its Western-trained soldiers to defeat the Islamist insurgents and reduce the regions of Puntland and Somaliland to obedience, restoring law and order throughout Somalia.
The problem is that the TFG can barely survive in Mogadishu let alone move out into the rest of the country. The TFG's own forces are weak and ineffective, and it relies for survival on military support from the African Union peacekeeping troops in the capital, some five thousand men from Uganda and Burundi. The United States has funded training of TFG soldiers in Uganda and Djibouti. Currently the European Union is spending large sums on training two thousand TFG soldiers in Uganda. (In reply Al-Shabab has now carried out suicide bombing in Kampala, the capital of Uganda.) Judging by past experience with such training efforts, once the soldiers return to Somalia most will desert the TFG to join the Islamist insurgents or to take up well-paid service with other Somali warlords.
It is often said that the Somali pirates cannot be beaten at sea, no matter how many foreign warships are cruising off the coast of Somalia. The only solution is a return to law and order on land in Somalia. The only realistic possibility of this happening is if the international community provides support to the existing governments in Somaliland and Puntland rather than wasting time and money on a hopelessly ineffective government in Mogadishu.
The United Nations-approved Transitional Federal Government (TFG) controls only a small part of Somalia's capital. Yet the international community persists in seeing this powerless administration as the only body capable of bringing peace and stability to the country, building a new Somalia.
Most of southern and central Somalia, including most of Mogadishu, remains under the control of Islamist militants. The principal groups are Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabab, with the latter having openly declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda. In the north of the country, however, are two states, Puntland and Somaliland, which have achieved a degree of stability unknown in the rest of Somalia.
Puntland has its own government, but it has promised to rejoin a united, federal Somalia if and when it is created. The area is the principal base for the infamous Somali pirates, but the Puntland government has made efforts to curb their activities. This has been done in spite of the fact that the annual income of the Somali pirates (at least US $50 million in 2009) vastly exceeeds that of the Puntland administration. The pirates rule the Indian Ocean coast of Puntland, but the local government has had some success in reducing their use of the region's coast along the Gulf of Aden.
West of Puntland is the self-declared independent state of Somaliland, which has enjoyed comparative peace since the collapse of Somalia's central government in 1991. Neither pirates nor Islamist militants have a foothold in Somaliland where the local government has achieved a high level of order and stability. Recently a democratic election has taken place and led to the victory of the opposition party. International observers declared the election largely free and fair. No other part of Somalia has witnessed such an election for decades.
Thus, contrary to the picture of war-torn Somalia usually presented in the Western media, the north of the country consists of two states enjoying a measure of stability. Neither Somaliland nor Puntland is hostile to the United States and its allies, unlike the Islamist insurgents who plague southern Somalia, and both states have at various times appealed for support from the international community. Anyone hoping to restore a functioning national government embracing the whole of Somalia would want to use Somaliland and Puntland as basic building blocks to achieve that aim.
However, rather than use existing governments, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union seem determined to pursue the fantasy of re-creating a national government of Somalia from scratch. In this fairy tale the national government, once established in the capital Mogadishu, will use its Western-trained soldiers to defeat the Islamist insurgents and reduce the regions of Puntland and Somaliland to obedience, restoring law and order throughout Somalia.
The problem is that the TFG can barely survive in Mogadishu let alone move out into the rest of the country. The TFG's own forces are weak and ineffective, and it relies for survival on military support from the African Union peacekeeping troops in the capital, some five thousand men from Uganda and Burundi. The United States has funded training of TFG soldiers in Uganda and Djibouti. Currently the European Union is spending large sums on training two thousand TFG soldiers in Uganda. (In reply Al-Shabab has now carried out suicide bombing in Kampala, the capital of Uganda.) Judging by past experience with such training efforts, once the soldiers return to Somalia most will desert the TFG to join the Islamist insurgents or to take up well-paid service with other Somali warlords.
It is often said that the Somali pirates cannot be beaten at sea, no matter how many foreign warships are cruising off the coast of Somalia. The only solution is a return to law and order on land in Somalia. The only realistic possibility of this happening is if the international community provides support to the existing governments in Somaliland and Puntland rather than wasting time and money on a hopelessly ineffective government in Mogadishu.
Sunday, June 13, 2010
Turkey and the Gaza Flotilla: Empty Threats and Real Dangers
The recent Israeli attack on the peace flotilla seeking to break the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the people of Gaza caused outrage around the world. Given that all those killed by the Israeli commandos were Turkish citizens, the reaction of Turkey was particularly strident. Commentators rushed to describe this incident as a turning point in the politics of the Middle East. Israel had lost the support of Turkey, its only Muslim ally in the region (although Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia remain as de facto allies of Israel at least in relation to Iran), and things could never be the same again.
In fact, like innumerable Israeli attacks in the past, the affair of the Gaza flotilla is following a very familiar path. The United States and its Western allies support Israel and the outrage expressed by Muslim states will not lead to any significant action against Israel. That the leading angry Muslim state this time is Turkey, NATO member and long-standing US ally, will make no difference.
As prime minister Netanyahu has said, as long as the United States supports Israel the Jewish state need not worry about the opinions of any other country on the planet. Turkey has called for the punishment of Israel and has demanded that the United States condemn Israeli actions. Neither of these demands is going to be met.
Lest it be thought that American indulgence towards Israeli belligerence is unique - a product of the supposed Zionist control of US foreign policy - one should consider the case of Thailand, another close ally of the United States.
Shortly before the attack on the Gaza flotilla, the Thai army crushed a populist protest movement that had set up camp in downtown Bangkok, killing at least seventy-five people and carrying out this repression in full view of the international media. If this action had occurred in Beijing or Tehran, the United States and its allies would have been loud in their expressions of outrage and condemnation. However, in the Thai case they made almost no comment, other than to advise their tourists to avoid the area. When the military forces of a close US ally behave brutally, Washington can be guaranteed to ignore such action.
This may be bad news for the current government of Turkey. The Turkish armed forces, like those of Thailand, have a long history of launching military coups against governments deemed to be insufficiently pro-American. Originally the democratic election of the current moderate Islamist government of Turkey, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was welcomed by the United States and its allies as a progressive step. Now their opinions may be changing.
Erdogan has not only denounced Israel's action against the flotilla, but he has also praised the Hamas party which controls Gaza as a Muslim resistance movement. Since Hamas is regarded as a terrorist group by the United States, Israel, and their allies, Erdogan may be fast losing his reputation as a moderate Islamist. His removal by a Turkish military coup, backed by the USA and Israel, may now be under consideration, but much will depend on whether Erdogan actually follows up his tough talk with action.
Despite all the rage and public demonstrations, it seems unlikely that Turkey will take any serious action against Israel, with which it has close economic and military ties. The Turkish armed forces have been very dependent on Israeli assistance in their recent efforts at military modernization. For example, while the USA has been reluctant to supply the Turkish military with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Israel agreed to sell Turkey some of its Heron UAVs. The Turkish generals will not want to see this contract ended by a general severing of relations between the two countries. In the military sphere, Turkish retaliation against Israel will not go beyond the symbolic cancellation of a few joint military exercises.
Annual Turkish exports to Israel amount to two and a half billion dollars worth of goods, and Turkish businessmen will not want to lose that trade. Turkey also has a long-term contract to supply water to Israel and any attempt to end this would be seen as dangerously provocative. Israeli visitors are also important to Turkey's tourist industry, which would not wish to lose such income because of a politically-motivated ban on such visits.
Since the United States has clearly backed Israel rather than Turkey in the Gaza flotilla affair, will Erdogan retaliate against Washington as well? Suggestions have included the withdrawal of the Turkish military contingent from Afghanistan; the closing of the remaining American bases in Turkey; or even taking Turkey out of NATO completely. None of these things are likely to happen. Should it look as if even one of them was being contemplated by Erdogan, the Turkish generals would no doubt launch a coup with Washington's blessing.
All in all Erdogan's threats to both Israel and the United States are just empty rhetoric. Because they will have no serious consequences in the real world, such words merely invite Western contempt for being just ineffectual Muslim rage. Of course if Erdogan should try to back up his words with action, then he will face the real danger that his government will be overthrown by a military coup. Backed by the United States and Israel, the Turkish generals will no doubt welcome the opportunity to suppress the Islamist movement which has posed such a threat in recent years to the secular state established by Ataturk back in the 1920s.
In fact, like innumerable Israeli attacks in the past, the affair of the Gaza flotilla is following a very familiar path. The United States and its Western allies support Israel and the outrage expressed by Muslim states will not lead to any significant action against Israel. That the leading angry Muslim state this time is Turkey, NATO member and long-standing US ally, will make no difference.
As prime minister Netanyahu has said, as long as the United States supports Israel the Jewish state need not worry about the opinions of any other country on the planet. Turkey has called for the punishment of Israel and has demanded that the United States condemn Israeli actions. Neither of these demands is going to be met.
Lest it be thought that American indulgence towards Israeli belligerence is unique - a product of the supposed Zionist control of US foreign policy - one should consider the case of Thailand, another close ally of the United States.
Shortly before the attack on the Gaza flotilla, the Thai army crushed a populist protest movement that had set up camp in downtown Bangkok, killing at least seventy-five people and carrying out this repression in full view of the international media. If this action had occurred in Beijing or Tehran, the United States and its allies would have been loud in their expressions of outrage and condemnation. However, in the Thai case they made almost no comment, other than to advise their tourists to avoid the area. When the military forces of a close US ally behave brutally, Washington can be guaranteed to ignore such action.
This may be bad news for the current government of Turkey. The Turkish armed forces, like those of Thailand, have a long history of launching military coups against governments deemed to be insufficiently pro-American. Originally the democratic election of the current moderate Islamist government of Turkey, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was welcomed by the United States and its allies as a progressive step. Now their opinions may be changing.
Erdogan has not only denounced Israel's action against the flotilla, but he has also praised the Hamas party which controls Gaza as a Muslim resistance movement. Since Hamas is regarded as a terrorist group by the United States, Israel, and their allies, Erdogan may be fast losing his reputation as a moderate Islamist. His removal by a Turkish military coup, backed by the USA and Israel, may now be under consideration, but much will depend on whether Erdogan actually follows up his tough talk with action.
Despite all the rage and public demonstrations, it seems unlikely that Turkey will take any serious action against Israel, with which it has close economic and military ties. The Turkish armed forces have been very dependent on Israeli assistance in their recent efforts at military modernization. For example, while the USA has been reluctant to supply the Turkish military with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Israel agreed to sell Turkey some of its Heron UAVs. The Turkish generals will not want to see this contract ended by a general severing of relations between the two countries. In the military sphere, Turkish retaliation against Israel will not go beyond the symbolic cancellation of a few joint military exercises.
Annual Turkish exports to Israel amount to two and a half billion dollars worth of goods, and Turkish businessmen will not want to lose that trade. Turkey also has a long-term contract to supply water to Israel and any attempt to end this would be seen as dangerously provocative. Israeli visitors are also important to Turkey's tourist industry, which would not wish to lose such income because of a politically-motivated ban on such visits.
Since the United States has clearly backed Israel rather than Turkey in the Gaza flotilla affair, will Erdogan retaliate against Washington as well? Suggestions have included the withdrawal of the Turkish military contingent from Afghanistan; the closing of the remaining American bases in Turkey; or even taking Turkey out of NATO completely. None of these things are likely to happen. Should it look as if even one of them was being contemplated by Erdogan, the Turkish generals would no doubt launch a coup with Washington's blessing.
All in all Erdogan's threats to both Israel and the United States are just empty rhetoric. Because they will have no serious consequences in the real world, such words merely invite Western contempt for being just ineffectual Muslim rage. Of course if Erdogan should try to back up his words with action, then he will face the real danger that his government will be overthrown by a military coup. Backed by the United States and Israel, the Turkish generals will no doubt welcome the opportunity to suppress the Islamist movement which has posed such a threat in recent years to the secular state established by Ataturk back in the 1920s.
Sunday, May 23, 2010
Unfinished Business: Conflicts in the Caucasus
The recent sixteenth anniversary of the ceasefire agreement that ended the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh passed largely unnoticed in the world outside the Caucasus. Yet this is one of several 'frozen' conflicts in that region which could break out again at any time with serious consequences both local and international.
In Soviet times Nagorno-Karabakh was a part of the republic of Azerbaijan which had a largely Armenian population. From 1988 onwards these Armenians began to demand separation from Azerbaijan and links with the nearby republic of Armenia. After the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991, both Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states and the unrest in Karabakh quickly turned into open warfare.
The 1992-1994 war involved the seizure of Karabakh by the local Armenian rebels, backed by Armenia, and the expulsion of the Azeri population. The government of Azerbaijan mounted repeated attacks in an attempt to regain the lost territory, but with no success. Some 15-20 per cent of the territory of Azerbaijan passed into Armenian hands. Over 30,000 people were killed in the conflict and around one million people became refugees. Armenian success was said to be due to military support from Russia and the poor organization of the Azeri war effort.
Much has changed since the ceasefire in 1994. Azerbaijan is now a wealthy country because of its oil riches and it has greatly strengthened its armed forces. Since the start of this year, Azeri nationalist rhetoric about regaining the nation's lost territory has steadily increased. In February the defence minister of Azerbaijan spoke of the likelihood of a 'great war' with Armenia which would lead to the reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Could such a renewed war break out?
Armenia's position today appears weaker than in the 1990s. Russia now has close political and economic ties with Azerbaijan and may be less willing to give Armenia military aid if that country is attacked. NATO member Turkey has even closer links with the Azeri Turks, and it has said it will not ratify its US-brokered agreement of October 2009 to normalize relations with Armenia unless the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is settled, presumably by Armenian concessions.
Despite the warlike rhetoric in Baku, a unilateral Azeri military attack on Nagorno-Karabakh seems unlikely. It was such an attack which Georgia launched on her break-away region of South Ossetia in August 2008 to 'unfreeze' a similar conflict in the Caucasus. The results were not to Georgia's benefit. Russia struck back to protect its client state and its forces rampaged across Georgia for several days before the government in Tbilisi came to terms. Unilateral action is clearly not the way forward for Caucasian nations seeking to regain lost territory if it provokes a military reaction from the Russian bear.
NATO promises of support for Georgia proved so much hot air during the short war with Russia in August 2008. Nevertheless since then the Western alliance has boosted its links with Georgia and held out to it the possibility of NATO membership. Might such support encourage the Georgian government to launch a second strike to regain lost territories like South Ossetia and Abkhazia? It seems unlikely. Russia is still the world's second most powerful nuclear-armed state. The USA and its NATO allies are unlikely to risk nuclear catastrophe by supporting a Georgian attack on obscure Russian client states in the distant Caucasus.
The other main conflict in the Caucasus region, Russia's war with Islamist guerrillas in Chechnya and the neighbouring states of Dagestan and Ingushetia, was declared 'won' by the Russians in April 2009 after a ten-year struggle. However, Islamist terrorists from the Caucasus are still able to carry out bombings within Russia as well as attacks in their home region. Low-level conflict of this sort seems likely to continue in the Caucasus for years to come and may grow in strength.
The 'frozen' conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan continue to have the potential to flare up again, but it seems that after the failure of Georgia's unilateral attack in 2008, the aggrieved Georgians and Azeris will probably hope that their big-power supporters can achieve favourable diplomatic settlements for them rather than risk further military action by their own forces. The increasing NATO presence in the Caucasus may encourage Russia to make concessions to local states, although there is also the risk that such a presence in an area long regarded by Russia as its own backyard may be seen as a dangerous provocation.
In Soviet times Nagorno-Karabakh was a part of the republic of Azerbaijan which had a largely Armenian population. From 1988 onwards these Armenians began to demand separation from Azerbaijan and links with the nearby republic of Armenia. After the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991, both Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states and the unrest in Karabakh quickly turned into open warfare.
The 1992-1994 war involved the seizure of Karabakh by the local Armenian rebels, backed by Armenia, and the expulsion of the Azeri population. The government of Azerbaijan mounted repeated attacks in an attempt to regain the lost territory, but with no success. Some 15-20 per cent of the territory of Azerbaijan passed into Armenian hands. Over 30,000 people were killed in the conflict and around one million people became refugees. Armenian success was said to be due to military support from Russia and the poor organization of the Azeri war effort.
Much has changed since the ceasefire in 1994. Azerbaijan is now a wealthy country because of its oil riches and it has greatly strengthened its armed forces. Since the start of this year, Azeri nationalist rhetoric about regaining the nation's lost territory has steadily increased. In February the defence minister of Azerbaijan spoke of the likelihood of a 'great war' with Armenia which would lead to the reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Could such a renewed war break out?
Armenia's position today appears weaker than in the 1990s. Russia now has close political and economic ties with Azerbaijan and may be less willing to give Armenia military aid if that country is attacked. NATO member Turkey has even closer links with the Azeri Turks, and it has said it will not ratify its US-brokered agreement of October 2009 to normalize relations with Armenia unless the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is settled, presumably by Armenian concessions.
Despite the warlike rhetoric in Baku, a unilateral Azeri military attack on Nagorno-Karabakh seems unlikely. It was such an attack which Georgia launched on her break-away region of South Ossetia in August 2008 to 'unfreeze' a similar conflict in the Caucasus. The results were not to Georgia's benefit. Russia struck back to protect its client state and its forces rampaged across Georgia for several days before the government in Tbilisi came to terms. Unilateral action is clearly not the way forward for Caucasian nations seeking to regain lost territory if it provokes a military reaction from the Russian bear.
NATO promises of support for Georgia proved so much hot air during the short war with Russia in August 2008. Nevertheless since then the Western alliance has boosted its links with Georgia and held out to it the possibility of NATO membership. Might such support encourage the Georgian government to launch a second strike to regain lost territories like South Ossetia and Abkhazia? It seems unlikely. Russia is still the world's second most powerful nuclear-armed state. The USA and its NATO allies are unlikely to risk nuclear catastrophe by supporting a Georgian attack on obscure Russian client states in the distant Caucasus.
The other main conflict in the Caucasus region, Russia's war with Islamist guerrillas in Chechnya and the neighbouring states of Dagestan and Ingushetia, was declared 'won' by the Russians in April 2009 after a ten-year struggle. However, Islamist terrorists from the Caucasus are still able to carry out bombings within Russia as well as attacks in their home region. Low-level conflict of this sort seems likely to continue in the Caucasus for years to come and may grow in strength.
The 'frozen' conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan continue to have the potential to flare up again, but it seems that after the failure of Georgia's unilateral attack in 2008, the aggrieved Georgians and Azeris will probably hope that their big-power supporters can achieve favourable diplomatic settlements for them rather than risk further military action by their own forces. The increasing NATO presence in the Caucasus may encourage Russia to make concessions to local states, although there is also the risk that such a presence in an area long regarded by Russia as its own backyard may be seen as a dangerous provocation.
Friday, April 9, 2010
Somali Sea Raiders: Pirates Not Corsairs
The Samho Dream is the third supertanker to be captured by Somali pirates in less than two years. These ships are the largest vessels ever captured by pirates. Yet are the Somali sea raiders really pirates? The Arabic media use a word to describe them which means 'corsair' rather than pirate, apparently conferring a higher status upon them.
The intention is clearly to associate the Somalis with the Barbary corsairs of North Africa who were a menace to European shipping from the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century. Their victims called them the 'Barbary pirates', but there is good reason to see them as different from pirates, just as there is good reason to deny the label 'corsair' to the modern Somali pirates.
The corsairs of the Ottoman regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli and the independent kingdom of Morocco were in part Muslim holy warriors, carrying on a campaign against Christian ships and coasts. Although also Muslims, the Somali pirates have never claimed to be carrying on a holy war at sea. Indeed they deny all links to the Islamist militants operating in Somalia lest such an association unleash the full wrath of the United States upon them. The Somali pirates are criminals not terrorists.
Pirates operate outside the law, the enemies of all nations as it used to be said. The Barbary corsairs operated under the control of the rulers of their home ports. European states could make treaties with, for example, the government of Algiers to stop corsair attacks on their ships. There is no effective national government in Somalia and the pirates are not even subject to the remaining regional governments in that country. The clan-based Somali sea raiders are true pirates, unfettered by any law, national or international.
For the Barbary corsairs the ships and cargoes they captured were less important than the passengers and crew aboard the vessels. During the period they were active, the Barbary corsairs captured more than a million European and American Christians, who either paid ransom to regain their freedom or remained as slaves. For the Somali pirates the ships and cargoes are more important, being held until multi-million dollar ransoms are paid. The crews aboard the captured vessels are less important, although threats to their safety may encourage reluctant ship owners to pay up.
The reduced importance of the human captives is a sign that the Barbary corsairs and the Somali pirates operate in very different political and economic worlds. The Barbary corsairs lived in a time of emerging European nation states. A French merchant ship, for example, was based in France and had a French crew. To capture it was to invite retaliation from the French government and its navy. Today the international shipping industry is very different. In the age of globalization a ship may be owned in one country, fly the flag of another, and have a crew drawn from any number of countries. It might be said that this modern diversity is reflected in the multi-national composition of the anti-piracy fleet of warships now assembled off Somalia, but the multiplicity of national interests involved in vessels captured by the pirates is a source of weakness not strength.
The celebrated Maersk Alabama incident in 2009 was very much the exception which proves the rule. To have an American warship save the all-American crew of an American-flag merchant ship was an echo of an earlier, simpler time. Generally merchant ships captured by the Somali pirates cause as many international complications as does the successful interception of suspected pirate craft by warships on anti-piracy patrol.
Thus it can be argued that the Somali pirates are not the heirs of the Barbary corsairs. Perhaps we should be glad of this. It took European and American states more than three centuries to defeat the Barbary corsairs. One can only hope that today's international community can curb the activities of the Somali pirates in a rather shorter period of time.
The intention is clearly to associate the Somalis with the Barbary corsairs of North Africa who were a menace to European shipping from the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century. Their victims called them the 'Barbary pirates', but there is good reason to see them as different from pirates, just as there is good reason to deny the label 'corsair' to the modern Somali pirates.
The corsairs of the Ottoman regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli and the independent kingdom of Morocco were in part Muslim holy warriors, carrying on a campaign against Christian ships and coasts. Although also Muslims, the Somali pirates have never claimed to be carrying on a holy war at sea. Indeed they deny all links to the Islamist militants operating in Somalia lest such an association unleash the full wrath of the United States upon them. The Somali pirates are criminals not terrorists.
Pirates operate outside the law, the enemies of all nations as it used to be said. The Barbary corsairs operated under the control of the rulers of their home ports. European states could make treaties with, for example, the government of Algiers to stop corsair attacks on their ships. There is no effective national government in Somalia and the pirates are not even subject to the remaining regional governments in that country. The clan-based Somali sea raiders are true pirates, unfettered by any law, national or international.
For the Barbary corsairs the ships and cargoes they captured were less important than the passengers and crew aboard the vessels. During the period they were active, the Barbary corsairs captured more than a million European and American Christians, who either paid ransom to regain their freedom or remained as slaves. For the Somali pirates the ships and cargoes are more important, being held until multi-million dollar ransoms are paid. The crews aboard the captured vessels are less important, although threats to their safety may encourage reluctant ship owners to pay up.
The reduced importance of the human captives is a sign that the Barbary corsairs and the Somali pirates operate in very different political and economic worlds. The Barbary corsairs lived in a time of emerging European nation states. A French merchant ship, for example, was based in France and had a French crew. To capture it was to invite retaliation from the French government and its navy. Today the international shipping industry is very different. In the age of globalization a ship may be owned in one country, fly the flag of another, and have a crew drawn from any number of countries. It might be said that this modern diversity is reflected in the multi-national composition of the anti-piracy fleet of warships now assembled off Somalia, but the multiplicity of national interests involved in vessels captured by the pirates is a source of weakness not strength.
The celebrated Maersk Alabama incident in 2009 was very much the exception which proves the rule. To have an American warship save the all-American crew of an American-flag merchant ship was an echo of an earlier, simpler time. Generally merchant ships captured by the Somali pirates cause as many international complications as does the successful interception of suspected pirate craft by warships on anti-piracy patrol.
Thus it can be argued that the Somali pirates are not the heirs of the Barbary corsairs. Perhaps we should be glad of this. It took European and American states more than three centuries to defeat the Barbary corsairs. One can only hope that today's international community can curb the activities of the Somali pirates in a rather shorter period of time.
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
How to Lose Friends: President Obama and the Middle East
To alienate one long-standing friend is a misfortune. To alienate two such friends within less than a month is a sign of carelessness. Yet this is what President Barack Obama has recently achieved, angering both of America's principal allies in the Middle East, Turkey and Israel.
It might be said that with regard to Turkey the offence was not given by the president but by a committee of the US Congress which called for official recognition of the Turkish killing of Armenians during the First World War as an act of genocide. The White House promptly said it would make every effort to prevent such a resolution being passed by Congress. Nevertheless Obama had promised to support such a resolution when he was seeking Armenian American votes during his presidential election campaign. Turkey has not been appeased and has promised that if such a resolution goes through, it will have a negative impact on US-Turkish relations.
With regard to Israel, whatever the provocations of the Netanyahu government, Obama's promise to re-start the Middle East peace process with regard to the Israel-Palestine dispute was not being fulfilled even before the clash over the expansion of Jewish settlements in Jerusalem. To appease his Arab allies, Obama will no doubt heap all the blame for the current crisis on Israel, but his own failure to take any serious interest in the peace process must also take some of the blame.
One might add that the Obama administration's penchant for offending long-standing allies of the USA is not restricted to the Middle East. During the same weeks that American relations with Turkey and Israel soured, Obama's hostility to Britain once again came into prominence. His administration's proclaimed 'neutrality' in the recent renewal of the dispute between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands did not pass unnoticed by the London media. This confirmed for many the president's anti-British feelings, supposedly caused by the suffering of his Kenyan family during British colonial rule in that country.
Nor can America's Arab allies in the Middle East take much comfort from President Obama's inept diplomacy. They walk a dangerous tightrope. The Arab masses they rule are alienated by their support for America's wars in the Islamic world. These Arab rulers need America to achieve real progress in the Israel-Palestine dispute so they can show their people that they are not just Western stooges, indifferent to the suffering of fellow Muslims. If no such progress can be shown, the Arab masses will continue to be radicalized and fall under the influence of Islamist extremists and terror groups.
The situation is particularly acute in Egypt, the only Arab country which directly assists Israel in the oppression of fellow Muslims through its role in the blockade of the Palestinians in Gaza. Ageing and ill, the current ruler of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, wants a smooth transition when he hands over power to his son. An American-brokered settlement between Israel and the Palestinians which appears to give some gains to the latter would greatly assist such a transition. As it is, the Egyptian government can only seek to appease growing Islamist radicalism by deflecting it into attacks on the country's Coptic Christian minority.
Arab rulers are well aware of the great popularity with the Arab masses of Iran's President Ahmadinejad because of his hostile declarations against Israel. Most of this ranting is just empty rhetoric, regularly repeated precisely because it embarrasses the Arab rulers with their own peoples. Even Syria would not dare issue such dire threats against Israel as those coming from Tehran. Nevertheless it is a high-risk strategy for the Iranians. President Nasser of Egypt repeatedly threatened Israel in such terms, but found himself helpless and humiliated in 1967 when Israel chose to take his words at face value and launched a pre-emptive military attack.
The danger in the current situation is that America's President Obama, conscious of his weak performance both at home and abroad, will feel forced to act tough to repair his image and win back the support of alienated allies. One way of doing this would be to launch a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Such action would be very popular with Israel, moderately popular with the rulers of America's Arab allies, especially in the Gulf, and might meet with Turkey's reluctant approval.
The wider consequences of such an attack for the Middle East and the rest of the world would of course be unforeseeable. Moreover, if for any reason the attack was less than totally successful, there is a risk for Barack Obama that his presidency would be doomed by events in Iran in the same way that Jimmy Carter's presidency was fatally blighted thirty years ago.
It might be said that with regard to Turkey the offence was not given by the president but by a committee of the US Congress which called for official recognition of the Turkish killing of Armenians during the First World War as an act of genocide. The White House promptly said it would make every effort to prevent such a resolution being passed by Congress. Nevertheless Obama had promised to support such a resolution when he was seeking Armenian American votes during his presidential election campaign. Turkey has not been appeased and has promised that if such a resolution goes through, it will have a negative impact on US-Turkish relations.
With regard to Israel, whatever the provocations of the Netanyahu government, Obama's promise to re-start the Middle East peace process with regard to the Israel-Palestine dispute was not being fulfilled even before the clash over the expansion of Jewish settlements in Jerusalem. To appease his Arab allies, Obama will no doubt heap all the blame for the current crisis on Israel, but his own failure to take any serious interest in the peace process must also take some of the blame.
One might add that the Obama administration's penchant for offending long-standing allies of the USA is not restricted to the Middle East. During the same weeks that American relations with Turkey and Israel soured, Obama's hostility to Britain once again came into prominence. His administration's proclaimed 'neutrality' in the recent renewal of the dispute between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands did not pass unnoticed by the London media. This confirmed for many the president's anti-British feelings, supposedly caused by the suffering of his Kenyan family during British colonial rule in that country.
Nor can America's Arab allies in the Middle East take much comfort from President Obama's inept diplomacy. They walk a dangerous tightrope. The Arab masses they rule are alienated by their support for America's wars in the Islamic world. These Arab rulers need America to achieve real progress in the Israel-Palestine dispute so they can show their people that they are not just Western stooges, indifferent to the suffering of fellow Muslims. If no such progress can be shown, the Arab masses will continue to be radicalized and fall under the influence of Islamist extremists and terror groups.
The situation is particularly acute in Egypt, the only Arab country which directly assists Israel in the oppression of fellow Muslims through its role in the blockade of the Palestinians in Gaza. Ageing and ill, the current ruler of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, wants a smooth transition when he hands over power to his son. An American-brokered settlement between Israel and the Palestinians which appears to give some gains to the latter would greatly assist such a transition. As it is, the Egyptian government can only seek to appease growing Islamist radicalism by deflecting it into attacks on the country's Coptic Christian minority.
Arab rulers are well aware of the great popularity with the Arab masses of Iran's President Ahmadinejad because of his hostile declarations against Israel. Most of this ranting is just empty rhetoric, regularly repeated precisely because it embarrasses the Arab rulers with their own peoples. Even Syria would not dare issue such dire threats against Israel as those coming from Tehran. Nevertheless it is a high-risk strategy for the Iranians. President Nasser of Egypt repeatedly threatened Israel in such terms, but found himself helpless and humiliated in 1967 when Israel chose to take his words at face value and launched a pre-emptive military attack.
The danger in the current situation is that America's President Obama, conscious of his weak performance both at home and abroad, will feel forced to act tough to repair his image and win back the support of alienated allies. One way of doing this would be to launch a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Such action would be very popular with Israel, moderately popular with the rulers of America's Arab allies, especially in the Gulf, and might meet with Turkey's reluctant approval.
The wider consequences of such an attack for the Middle East and the rest of the world would of course be unforeseeable. Moreover, if for any reason the attack was less than totally successful, there is a risk for Barack Obama that his presidency would be doomed by events in Iran in the same way that Jimmy Carter's presidency was fatally blighted thirty years ago.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)