The recent sixteenth anniversary of the ceasefire agreement that ended the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh passed largely unnoticed in the world outside the Caucasus. Yet this is one of several 'frozen' conflicts in that region which could break out again at any time with serious consequences both local and international.
In Soviet times Nagorno-Karabakh was a part of the republic of Azerbaijan which had a largely Armenian population. From 1988 onwards these Armenians began to demand separation from Azerbaijan and links with the nearby republic of Armenia. After the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991, both Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states and the unrest in Karabakh quickly turned into open warfare.
The 1992-1994 war involved the seizure of Karabakh by the local Armenian rebels, backed by Armenia, and the expulsion of the Azeri population. The government of Azerbaijan mounted repeated attacks in an attempt to regain the lost territory, but with no success. Some 15-20 per cent of the territory of Azerbaijan passed into Armenian hands. Over 30,000 people were killed in the conflict and around one million people became refugees. Armenian success was said to be due to military support from Russia and the poor organization of the Azeri war effort.
Much has changed since the ceasefire in 1994. Azerbaijan is now a wealthy country because of its oil riches and it has greatly strengthened its armed forces. Since the start of this year, Azeri nationalist rhetoric about regaining the nation's lost territory has steadily increased. In February the defence minister of Azerbaijan spoke of the likelihood of a 'great war' with Armenia which would lead to the reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Could such a renewed war break out?
Armenia's position today appears weaker than in the 1990s. Russia now has close political and economic ties with Azerbaijan and may be less willing to give Armenia military aid if that country is attacked. NATO member Turkey has even closer links with the Azeri Turks, and it has said it will not ratify its US-brokered agreement of October 2009 to normalize relations with Armenia unless the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is settled, presumably by Armenian concessions.
Despite the warlike rhetoric in Baku, a unilateral Azeri military attack on Nagorno-Karabakh seems unlikely. It was such an attack which Georgia launched on her break-away region of South Ossetia in August 2008 to 'unfreeze' a similar conflict in the Caucasus. The results were not to Georgia's benefit. Russia struck back to protect its client state and its forces rampaged across Georgia for several days before the government in Tbilisi came to terms. Unilateral action is clearly not the way forward for Caucasian nations seeking to regain lost territory if it provokes a military reaction from the Russian bear.
NATO promises of support for Georgia proved so much hot air during the short war with Russia in August 2008. Nevertheless since then the Western alliance has boosted its links with Georgia and held out to it the possibility of NATO membership. Might such support encourage the Georgian government to launch a second strike to regain lost territories like South Ossetia and Abkhazia? It seems unlikely. Russia is still the world's second most powerful nuclear-armed state. The USA and its NATO allies are unlikely to risk nuclear catastrophe by supporting a Georgian attack on obscure Russian client states in the distant Caucasus.
The other main conflict in the Caucasus region, Russia's war with Islamist guerrillas in Chechnya and the neighbouring states of Dagestan and Ingushetia, was declared 'won' by the Russians in April 2009 after a ten-year struggle. However, Islamist terrorists from the Caucasus are still able to carry out bombings within Russia as well as attacks in their home region. Low-level conflict of this sort seems likely to continue in the Caucasus for years to come and may grow in strength.
The 'frozen' conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan continue to have the potential to flare up again, but it seems that after the failure of Georgia's unilateral attack in 2008, the aggrieved Georgians and Azeris will probably hope that their big-power supporters can achieve favourable diplomatic settlements for them rather than risk further military action by their own forces. The increasing NATO presence in the Caucasus may encourage Russia to make concessions to local states, although there is also the risk that such a presence in an area long regarded by Russia as its own backyard may be seen as a dangerous provocation.
