Historical comparisons can both inform and mislead. On one level the present insurgency in Iraq against predominantly American and British forces has similarities with the 1920 Iraq revolt against the British and the 1899-1902 Philippines insurgency against the United States.
In 1898 the Americans landed in the Philippines and claimed to be liberating the inhabitants from oppressive Spanish rule. In 1917-18 the British freed Iraq from Ottoman Turkish rule and promised independence to the Arabs. In 2003 the Anglo-American forces overthrew Saddam Hussein and promised freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people. In all three cases significant sections of the liberated populations soon had reason to question the motives of their liberators and to rise in revolt against them.
Filipino nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo believed they had been promised independence by the United States and fought the Americans for three years in an attempt to win it. Unfortunately the rebels initially fought conventional battles with the American army in which they were defeated with heavy losses. Turning to guerrilla warfare, Aguinaldo's men had more success, but they were eventually worn down by a twin-track American strategy, combining military operations with medical and social improvement programmes to win support among the mass of the population. Disclaiming the label of imperialists, the Americans claimed to be acting as trustees in the Philippines, merely educating the Filipinos for eventual independence. This was achieved after the Second World War, but the United States retained major military bases and significant political influence in the Philippines until the early 1990s.
In Iraq after the First World War discontent among the urban political elites with British failure to honour wartime promises of independence was upstaged by rural tribal revolts in the summer of 1920. The largely Shiite rebels inflicted some early reverses on the British, but reinforements soon poured in from India and elsewhere. Within three months General Haldane's army of over 100,000 British and Indian troops had broken the back of the revolt. Nevertheless the outbreak forced the British to achieve an early political settlement with the largely Sunni Iraqi elites, installing a national government under King Feisal. Officially Iraq was not a British colony, but a mandated territory the British ruled under the authority of the League of Nations and it was to move rapidly to independence. This was granted in 1932, but the British retained important military bases in Iraq and much political influence in the country. During the Second World War Britain invaded Iraq to remove a pro-Axis government in 1941, and British influence in the country did not finally end until the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.
So will these historical Filipino and Iraqi scenarios be repeated in Iraq? An initial insurgency is defeated; a local government is put together and eventually granted independence; and the intervening power retains military bases and political influence in the country that may last for decades. Such developments do not seem impossible in current Iraqi conditions, but one must not endow historical comparisons with an air of inevitability. The present insurgency in Iraq has its own unique features which may lead to a different outcome.
Both the ealier revolts took place in a time when direct military interventions by major powers in the affairs of smaller states were still widely considered acceptable. The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was crticised by countries large and small around the globe, leaving the question of its legitimacy still open to intense debate. The earlier Filipino and Iraqi rebels had little or no support from outside their own countries, nor did their struggles attract much attention in the international media of their period. Iraqi insurgents today receive much aid from abroad and their activities attract daily attention in media around the world.
The novel features of the new insurgency may require a more sophisticated strategy to defeat them, but valuable lessons in quelling rebellions can still be gleaned from the earlier revolts. The American army of the early twentieth century combined anti-guerrilla operations with successful efforts to improve living conditions among the Filipino population. More than four years after the invasion of Iraq, much of its population still endures a lower standard of living than under Saddam Hussein, while millions have simply fled the country. Establishing security and improving the lot of the population should go hand in hand.
The British suppressed the 1920 Iraq revolt comparatively quickly with a massive use of force, but they knew that an immediate political settlement was needed to prevent further outbreaks. The present 'surge' operations are aimed at stabilising the security situation so that the Iraqi government can win over the Sunni minority with political concessions. In this way the insurgency may be ended. Unfortunately, whatever the military successes of the reinforced US forces, the present Shiite government appears unwilling to make the concessions needed to bring the Sunnis into the Iraqi political process.
History can show us parallels to current events, but it cannot predict future outcomes. If and when the current insurgency in Iraq is defeated, future political developments in that country may well mirror those which followed the defeat of the Filipino rebels and the 1920 Iraqi insurgents, but such developments cannot be taken for granted.
