A Turkish army stands on the northern border of Iraq. It is ready to invade Iraqi Kurdistan and destroy the bases of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose guerrillas have carried out numerous attacks in south-east Turkey. The PKK and the Iraqi Kurds have promised to resist any Turkish invasion.
The division between Turks and Kurds seems simple, but as in so many disputes in the Middle East, the reality is more complicated. The Turks invaded Iraqi Kurdistan in pursuit of the PKK on a number of occasions during the 1990s. The two principal incursions were in 1992 and 1997. On both occasions Iraqi Kurdish forces assisted the Turkish army in its attacks on the PKK.
It seems entirely possible that a new Turkish attack on PKK bases may once again enjoy local Kurdish support, or the Iraqi Kurds may suppress the PKK themselves, thus removing the need for any Turkish invasion. Both the United States and the government of Iraq undoubtedly hope the latter possibility will become reality.
After their failed uprising against Saddam Hussein in March 1991, Iraq's Kurds eventually received Anglo-American protection which allowed them to establish a safe area in the north of the country. In 1992 the main Kurdish nationalist parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani, set up the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
The new semi-independent Kurdish state was heavily dependent for its economic survival on trade routes through Turkey. As PKK attacks in Turkey increased during 1992, Ankara forced the KRG to impose restrictions on PKK activities. In retaliation the PKK declared a blockade of Iraqi Kurdistan in July and halted truck traffic by violent intimidation.
This action encouraged the Iraqi Kurds to join in Turkish plans to attack PKK bases in Iraq. In October and November 1992 the Turkish army crossed the border and KRG forces assisted them in their operations against the PKK. Soon most of the 5,000 PKK fighters had been killed, had fled to Iran, or had surrendered to the KRG, which refused to hand them over to the Turks.
The KRG's aid to the Turks angered many Kurdish nationalists, but the issue was soon forgotten as the KDP and the PUK fell out and by 1994 the two parties were at war. The United States tried to halt this Kurdish civil war, but other nations preferred to take sides, Turkey supporting the KDP and Iran the PUK. In 1996 the KDP even called in the help of Saddam Hussein's forces to drive the PUK back to the Iranian border.
With the Iraqi Kurds so bitterly divided, it seemed unsurprising that when Turkey launched another incursion into Iraq in May 1997 the KDP should assist Turkish troops against the PKK. To the KDP, the PKK were not brother Kurds but political rivals. Similarly, later in 1997 when the PUK launched an offensive against the KDP, Turkish air attacks helped to defeat it.
In the new Iraq created since 2003, the Kurds have sought to project an image of unity, with past disputes apparently forgotten. Jalal Talabani is now president of Iraq, while Massoud Barzani is president of the KRG. Feelings of Kurdish solidarity might seem to dictate that they should support the PKK against Turkey, but as already noted, Iraqi Kurds have been ready to assist the Turks against the PKK before. Also Iraqi Kurdistan is still very dependent on Turkey for its economic prosperity.
Iraqi Kurds know that in any serious military clash between them and the Turks the USA will be forced to back Turkey, the most important American ally in the Middle East after Israel. Iraqi Kurdistan has become the nearest thing to an independent state that the Kurdish nation has achieved in its modern history. It seems possible that rather than risk losing this state the Iraqi Kurds will sacrifice the PKK, preferably by suppressing its bases themselves to avoid another Turkish invasion of their territory.
