Among the deluge of books on Christian-Muslim conflict that have appeared since 9/11, one group has dealt with the clashes between the infant navy of the United States and the Barbary corsairs in the early nineteenth century. This struggle has been portrayed, to use the sub-title of a 2003 book, as 'America's First War on Terror'.
The United States Navy was brought into being to chastise Muslim pirates in North Africa who had been seizing American merchant ships and enslaving American sailors. In wars against Tripoli in 1801-1805 and against Algiers in 1815, the United States forced the Barbary corsairs to respect its power and sovereignty.
Both sides made reference to the religious aspects of these conflicts, but by this period political and economic considerations were more important in motivating both Christian captains and Muslim corsairs. Despite their claims to be carrying on a centuries-old jihad or holy war on the high seas, the Barbary pirates were running a protection racket. They demanded tribute from foreign maritime states in return for not attacking their merchant ships. The frigates of the new United States Navy soon convinced the Muslim pirates that the American republic would not submit to such extortion.
Now, two centuries after the wars against the Barbary corsairs, a new breed of Muslim pirate is active along the coast of Somalia, reaching out as far as two hundred miles into the neighbouring seas to capture ships and crews to be held for ransom. Today the United States Navy is the most powerful naval force in the world - indeed the most powerful navy in world history - and it might be expected to snuff out this new pirate menace with ease. However, such is not the case. Despite the ever-growing provocation by the Somali pirates, the United States Navy has taken only the most tentative action against this mosquito force. Why is this?
In part it is because unlike in the early 1800s America today has no large national merchant fleet needing protection. The mercantile marine of the early American republic quickly grew to be one of the largest in the world, its ships American-built, American-owned, and American-manned. Today, although much merchant tonnage is still American-owned, most of these vessels are registered under flags of convenience, chiefly Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, and the Marshall Islands. These ships have foreign flags and foreign crews. The chances of Somali pirates seizing a US-flag vessel with an American crew are remote.
Traditionally the world's dominant naval power polices the international shipping routes not just to protect its own merchant fleet, but also the ships of all maritime trading nations. Since the United States has comparatively few merchant ships under its own flag, it now seems to prefer to leave any action against pirates to the navies of their victims. For example, the Somali pirates recently seized a French cruise yacht and a Spanish fishing vessel, so it was left to the navies of those countries to take action. Although in both cases the ships and crews were released safely, ransoms were paid and only in the French case were some pirates captured.
Another reason for the apparent American hesitation to act against the Somali pirates would seem to be the perception that US and other international naval forces in the area are there primarily to fight terrorists while the pirates are 'only criminals'. It is certainly true that the motives of the Somali pirates are at the moment principally mercenary, aiming to collect ransoms. However, is it safe to assume that these Muslim pirates will never be infected by Islamist ideology, taking the jihad to sea as the Barbary corsairs did in past centuries?
The United States and its allies would no doubt say they have already taken sufficient action against the pirates by deploying the multinational naval force known as Combined Task Force 150 in the region since 2002. However, the primary duty of this force is to carry out 'the war on terror' and not to act as an anti-piracy force. Indeed during the years of CTF 150's existence, the threat posed by the Somali pirates has increased not decreased.
In any case, CTF 150 has only fourteen or fifteen ships and its area of operations extends from the Gulf of Oman in the north to the Mozambique Channel in the south, including both the entrance to the Red Sea and most of the western Indian Ocean. This is a huge area, and even if the task force's remit kept it only on the coast of Somalia, that coast is the longest in Africa. Could only fifteen ships effectively cover a coastline which is almost 2,000 miles long?
Currently a resolution is being hammered out at the United Nations which would allow foreign warships to enter Somali territorial waters to hunt down pirates. However, even when this resolution is passed, those pirates can only be suppressed if the United States and other naval powers have the will to act and provide the necessary forces to do so.
The Islamists currently battling against Somali government and Ethiopian forces in and around the capital Mogadishu are said by the United States to have links with al-Qaeda. The latter terrorist group has carried out maritime attacks in the past, including hitting a US warship in Aden harbour and a French tanker off the coast of Yemen. As yet the Somali pirates are not known to have links with the Islamists in their country, let alone al-Qaeda. However, there is always the danger that some pirates might link their actions to the Islamist cause, demanding political concessions as well as ransoms in return for releasing captured ships and crews. In the worst scenario, the pirates might be used as cover for al-Qaeda suicide boat attacks on Western shipping in a maritime choke point like the Gulf of Aden.
Before such scenarios can arise, the international community must take powerful and decisive action to crush the Somali pirate menace, with the United States Navy leading the way as it did in the wars against the Barbary pirates two centuries ago.
