Traditionally the world's foremost naval power ensures the safety of ships of all nations on the sea lanes circling the globe. This was what Britain's Royal Navy did in the nineteenth century.
Today's United States Navy is more powerful than any previous naval force in the history of the world. One might expect it to take swift and effective action to crush the growing menace of Somali piracy. In fact it has done remarkably little to deal with the modern heirs of the Barbary corsairs.
More than two centuries ago the activities of those Muslim pirates from North Africa led to the establishment of the United States Navy. Today's Muslim corsairs from Somalia can range across the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean seizing ships virtually unopposed. The ships and crews are held for ransom, while American warships can only watch and wait.
The United States Navy does not lack ships, trained personnel, and cutting-edge technology to deal with these maritime gangsters. What is lacking is the political will in Washington to order the navy into action. Why is this?
It seems to be a repeat of the phenomenon which has already manifested itself in the land war in Afghanistan. In a poor country lucrative economic activities are few. If they are illegal, is it wise for an intervening foreign power to suppress them if such suppression merely provides new recruits for the militant forces which the foreign power is trying to destroy?
In Afghanistan the illegal but lucrative activity is the drug trade in heroin, with poppy the most attractive crop for local farmers. The country is now the world's leading producer of the drug. There has long been a reluctance by the United States to suppress this trade because it provides income for both friendly warlords and ordinary Afghan farmers. Other members of NATO have complained that the heroin trade also provides a major source of income for the Taliban.
To suppress the heroin trade might reduce the Taliban's funds, but it would also alienate a large section of the Afghan population. If Afghan farmers are forced to give up poppy cultivation without being offered a financially viable alternative crop, they will become impoverished and desperate, ready-made recruits for the Taliban.
Piracy is now probably the most lucrative economic activity in Somalia, a nation usually regarded as the perfect example of a 'failed state'. As yet there are no known links between the pirates of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and the Islamist militants battling in Somalia's capital Mogadishu. Indeed the Islamists have on occasion shown marked hostility towards the pirates.
Similarly the Taliban once claimed to be opposed to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and even suppressed it for a time. However, once they saw its money-making potential, they put aside their scruples and demanded their cut. How long will the Somali Islamists resist the temptation to take a share in the spoils of piracy?
For the moment the Somali pirates are seen as 'ordinary' criminals, with no obvious links to Islamist terrorism that would invite American attacks such as those made in the past on supposed al Qaeda bases in Somalia. Instead American warships escort a few lucky merchant ships, but do not intervene as the pirates take captured vessels back to their home ports. Clearly the rationale is that, as in Afghanistan, it is better to let ordinary crime prosper if suppressing it would provide new recruits for Islamist militants.
Recently NATO, including the United States, has announced its intention to take more forceful action against the heroin trade in Afghanistan. If this action takes place, it may well reduce income going to the Taliban, but it may also alienate large sections of the Afghan rural population, giving the Taliban new supporters. Off the coast of Somalia the pirates continue to ply their trade with minimal interference from the United States Navy. Warships from other NATO nations are soon to join the Americans, but decisive action against the pirates appears unlikely. For the moment it still seems better to overlook crime rather than drive the criminals into the arms of the Islamist militants.
