In 1930 Britain agreed to grant independence to Iraq, which it had been ruling under a mandate from the League of Nations. In return the Iraqi government allowed the British to retain two air bases in the country and to train, equip, and support the Iraqi armed forces. The promised independence finally came in 1932, and one of the first acts of the new rulers in Baghdad was to send troops to suppress Kurdish separatists in the north of the country. The Iraqi government forces were initially repulsed, but had more success when British aircraft were deployed to support their efforts.
In late 2008, with its United Nations mandate to remain in Iraq running out, the United States agreed with the Iraqi government that all US combat troops would leave the country by the end of 2011. However, 'residual' US forces might remain to train Iraqi forces and these would need to retain some bases. The Baghdad government has now begun to reassert its authority over the Iraqi Kurds, challenging the autonomy they have achieved in the north of the country. The Kurds seem determined to resist this pressure. So far the Americans have said they will not take sides in the emerging struggle. However, America's earlier refusal to condemn Turkish military incursions into northern Iraq to attack Kurdish PKK guerrillas does not bode well for the future of the Iraqi Kurds.
Such are the similarities between 1932 and 2009. Perhaps more important are the differences. In 1932 British air attacks on the Kurds were nothing new. For the previous decade the British had been attempting to defeat Kurdish rebels in the north of Iraq, with only limited success. They were happy to support the Baghdad government in its efforts to subdue the Kurds.
The position of the United States today is very different from that of Britain more than seventy years ago. Iraqi Kurds have been America's most fervent supporters in that country. Indeed, in terms of popular support, Iraqi Kurds are perhaps the most pro-American Muslim group in the Middle East. While NATO ally Turkey refused to give passage to US forces intending to attack Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi Kurds did everything possible to assist the American invaders. When the Sunni Arabs later revolted against the American occupiers, the Kurds were ready to join with the Shia Arabs to form an Iraqi central government that was largely supportive of the United States.
Now, with the prospect of American withdrawal from Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds are becoming increasingly alarmed. The government of prime minister Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad is working to reconcile Shia and Sunni Arabs, but this reconciliation seems likely to be at the expense of the Kurds. The Americans are now increasingly cool towards their Kurdish friends in Iraq. Is the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan coming to an end?
That autonomy had its origins in the chaos that followed Saddam Hussein's defeat in the Gulf War of 1991. Within Iraq both the Shia Arabs and the Kurds rose up against the Baathist dictator. Both groups were brutally repressed, but, unlike the Shia Arabs, the Kurds found support from Britain and America. A 'no fly zone' was established over northern Iraq and 'safe havens', initially protected by Western troops, were set up in the area. Saddam Hussein could no longer harm most of Iraq's Kurds.
During the rest of the 1990s, these 'safe havens' coalesced into an autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, but it was not yet at peace, largely due to disagreements between Kurds and interference from neighbouring states. On several occasions the militias of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by the Talabani family, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by the Barzani family, clashed bloodily, while Turkey sent troops into the region on a number of occasions to attack PKK guerrillas based there.
Nevertheless, the Iraqi Kurds had achieved a measure of autonomy and this increased further after the United States, with help from Kurdish militias, overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. The PUK and KDP came together to present a united Kurdish front at a time when Iraq's Arabs were fighting each other and the American occupiers. Autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, ruled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), came to look more and more like a semi-independent state. Jalal Talabani might become president of Iraq under the Kurdish-Shia agreement setting up a new Iraqi central government, but most Iraqi Kurds considered Arbil, home of the KRG, to be their capital not Baghdad.
Sunni Arab abstention from local elections in protest at the occupation only further increased Kurdish political power in the border areas of their region. The Kurds built up a strong position in Nineveh province, especially in the city of Mosul, while they sought to reverse the Arabization process Saddam Hussein had imposed on the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, where the Kurds had previously been the largest ethnic group.
Oil was an important issue between the rival authorities in Arbil and Baghdad. The KRG began to hand out contracts to search for oil to small and medium foreign energy firms without first getting permission from Baghdad. The central government retaliated by threatening not to share revenue from other oil regions of Iraq with the KRG.
After the recent provincial elections in Iraq, which the Sunni Arabs did not boycott, the Kurdish position in Nineveh and Mosul was considerably reduced. Prime minister Nuri al-Maliki's party did well in the elections, getting Sunni Arab as well as Shia Arab votes because of his claim to take a less sectarian approach to national politics than the Islamist religious parties. Although the prime minister has emphasized his commitment to unite all ethnic and religious groups in a new Iraq, it seems unlikely he will resist the temptation to unite the Arabs of Iraq through their common hostility to the Kurds.
In 2008 Iraqi central government forces took control of the oil-rich city of Khanaqin in Diyala province, despite Kurdish claims that they have an interest in the area. Earlier this year the Baghdad government even seemed ready to send its troops to Kirkuk, but later halted the deployment when Kurdish forces in that area threatened armed resistance.
Although oil will remain one of the reasons the Iraqi central government will wish to curb Kurdish separatism, its importance will probably be reduced as the balance changes in Iraq's energy production. The venerable but still important large oilfield at Kirkuk has been producing since the 1930s, but the oilfields of southern Iraq have become more important. Since southern Iraq now seems likely to enjoy a measure of peace and stability in the near future, major international energy companies are signing up to repair, modernize, and develop its oil and gas fields. This will provide the Baghdad government with valuable revenue to fund operations to curb Kurdish separatism.
Whether military efforts to overawe the Iraqi Kurds will be successful is of course another matter. The successive governments in Baghdad have been fighting Kurdish rebels in the north of the country on and off since 1962, with only intermittent success. Nevertheless, if the United States is ready to desert its Kurdish friends, then at least important centres such as Mosul and Kirkuk can be brought firmly under the rule of Baghdad. With the Iraqi Kurds unlikely to get support from any of the neighbouring countries, they may well be forced to agree to a settlement with the Iraqi national government which severely limits their present hard-won autonomy.
