Among the deluge of books on Christian-Muslim conflict that have appeared since 9/11, one group has dealt with the clashes between the infant navy of the United States and the Barbary corsairs in the early nineteenth century. This struggle has been portrayed, to use the sub-title of a 2003 book, as 'America's First War on Terror'.
The United States Navy was brought into being to chastise Muslim pirates in North Africa who had been seizing American merchant ships and enslaving American sailors. In wars against Tripoli in 1801-1805 and against Algiers in 1815, the United States forced the Barbary corsairs to respect its power and sovereignty.
Both sides made reference to the religious aspects of these conflicts, but by this period political and economic considerations were more important in motivating both Christian captains and Muslim corsairs. Despite their claims to be carrying on a centuries-old jihad or holy war on the high seas, the Barbary pirates were running a protection racket. They demanded tribute from foreign maritime states in return for not attacking their merchant ships. The frigates of the new United States Navy soon convinced the Muslim pirates that the American republic would not submit to such extortion.
Now, two centuries after the wars against the Barbary corsairs, a new breed of Muslim pirate is active along the coast of Somalia, reaching out as far as two hundred miles into the neighbouring seas to capture ships and crews to be held for ransom. Today the United States Navy is the most powerful naval force in the world - indeed the most powerful navy in world history - and it might be expected to snuff out this new pirate menace with ease. However, such is not the case. Despite the ever-growing provocation by the Somali pirates, the United States Navy has taken only the most tentative action against this mosquito force. Why is this?
In part it is because unlike in the early 1800s America today has no large national merchant fleet needing protection. The mercantile marine of the early American republic quickly grew to be one of the largest in the world, its ships American-built, American-owned, and American-manned. Today, although much merchant tonnage is still American-owned, most of these vessels are registered under flags of convenience, chiefly Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, and the Marshall Islands. These ships have foreign flags and foreign crews. The chances of Somali pirates seizing a US-flag vessel with an American crew are remote.
Traditionally the world's dominant naval power polices the international shipping routes not just to protect its own merchant fleet, but also the ships of all maritime trading nations. Since the United States has comparatively few merchant ships under its own flag, it now seems to prefer to leave any action against pirates to the navies of their victims. For example, the Somali pirates recently seized a French cruise yacht and a Spanish fishing vessel, so it was left to the navies of those countries to take action. Although in both cases the ships and crews were released safely, ransoms were paid and only in the French case were some pirates captured.
Another reason for the apparent American hesitation to act against the Somali pirates would seem to be the perception that US and other international naval forces in the area are there primarily to fight terrorists while the pirates are 'only criminals'. It is certainly true that the motives of the Somali pirates are at the moment principally mercenary, aiming to collect ransoms. However, is it safe to assume that these Muslim pirates will never be infected by Islamist ideology, taking the jihad to sea as the Barbary corsairs did in past centuries?
The United States and its allies would no doubt say they have already taken sufficient action against the pirates by deploying the multinational naval force known as Combined Task Force 150 in the region since 2002. However, the primary duty of this force is to carry out 'the war on terror' and not to act as an anti-piracy force. Indeed during the years of CTF 150's existence, the threat posed by the Somali pirates has increased not decreased.
In any case, CTF 150 has only fourteen or fifteen ships and its area of operations extends from the Gulf of Oman in the north to the Mozambique Channel in the south, including both the entrance to the Red Sea and most of the western Indian Ocean. This is a huge area, and even if the task force's remit kept it only on the coast of Somalia, that coast is the longest in Africa. Could only fifteen ships effectively cover a coastline which is almost 2,000 miles long?
Currently a resolution is being hammered out at the United Nations which would allow foreign warships to enter Somali territorial waters to hunt down pirates. However, even when this resolution is passed, those pirates can only be suppressed if the United States and other naval powers have the will to act and provide the necessary forces to do so.
The Islamists currently battling against Somali government and Ethiopian forces in and around the capital Mogadishu are said by the United States to have links with al-Qaeda. The latter terrorist group has carried out maritime attacks in the past, including hitting a US warship in Aden harbour and a French tanker off the coast of Yemen. As yet the Somali pirates are not known to have links with the Islamists in their country, let alone al-Qaeda. However, there is always the danger that some pirates might link their actions to the Islamist cause, demanding political concessions as well as ransoms in return for releasing captured ships and crews. In the worst scenario, the pirates might be used as cover for al-Qaeda suicide boat attacks on Western shipping in a maritime choke point like the Gulf of Aden.
Before such scenarios can arise, the international community must take powerful and decisive action to crush the Somali pirate menace, with the United States Navy leading the way as it did in the wars against the Barbary pirates two centuries ago.
Friday, May 2, 2008
Thursday, April 3, 2008
Waziristan: Avoiding A Step Too Far
During the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, the Afghan guerrillas had the great advantage of being able to retreat to safe bases in neighbouring Pakistan if Russian military pressure became too great. With the USA supporting Pakistan, there was never any chance the Soviet Union would attack those bases and risk a major crisis between the superpowers.
Today the Taliban militants operating against Western forces in Afghanistan run their operations from bases in the regions of Pakistan along the Afghan border. These safe havens are chiefly in northern Balochistan and the so-called Federally Administered Tribal Areas, especially North and South Waziristan. Other than occasional airstrikes, chiefly by Predator UAVs, the Americans have been reluctant to take direct military action against these Taliban and al-Qaeda bases in Pakistan. Instead the USA has encouraged the Pakistani government to suppress them.
So far such Pakistani military efforts have met with only limited success, and there have been increasing calls in some quarters for the USA and its Western allies to undertake direct military action against terrorist bases in the border areas of Pakistan, above all in Waziristan. Such calls must be resisted since for the West to invade a Muslim nation for the third time since 2001 (the other invasions being Afghanistan and Iraq) would only further inflame hatred of the USA and its Western allies in the Islamic world.
The tribesmen of Waziristan have successfully resisted foreign invaders for centuries. Even the British Raj had to recognise their semi-independent status in 1893. However, this did not stop clashes between the two sides. For example, after the short-lived Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, a considerable revolt broke out in Waziristan. British and Indian forces suffered more than two thousand casualties before they forced the tribesmen to make peace in March 1920. Nevertheless further clashes, large and small, continued in Waziristan up until 1947 when Britain could hand the problem area over to newly independent Pakistan.
The Pakistanis avoided serious trouble in Waziristan largely by leaving the local people to run their own affairs. However, after 9/11 and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants, including leaders such as Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, fled across the border into Waziristan and adjacent areas. Under American pressure, the ruler of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, was compelled to send large numbers of troops into North and South Waziristan for the first time in decades. These forces had comparatively little success in rounding up Taliban and al-Qaeda militants, but their presence did anger local tribesmen, leading to increasing clashes between the two sides.
In March 2004 these clashes escalated into an open war between the Pakistani forces on one side and local tribesmen, Taliban guerrillas, and al-Qaeda fighters (mostly foreign) on the other. By the time a peace accord was finally negotiated between the contesting parties in September 2006, an estimated 700 Pakistani troops had been killed, as well as 1,000 militants and 1,000 civilians.
Although fragile, the peace accord did give the Pakistani authorities a chance to exploit divisions among their opponents. Relations between local people and foreign Islamist fighters had not always been good, and in the spring of 2007 violence broke out between local tribesmen and Uzbek fighters linked to al-Qaeda. By mid-April the Uzbeks had been largely driven out of South Waziristan, with Pakistani artillery assisting local tribesmen in some of their attacks.
These favourable developments might have led to further attacks on foreign Islamist fighters in the area, but in July 2007 Musharraf's government enraged radical Islamists all over Pakistan by its clumsy and bloody suppression of militant activity at the Red Mosque in the capital Islamabad. The Waziristan peace accord collapsed and between July and November 2007 there was intense fighting in the region, with suicide bombers taking a new prominence in attacks on Pakistani forces. By early 2008 the estimated casualties after barely six months of fighting exceeded those for the whole 2004-06 war: 850 troops killed, as well as 1,900 militants and 1,800 civilians.
Recently the tempo of the fighting has decreased and the new civilian government of Pakistan is promising to negotiate a peaceful settlement in Waziristan and adjacent areas rather than using further military force. The US government has expressed concern about this approach and some commentators have now suggested the Americans and their allies may have to intervene directly in Waziristan to destroy terrorist bases, with or without the approval of the Pakistani government in Islamabad. Such Western intervention, even if only in the form of increased airstrikes and raids by special forces, can only further inflame the situation in the region.
The only way to root out the Taliban and al-Qaeda from Waziristan and adjacent areas is for the Pakistani government to take action. As shown by the successful efforts against Uzbek fighters in South Waziristan in 2007, the Pakistanis can get local tribesmen to drive out foreign Islamist militants. This is the only way to go. It may not be swift, but it is likely to be effective in the long run. If impatience leads to clumsy Western military intervention in Waziristan, such action is more likely to spread war across Pakistan than to end it in Afghanistan.
Today the Taliban militants operating against Western forces in Afghanistan run their operations from bases in the regions of Pakistan along the Afghan border. These safe havens are chiefly in northern Balochistan and the so-called Federally Administered Tribal Areas, especially North and South Waziristan. Other than occasional airstrikes, chiefly by Predator UAVs, the Americans have been reluctant to take direct military action against these Taliban and al-Qaeda bases in Pakistan. Instead the USA has encouraged the Pakistani government to suppress them.
So far such Pakistani military efforts have met with only limited success, and there have been increasing calls in some quarters for the USA and its Western allies to undertake direct military action against terrorist bases in the border areas of Pakistan, above all in Waziristan. Such calls must be resisted since for the West to invade a Muslim nation for the third time since 2001 (the other invasions being Afghanistan and Iraq) would only further inflame hatred of the USA and its Western allies in the Islamic world.
The tribesmen of Waziristan have successfully resisted foreign invaders for centuries. Even the British Raj had to recognise their semi-independent status in 1893. However, this did not stop clashes between the two sides. For example, after the short-lived Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, a considerable revolt broke out in Waziristan. British and Indian forces suffered more than two thousand casualties before they forced the tribesmen to make peace in March 1920. Nevertheless further clashes, large and small, continued in Waziristan up until 1947 when Britain could hand the problem area over to newly independent Pakistan.
The Pakistanis avoided serious trouble in Waziristan largely by leaving the local people to run their own affairs. However, after 9/11 and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants, including leaders such as Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, fled across the border into Waziristan and adjacent areas. Under American pressure, the ruler of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, was compelled to send large numbers of troops into North and South Waziristan for the first time in decades. These forces had comparatively little success in rounding up Taliban and al-Qaeda militants, but their presence did anger local tribesmen, leading to increasing clashes between the two sides.
In March 2004 these clashes escalated into an open war between the Pakistani forces on one side and local tribesmen, Taliban guerrillas, and al-Qaeda fighters (mostly foreign) on the other. By the time a peace accord was finally negotiated between the contesting parties in September 2006, an estimated 700 Pakistani troops had been killed, as well as 1,000 militants and 1,000 civilians.
Although fragile, the peace accord did give the Pakistani authorities a chance to exploit divisions among their opponents. Relations between local people and foreign Islamist fighters had not always been good, and in the spring of 2007 violence broke out between local tribesmen and Uzbek fighters linked to al-Qaeda. By mid-April the Uzbeks had been largely driven out of South Waziristan, with Pakistani artillery assisting local tribesmen in some of their attacks.
These favourable developments might have led to further attacks on foreign Islamist fighters in the area, but in July 2007 Musharraf's government enraged radical Islamists all over Pakistan by its clumsy and bloody suppression of militant activity at the Red Mosque in the capital Islamabad. The Waziristan peace accord collapsed and between July and November 2007 there was intense fighting in the region, with suicide bombers taking a new prominence in attacks on Pakistani forces. By early 2008 the estimated casualties after barely six months of fighting exceeded those for the whole 2004-06 war: 850 troops killed, as well as 1,900 militants and 1,800 civilians.
Recently the tempo of the fighting has decreased and the new civilian government of Pakistan is promising to negotiate a peaceful settlement in Waziristan and adjacent areas rather than using further military force. The US government has expressed concern about this approach and some commentators have now suggested the Americans and their allies may have to intervene directly in Waziristan to destroy terrorist bases, with or without the approval of the Pakistani government in Islamabad. Such Western intervention, even if only in the form of increased airstrikes and raids by special forces, can only further inflame the situation in the region.
The only way to root out the Taliban and al-Qaeda from Waziristan and adjacent areas is for the Pakistani government to take action. As shown by the successful efforts against Uzbek fighters in South Waziristan in 2007, the Pakistanis can get local tribesmen to drive out foreign Islamist militants. This is the only way to go. It may not be swift, but it is likely to be effective in the long run. If impatience leads to clumsy Western military intervention in Waziristan, such action is more likely to spread war across Pakistan than to end it in Afghanistan.
Saturday, March 1, 2008
Kosovars and Kurds: Same Game, Different Rules
There was once a land-locked province in a distant country. One ethnic group formed the majority population in the province, but it was oppressed by the ethnic group which formed a majority in the whole country.
The oppressed provincials finally rose in revolt. After some hesitation, Western nations eventually came to their assistance and by military means, including bombing of the national capital, forced the oppressive national government to withdraw its forces from the province.
The local ethnic majority then set up its own government in the liberated territory. Only one more political step remained to be undertaken. The government would wish to declare national independence and create a new state in the world.
This story outlines the course of events in not one but two oppressed provinces in recent history. One is Albanian-dominated Kosovo, part of Serbia (former Yugoslavia), and the other is Iraqi Kurdistan, the most northerly section of the republic of Iraq.
Recently the Kosovar government in Pristina has been allowed by its Western sponsors to take the final step. National independence has been declared, a unilateral declaration, without even the fig leaf of a favourable popular vote on the subject. Although nobody can doubt the majority of Kosovars support the declaration, the lack of a referendum sets a dangerous precedent.
The situation has been very different in Arbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the declared wishes of both politicians and people, the Iraqi Kurds will not be allowed to declare national independence. While the United States denies the Serbian government in Belgrade has any right to prevent the secession of Kosovo, it is determined to keep Iraqi Kurdistan at least nominally linked to the national government in Baghdad
Why is national self determination permitted to the Kosovars but denied to the Iraqi Kurds? David Miliband, the British foreign minister, declared when he announced UK recognition of the independence of Kosovo that this was 'a unique case' which would not serve as a precedent for dissident regions in other countries. But how can that be? The principle of national self determination must be generally applicable around the world or it is no principle at all.
Mr. Miliband is no doubt keen to stress Kosovo's supposed 'uniqueness' because if a regional government can be allowed to declare its independence from the wider nation without even a referendum on the subject then the United Kingdom will soon be on the road to dissolution. A Scottish nationalist government is already in power in Edinburgh and if it took Kosovo as a precedent, it could declare the independence of Scotland at any time.
The crucial difference in the treatment given by the United States and its allies to Kosovo and Iraqi Kurdistan derives from their different geo-strategic positions and how neighbouring countries will react to such provinces claiming national independence.
With regard to Kosovo, the United States will suffer little damage to its interests from backing independence. Indeed there is already a major US military base in Kosovo and the country is slated to be on the route of an American-backed energy pipeline. Serbian and Russian threats are no more than hot air, with the attack on the US embassy in Belgrade signifying the impotence of Serbian nationalists rather than their strength. With Kosovo independent, the Albanian-majority areas of north-west Macedonia will no doubt demand autonomy at the very least, but whatever the reaction of the Macedonian government, the United States will have the final word.
How different the situation would be if the Iraqi Kurds were allowed to declare national independence. The Baghdad government and neighbouring countries with Kurdish populations would be outraged. The biggest outcry would come from Turkey, where Kurds make up at least twenty per cent of the national population and form a clear majority in the south-eastern provinces of the country. Even more than Israel, Turkey is the most important strategic ally the United States has in the Middle East. Its wishes cannot be ignored.
The Americans who in 1999 rained bombs on Yugoslavia in support of Kosovar guerrillas now try to look the other way while Turkish forces invade Iraqi Kurdistan to hunt down Kurdish guerrillas. The great Irish patriot Charles Stewart Parnell said that no man can set a limit to the march of a nation. Having encouraged the national independence of Kosovo, it will be interesting to see how long the United States can continue to hold back the national aspirations of the Kurds, the largest ethnic group in the world still without a state of their own.
The oppressed provincials finally rose in revolt. After some hesitation, Western nations eventually came to their assistance and by military means, including bombing of the national capital, forced the oppressive national government to withdraw its forces from the province.
The local ethnic majority then set up its own government in the liberated territory. Only one more political step remained to be undertaken. The government would wish to declare national independence and create a new state in the world.
This story outlines the course of events in not one but two oppressed provinces in recent history. One is Albanian-dominated Kosovo, part of Serbia (former Yugoslavia), and the other is Iraqi Kurdistan, the most northerly section of the republic of Iraq.
Recently the Kosovar government in Pristina has been allowed by its Western sponsors to take the final step. National independence has been declared, a unilateral declaration, without even the fig leaf of a favourable popular vote on the subject. Although nobody can doubt the majority of Kosovars support the declaration, the lack of a referendum sets a dangerous precedent.
The situation has been very different in Arbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the declared wishes of both politicians and people, the Iraqi Kurds will not be allowed to declare national independence. While the United States denies the Serbian government in Belgrade has any right to prevent the secession of Kosovo, it is determined to keep Iraqi Kurdistan at least nominally linked to the national government in Baghdad
Why is national self determination permitted to the Kosovars but denied to the Iraqi Kurds? David Miliband, the British foreign minister, declared when he announced UK recognition of the independence of Kosovo that this was 'a unique case' which would not serve as a precedent for dissident regions in other countries. But how can that be? The principle of national self determination must be generally applicable around the world or it is no principle at all.
Mr. Miliband is no doubt keen to stress Kosovo's supposed 'uniqueness' because if a regional government can be allowed to declare its independence from the wider nation without even a referendum on the subject then the United Kingdom will soon be on the road to dissolution. A Scottish nationalist government is already in power in Edinburgh and if it took Kosovo as a precedent, it could declare the independence of Scotland at any time.
The crucial difference in the treatment given by the United States and its allies to Kosovo and Iraqi Kurdistan derives from their different geo-strategic positions and how neighbouring countries will react to such provinces claiming national independence.
With regard to Kosovo, the United States will suffer little damage to its interests from backing independence. Indeed there is already a major US military base in Kosovo and the country is slated to be on the route of an American-backed energy pipeline. Serbian and Russian threats are no more than hot air, with the attack on the US embassy in Belgrade signifying the impotence of Serbian nationalists rather than their strength. With Kosovo independent, the Albanian-majority areas of north-west Macedonia will no doubt demand autonomy at the very least, but whatever the reaction of the Macedonian government, the United States will have the final word.
How different the situation would be if the Iraqi Kurds were allowed to declare national independence. The Baghdad government and neighbouring countries with Kurdish populations would be outraged. The biggest outcry would come from Turkey, where Kurds make up at least twenty per cent of the national population and form a clear majority in the south-eastern provinces of the country. Even more than Israel, Turkey is the most important strategic ally the United States has in the Middle East. Its wishes cannot be ignored.
The Americans who in 1999 rained bombs on Yugoslavia in support of Kosovar guerrillas now try to look the other way while Turkish forces invade Iraqi Kurdistan to hunt down Kurdish guerrillas. The great Irish patriot Charles Stewart Parnell said that no man can set a limit to the march of a nation. Having encouraged the national independence of Kosovo, it will be interesting to see how long the United States can continue to hold back the national aspirations of the Kurds, the largest ethnic group in the world still without a state of their own.
Friday, February 1, 2008
To the Shores of Tripoli: Wars Without End - And How They End
We are told that the present 'war on terror' is a potentially endless conflict. Critics have ridiculed the idea of making war on an abstract noun. Yet this is not a novelty. The present struggle against 'terror' is comparable to the worldwide fight against 'slavery' in the nineteenth century or the centuries-old effort to suppress 'piracy'.
Indeed the latter conflict may offer some parallels to the current 'war on terror'. Today the principal terrorists Western nations have in mind are Islamist ones. The most powerful and dangerous pirates in the past were those associated with the Muslim political entities known as the Barbary states. From the start of the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century, the Barbary pirates terrorised the Christian nations bordering the Mediterranean Sea and even operated on the Atlantic coasts of northwestern Europe.
The Barbary pirates were based principally at Tripoli (Libya), Tunis (Tunisia), Algiers (Algeria), and Rabat/Sale (Morocco). The long-running Christian-Muslim conflict had been carried on at sea in the Mediterranean before, but generally the Christians had managed to retain the upper hand for most of the time. This situation changed during the sixteenth century and Muslim power at sea increased dramatically. In part this was due to the growing strength of the navy of the Ottoman Empire, but even that force was very dependent on naval assistance from the Barbary states.
The stimulus that converted North Africa into perhaps the most important base for pirates in the world was provided by the final defeat of Islam in Spain and Portugal at the end of the fifteenth century. Thousands of Muslim refugees fled to North Africa, thirsting for revenge against the Iberian Christians. Piracy seemed to offer the easiest and most effective way of achieving this.
Of course these Muslim corsairs did not see themselves as pirates. Instead they saw themselves as warriors for the faith, carrying on a maritime jihad against their Christian enemies. If such activities also brought economic benefits in terms of plunder and ransoms, then so much the better.
During the sixteenth century Spain was the principal enemy of the Barbary states and Spanish naval and military forces sought to curb the activities of the Muslim corsairs. The Spanish failed in several attempts to capture Algiers, and although they took control of Tunis several times, they could not keep control of it for more than a few years.
In the first half of the seventeenth century the Barbary pirates enjoyed their heyday. Spanish power was declining, while the growing maritime powers of France, England and the Netherlands did not yet have navies strong enough to inflict serious damage on the Barbary states. This was the period when theBarbary pirates broke out of the Mediterranean into the Atlantic, raiding as far away as southern England and Ireland, Iceland, and the Newfoundland fisheries.
Only after 1660 did the French, English and Dutch navies begin to make serious efforts to suppress the Barbary pirates. However, they soon came to realise the limits of their coercive powers. A port like Algiers could be bombarded from the sea, forcing the release of Christian captives and obtaining promises of good behaviour from its rulers, but such attacks had little long-term impact on the problem of piracy. Once the Christian warships disappeared over the horizon, the Barbary pirates could return to their depredations. Also, the European naval powers spent more time fighting each other than chasing pirates. When they were at war, the Barbary pirates could be active without fear of retribution.
Even in the eighteenth century the Barbary states still posed a considerable maritime threat. Rather than waste money on ineffective punitive naval expeditions against their pirate strongholds, even major European naval powers were prepared to make deals. In return for immunity from pirate attack for their merchant ships, these maritime powers gave 'gifts' to the rulers of Barbary, though still threatening naval bombardments if the pirates went back on their word. The lesser maritime states had unashamedly to pay 'tribute' to the Barbary pirates to buy a measure of immunity. To keep the pirate business going, the rulers of the Barbary states were careful never to be at peace with all the European maritime states at any one time.
Even as he prepared for the battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Admiral Horatio Nelson still sought to appease the Barbary states, less to curb their pirate attacks than to get supplies for his fleet from their ports. The infant United States had initially been forced to pay tribute to the Barbary states, but their continued threat to American merchant shipping eventually led to the creation of the United States Navy. Soon US sailors and marines were sailing 'to the shores of Tripoli' to wage war against the pirates from that port. Somewhat later America had another short war with Algiers. The Barbary rulers were forced to make concessions to the Americans, but as in the past there was no assurance these would continue after American warships withdrew.
At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 at the end of the Napoleonic wars, the European powers agreed that they would concert their efforts so as to achieve a final solution to the problem of Barbary piracy. The following years saw more French, British and Dutch bombardments of Barbary ports, but whatever the impact of external force, the decline of Barbary piracy after 1815 was also due to internal changes within the Barbary states themselves.
In the mid-eighteenth century the ruler of Morocco had decided that corsair attacks on Christian shipping were no longer worth the effort. Normal trade with European powers brought greater benefits. Morocco steadily withdrew from the corsair business, and even in ports such as Algiers and Tripoli the number of pirate vessels had considerably declined by 1800 and their activities had been brought under more direct government control.
Although the French claimed that one of the motives for their 1830 invasion of Algeria was to suppress piracy, corsair activity from Algiers had dropped to a very low level by that date. Nevertheless the fear of providing an excuse for invasion by the ever more powerful European powers led the remaining Barbary states to end their last links to piracy. By 1840 Tunisia and Libya were out of the business. The end of piracy may have bought the remaining free Barbary states a reprieve from European conquest for a time, but they fell eventually: Tunisia to the French in 1881; Libya to the Italians in 1911; and Morocco to the French and Spanish in 1912.
To most Europeans living on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and even eighteenth centuries a decisive victory in the war with the Barbary pirates must have seemed an impossible dream. Yet in the first half of the nineteenth century this 'endless' war was terminated, with the Muslim states ending their predatory activities. There were two main reasons for this outcome. First, an external factor, the ever-growing military and naval power of the European states, who would eventually come to rule all the Barbary states for a time. Secondly, internal changes within the Barbary states made piracy seem no longer an attractive activity in political or economic terms. Even in ideological terms, the intensity of Christian-Muslim conflict had diminished and trade with the infidels seemed more attractive than maritime holy war.
Does this 350 year struggle against the Barbary pirates have any lessons for the current war against terror? Perhaps. The United States and its Western allies can clearly deploy massive military forces as an external hammer to strike any Muslim state that seems to be supporting terrorism. However, given the bitter past history of relations between the Christian West and the Islamic world, to rely solely on the application of external force is likely to be counter-productive, breeding more terrorists rather than stamping them out. Internal changes within Muslim countries will be more important in draining away popular support for Islamist terrorism.
One view has it that Barbary piracy only came to an end when the Barbary states were occupied by the European powers. However, as we have already noted, pirate activities were largely suppressed before the Europeans invaded. It was Muslim governments that ended the threat. As it is clearly impossible in this day and age for Western countries to occupy Muslim states on the excuse of suppressing terrorism, it is even more true today that the suppression of illegal activity must be carried out by the internal policies of Muslim governments.
One significant difference between the present war on terror and the earlier war against Barbary piracy is the perception of the time the struggle will take. War against the Barbary pirates was just part of a Christian-Muslim conflict that had been going on for centuries, an existential struggle which might continue for further centuries into the future. Europeans were not expecting any quick victory over the Muslim corsairs. They fought to destroy them, but for much of the time they were forced reluctantly to put up with their activities as one of the costs of maritime trade.
Today, Western perceptions are different. Despite the rantings of Osama bin Laden, few Westerners see the war against terror as a war with Islam. Indeed while Western troops fight in the heart of the Islamic world, their home governments allow a steady stream of Muslim immigrants into Europe and North America. Yet it is this reluctance to see the present conflict as just another round in the ancient Christian-Muslim conflict that makes Westerners impatient and unwilling to see the war on terror as a long-lasting struggle.
The war on terror has lasted barely seven years and already the long-term commitment of many Western nations to the struggle is being questioned. If this 'endless' war is ever to be brought to a successful conclusion, the first thing that Westerners must accept is that it may well be a conflict that will last for several generations at least. If such a long-term commitment can be sustained, 'terror' may one day be as much a part of the unhappy past as 'piracy' and 'slavery'.
Indeed the latter conflict may offer some parallels to the current 'war on terror'. Today the principal terrorists Western nations have in mind are Islamist ones. The most powerful and dangerous pirates in the past were those associated with the Muslim political entities known as the Barbary states. From the start of the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century, the Barbary pirates terrorised the Christian nations bordering the Mediterranean Sea and even operated on the Atlantic coasts of northwestern Europe.
The Barbary pirates were based principally at Tripoli (Libya), Tunis (Tunisia), Algiers (Algeria), and Rabat/Sale (Morocco). The long-running Christian-Muslim conflict had been carried on at sea in the Mediterranean before, but generally the Christians had managed to retain the upper hand for most of the time. This situation changed during the sixteenth century and Muslim power at sea increased dramatically. In part this was due to the growing strength of the navy of the Ottoman Empire, but even that force was very dependent on naval assistance from the Barbary states.
The stimulus that converted North Africa into perhaps the most important base for pirates in the world was provided by the final defeat of Islam in Spain and Portugal at the end of the fifteenth century. Thousands of Muslim refugees fled to North Africa, thirsting for revenge against the Iberian Christians. Piracy seemed to offer the easiest and most effective way of achieving this.
Of course these Muslim corsairs did not see themselves as pirates. Instead they saw themselves as warriors for the faith, carrying on a maritime jihad against their Christian enemies. If such activities also brought economic benefits in terms of plunder and ransoms, then so much the better.
During the sixteenth century Spain was the principal enemy of the Barbary states and Spanish naval and military forces sought to curb the activities of the Muslim corsairs. The Spanish failed in several attempts to capture Algiers, and although they took control of Tunis several times, they could not keep control of it for more than a few years.
In the first half of the seventeenth century the Barbary pirates enjoyed their heyday. Spanish power was declining, while the growing maritime powers of France, England and the Netherlands did not yet have navies strong enough to inflict serious damage on the Barbary states. This was the period when theBarbary pirates broke out of the Mediterranean into the Atlantic, raiding as far away as southern England and Ireland, Iceland, and the Newfoundland fisheries.
Only after 1660 did the French, English and Dutch navies begin to make serious efforts to suppress the Barbary pirates. However, they soon came to realise the limits of their coercive powers. A port like Algiers could be bombarded from the sea, forcing the release of Christian captives and obtaining promises of good behaviour from its rulers, but such attacks had little long-term impact on the problem of piracy. Once the Christian warships disappeared over the horizon, the Barbary pirates could return to their depredations. Also, the European naval powers spent more time fighting each other than chasing pirates. When they were at war, the Barbary pirates could be active without fear of retribution.
Even in the eighteenth century the Barbary states still posed a considerable maritime threat. Rather than waste money on ineffective punitive naval expeditions against their pirate strongholds, even major European naval powers were prepared to make deals. In return for immunity from pirate attack for their merchant ships, these maritime powers gave 'gifts' to the rulers of Barbary, though still threatening naval bombardments if the pirates went back on their word. The lesser maritime states had unashamedly to pay 'tribute' to the Barbary pirates to buy a measure of immunity. To keep the pirate business going, the rulers of the Barbary states were careful never to be at peace with all the European maritime states at any one time.
Even as he prepared for the battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Admiral Horatio Nelson still sought to appease the Barbary states, less to curb their pirate attacks than to get supplies for his fleet from their ports. The infant United States had initially been forced to pay tribute to the Barbary states, but their continued threat to American merchant shipping eventually led to the creation of the United States Navy. Soon US sailors and marines were sailing 'to the shores of Tripoli' to wage war against the pirates from that port. Somewhat later America had another short war with Algiers. The Barbary rulers were forced to make concessions to the Americans, but as in the past there was no assurance these would continue after American warships withdrew.
At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 at the end of the Napoleonic wars, the European powers agreed that they would concert their efforts so as to achieve a final solution to the problem of Barbary piracy. The following years saw more French, British and Dutch bombardments of Barbary ports, but whatever the impact of external force, the decline of Barbary piracy after 1815 was also due to internal changes within the Barbary states themselves.
In the mid-eighteenth century the ruler of Morocco had decided that corsair attacks on Christian shipping were no longer worth the effort. Normal trade with European powers brought greater benefits. Morocco steadily withdrew from the corsair business, and even in ports such as Algiers and Tripoli the number of pirate vessels had considerably declined by 1800 and their activities had been brought under more direct government control.
Although the French claimed that one of the motives for their 1830 invasion of Algeria was to suppress piracy, corsair activity from Algiers had dropped to a very low level by that date. Nevertheless the fear of providing an excuse for invasion by the ever more powerful European powers led the remaining Barbary states to end their last links to piracy. By 1840 Tunisia and Libya were out of the business. The end of piracy may have bought the remaining free Barbary states a reprieve from European conquest for a time, but they fell eventually: Tunisia to the French in 1881; Libya to the Italians in 1911; and Morocco to the French and Spanish in 1912.
To most Europeans living on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and even eighteenth centuries a decisive victory in the war with the Barbary pirates must have seemed an impossible dream. Yet in the first half of the nineteenth century this 'endless' war was terminated, with the Muslim states ending their predatory activities. There were two main reasons for this outcome. First, an external factor, the ever-growing military and naval power of the European states, who would eventually come to rule all the Barbary states for a time. Secondly, internal changes within the Barbary states made piracy seem no longer an attractive activity in political or economic terms. Even in ideological terms, the intensity of Christian-Muslim conflict had diminished and trade with the infidels seemed more attractive than maritime holy war.
Does this 350 year struggle against the Barbary pirates have any lessons for the current war against terror? Perhaps. The United States and its Western allies can clearly deploy massive military forces as an external hammer to strike any Muslim state that seems to be supporting terrorism. However, given the bitter past history of relations between the Christian West and the Islamic world, to rely solely on the application of external force is likely to be counter-productive, breeding more terrorists rather than stamping them out. Internal changes within Muslim countries will be more important in draining away popular support for Islamist terrorism.
One view has it that Barbary piracy only came to an end when the Barbary states were occupied by the European powers. However, as we have already noted, pirate activities were largely suppressed before the Europeans invaded. It was Muslim governments that ended the threat. As it is clearly impossible in this day and age for Western countries to occupy Muslim states on the excuse of suppressing terrorism, it is even more true today that the suppression of illegal activity must be carried out by the internal policies of Muslim governments.
One significant difference between the present war on terror and the earlier war against Barbary piracy is the perception of the time the struggle will take. War against the Barbary pirates was just part of a Christian-Muslim conflict that had been going on for centuries, an existential struggle which might continue for further centuries into the future. Europeans were not expecting any quick victory over the Muslim corsairs. They fought to destroy them, but for much of the time they were forced reluctantly to put up with their activities as one of the costs of maritime trade.
Today, Western perceptions are different. Despite the rantings of Osama bin Laden, few Westerners see the war against terror as a war with Islam. Indeed while Western troops fight in the heart of the Islamic world, their home governments allow a steady stream of Muslim immigrants into Europe and North America. Yet it is this reluctance to see the present conflict as just another round in the ancient Christian-Muslim conflict that makes Westerners impatient and unwilling to see the war on terror as a long-lasting struggle.
The war on terror has lasted barely seven years and already the long-term commitment of many Western nations to the struggle is being questioned. If this 'endless' war is ever to be brought to a successful conclusion, the first thing that Westerners must accept is that it may well be a conflict that will last for several generations at least. If such a long-term commitment can be sustained, 'terror' may one day be as much a part of the unhappy past as 'piracy' and 'slavery'.
Saturday, January 5, 2008
Another Shift in the Iraqi Kaleidoscope
Given Sunni Arab support for the insurgency, the 2005 Iraqi constitution could only be achieved by a political compromise between the Shia Arab majority and the Kurdish minority in the north of the country. This arrangement begn to collapse in the second half of 2007 as the United States weaned the Sunni Arab minority away from the insurgency and began to move away from its previous support of the Shia Arabs and the Kurds.
By the end of 2007 the United States had armed a 70,000 strong Sunni Arab militia in formerly rebellious parts of Iraq, much to the concern of the Shia Arab government in Baghdad and the authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan. This American swing towards the Sunni Arabs was in part just the internal Iraqi aspect of a wider American rapprochement with Sunni Arab states in the region. In return for them joining an American-backed coalition to oppose the growing power of the Shia state of Iran, those states, including Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Co-operation Council, were promised both a settlement of the Israel-Palestine question (still to be delivered) and a definite change in the US attitude to the Sunni Arab minority within Iraq.
This shift in the US position has understandably alarmed Iraq's Shia Arab majority, as it was probably intended to do. When it seemed likely that the USA would launch a military attack on Iran (an attack now at least postponed), the Americans were ready to neutralise possible Iraqi Shia military support for the Iranians by creating a Sunni Arab military counterweight within the country.
In many ways this American shift towards the Sunni Arab minority has been a reversion to the traditional power arrangement in Iraq. After the Ottoman Turkish sultans took the country away from the Iranians during the sixteenth century, they ensured Sunni rule over the majority Shia for the next four centuries. After the British took control of Iraq in 1917-18, they continued this political hegemony, installing a Sunni Arab monarch to rule the country. Even after the fall of the monarchy in 1958, the Sunni Arab minority - including Saddam Hussein and his Tikriti gang - continued to run Iraq. Only since 2003 has the Shia Arab majority achieved political dominance after centuries of oppression. Now those Shia fear that the United States may be going back on its commitment to democracy so as to further the interests of its allies in neighbouring Sunni Arab countries.
The Iraqi Kurds have traditionally been hostile to all Arabs, whether Sunni or Shia, but since 2003 it has been in their interest to ally with the Shia Arab majority, in part because this was what their American friends wanted. Now the amity between Iraqi Kurdistan and the United States is becoming increasingly strained. Despite US denials, American assistance to Turkish air attacks on PKK guerrillas in Iraqi Kurdistan during December 2007 has been patently obvious. For the moment Iraqi Kurds are prepared to overlook this rather than alienate the USA, their principal ally. However, if Turkish attacks continue, extreme Kurdish nationalists may well start hitting back at the Americans was well as the Turks. The continued postponement of the Kirkuk referendum is also increasing Kurdish hostility.
The Americans claim that the success of their 'surge' strategy in reducing the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq has produced an ideal opportunity for a general political settlement in that country. However, neither the Shia Arabs nor the Kurds seem in any mood to do favours for the USA and its new Sunni Arab friends in Iraq at the moment. One sign of this is the continued delay in passing a new Iraqi oil law which would benefit US energy companies. The Americans have certainly shifted the political kaleidoscope in Iraq, but the consequence seems unlikely to be the settlement they desire. Pursuing the Sunni Arab agenda in Iraq seems more likely to alienate old allies from the USA rather than win them to its cause.
By the end of 2007 the United States had armed a 70,000 strong Sunni Arab militia in formerly rebellious parts of Iraq, much to the concern of the Shia Arab government in Baghdad and the authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan. This American swing towards the Sunni Arabs was in part just the internal Iraqi aspect of a wider American rapprochement with Sunni Arab states in the region. In return for them joining an American-backed coalition to oppose the growing power of the Shia state of Iran, those states, including Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Co-operation Council, were promised both a settlement of the Israel-Palestine question (still to be delivered) and a definite change in the US attitude to the Sunni Arab minority within Iraq.
This shift in the US position has understandably alarmed Iraq's Shia Arab majority, as it was probably intended to do. When it seemed likely that the USA would launch a military attack on Iran (an attack now at least postponed), the Americans were ready to neutralise possible Iraqi Shia military support for the Iranians by creating a Sunni Arab military counterweight within the country.
In many ways this American shift towards the Sunni Arab minority has been a reversion to the traditional power arrangement in Iraq. After the Ottoman Turkish sultans took the country away from the Iranians during the sixteenth century, they ensured Sunni rule over the majority Shia for the next four centuries. After the British took control of Iraq in 1917-18, they continued this political hegemony, installing a Sunni Arab monarch to rule the country. Even after the fall of the monarchy in 1958, the Sunni Arab minority - including Saddam Hussein and his Tikriti gang - continued to run Iraq. Only since 2003 has the Shia Arab majority achieved political dominance after centuries of oppression. Now those Shia fear that the United States may be going back on its commitment to democracy so as to further the interests of its allies in neighbouring Sunni Arab countries.
The Iraqi Kurds have traditionally been hostile to all Arabs, whether Sunni or Shia, but since 2003 it has been in their interest to ally with the Shia Arab majority, in part because this was what their American friends wanted. Now the amity between Iraqi Kurdistan and the United States is becoming increasingly strained. Despite US denials, American assistance to Turkish air attacks on PKK guerrillas in Iraqi Kurdistan during December 2007 has been patently obvious. For the moment Iraqi Kurds are prepared to overlook this rather than alienate the USA, their principal ally. However, if Turkish attacks continue, extreme Kurdish nationalists may well start hitting back at the Americans was well as the Turks. The continued postponement of the Kirkuk referendum is also increasing Kurdish hostility.
The Americans claim that the success of their 'surge' strategy in reducing the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq has produced an ideal opportunity for a general political settlement in that country. However, neither the Shia Arabs nor the Kurds seem in any mood to do favours for the USA and its new Sunni Arab friends in Iraq at the moment. One sign of this is the continued delay in passing a new Iraqi oil law which would benefit US energy companies. The Americans have certainly shifted the political kaleidoscope in Iraq, but the consequence seems unlikely to be the settlement they desire. Pursuing the Sunni Arab agenda in Iraq seems more likely to alienate old allies from the USA rather than win them to its cause.
Thursday, December 13, 2007
Decision Postponed: Will the Kirkuk Referendum Ever Happen?
One of the vital factors in winning Kurdish support for the 2005 Iraqi constitution was the promise of a referendum on the status of Kirkuk in northern Iraq. Kurds claim the city and its surrounding area should be part of the semi-independent Kurdistan Regional Government. Their claim matters because near Kirkuk is the most important oilfield in northern Iraq, a field which produces nearly half of that country's oil exports.
If the Kurdish autonomous region gets control of such oil riches, there may be serious consequences. The Baghdad government will lose access to much of its income from oil exports and its already tenuous control of the northern Kurdish region will dwindle to almost nothing. An oil-rich Iraqi Kurdistan will also act as a beacon to encourage separatist tendencies among the Kurdish populations of neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Iran.
The Kirkuk oilfield was first discovered in 1927 and went into production in 1934. For more than seven decades this field has provided the backbone of Iraq's oil industry, although new fields were later discovered in the centre and south of the country. This ageing 'supergiant' oilfield is still said to have proven reserves of over ten billion barrels of oil and it currently produces a million barrels a day. Most of this oil is exported by pipeline across Turkey to the port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea.
Facing a continuing Kurdish insurrection in northern Iraq, the Baghdad government decided in the 1970s to begin a policy of ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk. The majority Kurds and significant minorities such as the Turkomans were expelled from the city and surrounding area, being replaced by Arabs transplanted from central and southern Iraq. This 'Arabization' policy was intensified by Saddam Hussein during the 1980s and by 2000 several hundred thousand people had been removed from their homes in Kirkuk.
After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds demanded that their people should be allowed to return to Kirkuk. This right of return was granted to them and other expelled groups by the 2005 Iraqi constitution. Arabs were to be sent back to their home areas and compensated. Once the demographic balance had been 'normalized' in Kirkuk, a census would be held and a list of voters prepared for a referendum to decide if Kirkuk should be included in the Kurdish autonomous area.
It was envisaged that the 'normalization' of the population and the carrying out of the census would be completed in the summer of 2007, with the referendum taking place in November 2007. Initial delays in the process led to the date of the referendum being changed to 'the end of 2007', but this timetable has now become unrealistic.
Even in early 2007 the Baghdad government was stating that the Kirkuk referendum would have to be postponed. Now it is claimed that the Kurdish authorities are ready to accept a postponement of the vote for some months, perhaps until May 2008. This delay is said to be due to purely administrative problems, but many Kurds are suspicious and some have threatened a unilateral seizure of Kirkuk if the promised referendum does not take place soon.
The Baghdad government and many American officials would like to see the referendum postponed for some years, if not indefinitely, to avoid provoking bloody ethnic conflict in a part of Iraq which has so far seen comparatively little violence. Neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Iran take a similar view of the proposed referendum because of fears about its impact on their own Kurdish populations. But how long will the Kurds tolerate such postponement?
If the Iraqi Kurds take control of Kirkuk, whether by democratic vote or unilateral action, Turkey has threatened to take military measures against them. This would not only be to protect the Turkoman minority in the city, but also to avoid any possibility of the creation of an oil-rich independent Kurdish state. Of course military action may not be needed to curb the Iraqi Kurds. All Turkey has to do is close the pipeline to Ceyhan and so end oil exports from Kirkuk, although this would probably cause a sharp rise in the world oil price.
The Kurdistan Regional Government is no doubt conscious of these possible actions by rival powers, but it has only limited room to manoeuvre on the Kirkuk issue. A postponement of the referendum for a few months may be acceptable. However, if further postponements follow, direct action can be expected from the more extreme Kurdish nationalists, with possibly dangerous consequences for both Iraq and the wider Middle East.
If the Kurdish autonomous region gets control of such oil riches, there may be serious consequences. The Baghdad government will lose access to much of its income from oil exports and its already tenuous control of the northern Kurdish region will dwindle to almost nothing. An oil-rich Iraqi Kurdistan will also act as a beacon to encourage separatist tendencies among the Kurdish populations of neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Iran.
The Kirkuk oilfield was first discovered in 1927 and went into production in 1934. For more than seven decades this field has provided the backbone of Iraq's oil industry, although new fields were later discovered in the centre and south of the country. This ageing 'supergiant' oilfield is still said to have proven reserves of over ten billion barrels of oil and it currently produces a million barrels a day. Most of this oil is exported by pipeline across Turkey to the port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea.
Facing a continuing Kurdish insurrection in northern Iraq, the Baghdad government decided in the 1970s to begin a policy of ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk. The majority Kurds and significant minorities such as the Turkomans were expelled from the city and surrounding area, being replaced by Arabs transplanted from central and southern Iraq. This 'Arabization' policy was intensified by Saddam Hussein during the 1980s and by 2000 several hundred thousand people had been removed from their homes in Kirkuk.
After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds demanded that their people should be allowed to return to Kirkuk. This right of return was granted to them and other expelled groups by the 2005 Iraqi constitution. Arabs were to be sent back to their home areas and compensated. Once the demographic balance had been 'normalized' in Kirkuk, a census would be held and a list of voters prepared for a referendum to decide if Kirkuk should be included in the Kurdish autonomous area.
It was envisaged that the 'normalization' of the population and the carrying out of the census would be completed in the summer of 2007, with the referendum taking place in November 2007. Initial delays in the process led to the date of the referendum being changed to 'the end of 2007', but this timetable has now become unrealistic.
Even in early 2007 the Baghdad government was stating that the Kirkuk referendum would have to be postponed. Now it is claimed that the Kurdish authorities are ready to accept a postponement of the vote for some months, perhaps until May 2008. This delay is said to be due to purely administrative problems, but many Kurds are suspicious and some have threatened a unilateral seizure of Kirkuk if the promised referendum does not take place soon.
The Baghdad government and many American officials would like to see the referendum postponed for some years, if not indefinitely, to avoid provoking bloody ethnic conflict in a part of Iraq which has so far seen comparatively little violence. Neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Iran take a similar view of the proposed referendum because of fears about its impact on their own Kurdish populations. But how long will the Kurds tolerate such postponement?
If the Iraqi Kurds take control of Kirkuk, whether by democratic vote or unilateral action, Turkey has threatened to take military measures against them. This would not only be to protect the Turkoman minority in the city, but also to avoid any possibility of the creation of an oil-rich independent Kurdish state. Of course military action may not be needed to curb the Iraqi Kurds. All Turkey has to do is close the pipeline to Ceyhan and so end oil exports from Kirkuk, although this would probably cause a sharp rise in the world oil price.
The Kurdistan Regional Government is no doubt conscious of these possible actions by rival powers, but it has only limited room to manoeuvre on the Kirkuk issue. A postponement of the referendum for a few months may be acceptable. However, if further postponements follow, direct action can be expected from the more extreme Kurdish nationalists, with possibly dangerous consequences for both Iraq and the wider Middle East.
Friday, November 30, 2007
Muslims Must Lead the Fight Against Islamist Terror
In November 1997 Islamist terrorists attacked foreign tourists visiting the ancient sites at Luxor, Egypt. More than sixty people were killed, mostly tourists, and then the terrorists committed suicide. Ordinary Egyptians were outraged at this crime. When the killers fled into nearby hills, it was significant that their first pursuers were local people not Egyptian security forces.
The Luxor massacre was a step too far for the Egyptian people and in its aftermath they largely rejected Islamist violence. In the five years before Luxor, Islamist terrorists killed more than 1,200 people in Egypt, many of them foreigners. After Luxor the Islamist terrorist movement in the country largely collapsed. Without some measure of popular support, the Islamists could no longer continue their campaign of violence.
In September 2001 Islamist terrorists launched their attacks in the United States using hijacked airliners as suicide weapons. Almost 3,000 people were killed. Despite the rejoicing of a small section of the Islamic world, the mass of the world's Muslims expressed their horror and disgust at these crimes. This widespread Muslim rejection of al-Qaeda and its actions was underlined by events in Afghanistan in the following months.
Osama bin Laden and his associate Ayman al-Zawahiri had hoped that in reaction to the events of 9/11 the United States would plunge into a war against their Taliban hosts in Afghanistan which would be a repeat of the Soviet-Afghan conflict of 1979-89. The Islamic world would rally to the support of Afghanistan, ready for another struggle against the infidel. Nothing like that happened. The world's Muslims would have nothing to do with the extremist criminals in Afghanistan.
Instead of a ten-year jihad, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were routed in a campaign lasting only a few months. Wisely the US-led coalition restricted its participation in the war to air attacks and the provision of special forces units on the ground. Most of the fighting against the Taliban and al-Qaeda was undertaken by their Afghan opponents and by tribal leaders who had found it prudent to change sides.
By early 2002 the Taliban and al-Qaeda seemed to have suffered a decisive defeat. Nor did their few supporters in the wider world have much impact. According to US State Department figures, the number of terrorist attacks around the world in 2002 was lower than in 2001 and, despite tragedies like the Bali bombing, the number of fatalities caused by such attacks had fallen substantially. Those extremists who wished to bring about a bloody 'clash of civilisations' between the West and the Islamic world seemed to have failed.
Then came the historic folly of the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Once it became clear that the swift American victory over Saddam Hussein would not be followed by peace but by an extended guerrilla war, Islamist extremists had the opportunity they had long sought. Thousands of Western troops were battling Muslims in the heart of the Islamic world, and these struggles were broadcast around the world every day. Despite the denunciations of Islamist terror by Muslim governments, increasing numbers of their people were ready to support the resistance struggle in Iraq.
By the end of 2004, the war in Iraq had begun to re-awaken the conflict in Afghanistan. Several years of comparative peace in that country had been wasted. Despite many promises, Western governments had failed to provide sufficient aid and assistance to bring stability and prosperity to Afghanistan. The influence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda began to revive and soon they were launching a new war from their bases in Pakistan. Many Afghans who had rejected their extremism in 2001 were now ready to join them.
Of course one cannot blame the strong revival of Islamist terrorism since 2003 solely on the actions of the West. As Osama bin Laden and his associates have made clear, they see many Muslim governments as being as bad as, if not worse than, the Western 'crusaders'. However, Osama bin Laden's endlessly repeated denunciations of 'crusader aggression' would be just meaningless ranting if the West had not taken military actions which gave them some plausibility.
No amount of Western sophistry could explain away the brutality depicted in the pictures of American military police ill-treating Muslim prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Images are always more powerful than words. Most Muslims will never actively support Islamist terrorism, but enough young men have been radicalised by Western military excesses in Iraq and Afghanistan to give a new lease of life to an extremist movement which seemed to be in terminal decline in 2002.
In their reactions to the Islamist terrorist atrocities of 1997 and 2001, Muslims have shown their instinctive hostility to such crimes. However, since 2003 the terrorists have been able to win support in some parts of the Islamic world by portraying the presence of Western military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as 'crusader aggression'. Resistance to such forces is said to be as much a duty for Muslims as was resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan during the 1980s.
Only a rapid reduction of this Western military presence can rob the extremists of one of their chief claims to wider Muslim support. Western governments must not see such a withdrawal as being a defeat. A lasting victory over Muslim extremism can only be achieved by other Muslims. The West may provide weapons, intelligence, logistics, and other valuable support, but Muslim governments must have the main role in suppressing Islamist terrorism.
At present Western military operations seem to be largely counter-productive, merely providing new recruits for the terrorists and alienating opinion in much of the Islamic world. It is time to give up the heavy-handed blundering that has characterised Western strategy since 2003 and attempt to formulate a more skilful and focused approach. In this new strategy Muslim countries must be more closely involved in both the planning and execution of anti-terrorist measures. Only then can the perpetrators of the atrocities of 1997 and 2001 be isolated and defeated, having lost all wider support in the Muslim community.
The Luxor massacre was a step too far for the Egyptian people and in its aftermath they largely rejected Islamist violence. In the five years before Luxor, Islamist terrorists killed more than 1,200 people in Egypt, many of them foreigners. After Luxor the Islamist terrorist movement in the country largely collapsed. Without some measure of popular support, the Islamists could no longer continue their campaign of violence.
In September 2001 Islamist terrorists launched their attacks in the United States using hijacked airliners as suicide weapons. Almost 3,000 people were killed. Despite the rejoicing of a small section of the Islamic world, the mass of the world's Muslims expressed their horror and disgust at these crimes. This widespread Muslim rejection of al-Qaeda and its actions was underlined by events in Afghanistan in the following months.
Osama bin Laden and his associate Ayman al-Zawahiri had hoped that in reaction to the events of 9/11 the United States would plunge into a war against their Taliban hosts in Afghanistan which would be a repeat of the Soviet-Afghan conflict of 1979-89. The Islamic world would rally to the support of Afghanistan, ready for another struggle against the infidel. Nothing like that happened. The world's Muslims would have nothing to do with the extremist criminals in Afghanistan.
Instead of a ten-year jihad, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were routed in a campaign lasting only a few months. Wisely the US-led coalition restricted its participation in the war to air attacks and the provision of special forces units on the ground. Most of the fighting against the Taliban and al-Qaeda was undertaken by their Afghan opponents and by tribal leaders who had found it prudent to change sides.
By early 2002 the Taliban and al-Qaeda seemed to have suffered a decisive defeat. Nor did their few supporters in the wider world have much impact. According to US State Department figures, the number of terrorist attacks around the world in 2002 was lower than in 2001 and, despite tragedies like the Bali bombing, the number of fatalities caused by such attacks had fallen substantially. Those extremists who wished to bring about a bloody 'clash of civilisations' between the West and the Islamic world seemed to have failed.
Then came the historic folly of the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Once it became clear that the swift American victory over Saddam Hussein would not be followed by peace but by an extended guerrilla war, Islamist extremists had the opportunity they had long sought. Thousands of Western troops were battling Muslims in the heart of the Islamic world, and these struggles were broadcast around the world every day. Despite the denunciations of Islamist terror by Muslim governments, increasing numbers of their people were ready to support the resistance struggle in Iraq.
By the end of 2004, the war in Iraq had begun to re-awaken the conflict in Afghanistan. Several years of comparative peace in that country had been wasted. Despite many promises, Western governments had failed to provide sufficient aid and assistance to bring stability and prosperity to Afghanistan. The influence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda began to revive and soon they were launching a new war from their bases in Pakistan. Many Afghans who had rejected their extremism in 2001 were now ready to join them.
Of course one cannot blame the strong revival of Islamist terrorism since 2003 solely on the actions of the West. As Osama bin Laden and his associates have made clear, they see many Muslim governments as being as bad as, if not worse than, the Western 'crusaders'. However, Osama bin Laden's endlessly repeated denunciations of 'crusader aggression' would be just meaningless ranting if the West had not taken military actions which gave them some plausibility.
No amount of Western sophistry could explain away the brutality depicted in the pictures of American military police ill-treating Muslim prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Images are always more powerful than words. Most Muslims will never actively support Islamist terrorism, but enough young men have been radicalised by Western military excesses in Iraq and Afghanistan to give a new lease of life to an extremist movement which seemed to be in terminal decline in 2002.
In their reactions to the Islamist terrorist atrocities of 1997 and 2001, Muslims have shown their instinctive hostility to such crimes. However, since 2003 the terrorists have been able to win support in some parts of the Islamic world by portraying the presence of Western military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as 'crusader aggression'. Resistance to such forces is said to be as much a duty for Muslims as was resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan during the 1980s.
Only a rapid reduction of this Western military presence can rob the extremists of one of their chief claims to wider Muslim support. Western governments must not see such a withdrawal as being a defeat. A lasting victory over Muslim extremism can only be achieved by other Muslims. The West may provide weapons, intelligence, logistics, and other valuable support, but Muslim governments must have the main role in suppressing Islamist terrorism.
At present Western military operations seem to be largely counter-productive, merely providing new recruits for the terrorists and alienating opinion in much of the Islamic world. It is time to give up the heavy-handed blundering that has characterised Western strategy since 2003 and attempt to formulate a more skilful and focused approach. In this new strategy Muslim countries must be more closely involved in both the planning and execution of anti-terrorist measures. Only then can the perpetrators of the atrocities of 1997 and 2001 be isolated and defeated, having lost all wider support in the Muslim community.
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