The modern state of Saudi Arabia was born from the conquests of Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in the first quarter of the twentieth century. This desert warrior took possession of most of Arabia, including the two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina. If such a tide of conquest had been continued, Abdul Aziz would inevitably have come into conflict with Britain and France, the two dominant colonial powers in the Middle East in those years.
However, Abdul Aziz was one of those rare leaders who accepted Bismarck's observation that political genius consists of knowing when to stop. When the most militant of his warriors seemed likely to attack British territory, Abdul Aziz crushed them and in future followed a policy of living in peace with his neighbours. He even welcomed a new great power, the United States, to the Middle East as a counter-weight to the British and French, and soon after the formal creation of Saudi Arabia in 1932, American geologists found the vast oil reserves that have enriched the country ever since.
Having given up wars of conquest, Abdul Aziz founded his new state on three pillars: consensus, conservatism, and caution. Abdul Aziz died in 1953, but all his sons who have ruled Saudi Arabia since then upheld those pillars of state - until now. Since 2015 Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), son of the current king Salman and as crown prince already de facto ruler of the country, has begun revolutionary changes in Saudi Arabia which threaten to undermine the pillars of state created by Abdul Aziz.
First is consensus. This does not of course mean consensus among the population of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi kingdom is no democracy, nor is MBS going to make it one. He seems to be modelling himself on the 'enlightened despots' of eighteenth century Europe. Rulers such as Joseph II of Austria and Catherine the Great of Russia sought to reform and modernise their countries without giving away any of their own absolute power. These were to be revolutions from the top down, carefully managed so that the autocrats stayed in control.
Consensus in Saudi Arabia has always meant consensus among the members of the ruling House of Saud. Up to now this system has worked remarkably well. Troublesome members of the ruling house have been passed over for the crown or removed from the throne if they threatened to endanger political stability. MBS has totally destroyed this family consensus. He has successfully grabbed all power for himself, and rival Saudi princes appear too shocked and weak to put up any effective opposition. Once the ruler of Saudi Arabia was just the chairman of the family board of management - now MBS is sole ruler.
The second pillar, conservatism, largely means religious conservatism. Saudi Arabia has no political constitution because the Koran serves that function and the interpreters of the Koran are the Wahhabi Muslim clerics who have long supported the House of Saud. These Sunni Muslim religious leaders have a powerful voice in all political, judicial, and social affairs in the kingdom. Unlike the Shia Muslim clerics in Iran, the Wahhabis have no desire to actually run the country, but they do expect the Saudi ruler to uphold their conservative brand of Islam at home and abroad. So far MBS has avoided a direct confrontation with the Wahhabi clerics, and only those viewed as 'extremist' have been arrested, supposedly as part of the campaign against Islamist terrorism. However, as modernisation of the Saudi state will necessarily involve increased Westernisation in many forms, a potentially explosive clash between MBS and the clerical hardliners must come at some point.
Finally comes caution. The House of Saud has previously moved cautiously in both internal and foreign affairs, but MBS seems determined to take risky policy initiatives in both areas almost as a matter of course. Since 2015 he has embarked on an apparently endless war in Yemen, has imposed a fairly pointless blockade on Qatar, and has openly interfered in the government of Lebanon. Now, if we are to believe Israeli sources, MBS is ready to take the most reckless step of all: to dump the Palestinian cause and join Israel in an anti-Iranian front. A more provocative action could scarcely be imagined in the Muslim world.
Consensus, conservatism, and caution have kept the House of Saud in control of Arabia for more than eighty years. They are the pillars of the state. MBS has now chosen to tear them down. Many commentators see him as moving too far too fast. One thing seems certain, if his modernising revolution fails, its failure will not only endanger him but the very existence of the Saudi Arabian state.
Thursday, November 30, 2017
Saturday, December 24, 2016
Karak: Echoes of Past Conflict.
The recent terrorist attack in Jordan which killed ten people, including a Canadian tourist, took place at al-Karak, a city of much significance in past Christian-Muslim conflict. The principal tourist attraction is Karak (or Kerak) Castle, usually described as a Crusader fortress. In the twelfth century it was controlled by Reynald de Chatillon, a Christian warrior whose relentless attacks on Muslim lands would in 1187 lead to the capture of Christian-held Jerusalem by the great Muslim leader Saladin.
Reynald might be unknown to most people but for his portrayal by actor Brendan Gleeson in the 2005 movie Kingdom of Heaven. In the context of Christian-Muslim conflict in the Middle East in the medieval period he was a major figure. Originally from France, he came to the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem during the Second Crusade. After marrying the heiress to the neighbouring Principality of Antioch in 1153, he became its ruler. However, in 1160 Reynald was captured by the Muslim emir of Aleppo and he was a prisoner until ransomed in 1176.
Reynald's wife had died during his captivity and he could not return to Antioch. Instead he married the heiress of Oultrejourdain, the Christian territory to the south of the Dead Sea. Its principal stronghold was Karak Castle, where Reynald took up residence. The fortress held an important strategic position at what might be called the hinge of Saladin's emerging Egyptian-Syrian state. From Karak Reynald could attack the caravan route from Egypt to Syria and the route from Damascus to the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Reynald also gave support to the Kingdom of Jerusalem and in 1177 was one of the leaders of the Christian army that defeated Saladin at Montgisard.
Reynald later seized the port of Aqaba and in 1182 sent a raiding squadron into the Red Sea. He intended that the ships would prey on the pilgrim trade and then put men ashore to attack Mecca and Medina. Saladin sent forces to oppose the raiders, and their last remnant was captured and executed only a few miles from Medina. This was the closest the Christians ever came to attacking the two holiest cities of Islam, and their near success was a major embarrassment for Saladin.
Twice Saladin tried to capture Reynald's castle at Karak, but each time he failed. Finally, in 1187, during a time of Christian-Muslim truce, Reynald launched a treacherous attack on a caravan from Damascus that was passing his lands. Being now prepared for a final confrontation with the Christians, Saladin used this attack as an excuse to go to war. In July 1187 Saladin defeated the Christian army of King Guy of Jerusalem at the Horns of Hattin. Reynald was among those captured and Saladin had him executed. Jerusalem fell to Saladin in October, returning the city to Muslim control after nearly a century of Christian occupation. Karak Castle fell to the Muslims a year later.
Thus an apparently minor incident near Karak, the attack on a caravan, had culminated in momentous events for the Christians: defeat at Hattin and the loss of Jerusalem. No doubt the recent attackers at al-Karak hoped their actions would lead to larger consequences, but they are very unlikely to be as significant as those of 1187. No doubt Jordan's tourist industry will be damaged for a time, but it is unlikely that the pro-Western government of Jordan's King Abdullah will be undermined. There is no new Saladin waiting to attack Christian, or rather Western, interests in the Middle East.
The recent terrorist attack in Jordan which killed ten people, including a Canadian tourist, took place at al-Karak, a city of much significance in past Christian-Muslim conflict. The principal tourist attraction is Karak (or Kerak) Castle, usually described as a Crusader fortress. In the twelfth century it was controlled by Reynald de Chatillon, a Christian warrior whose relentless attacks on Muslim lands would in 1187 lead to the capture of Christian-held Jerusalem by the great Muslim leader Saladin.
Reynald might be unknown to most people but for his portrayal by actor Brendan Gleeson in the 2005 movie Kingdom of Heaven. In the context of Christian-Muslim conflict in the Middle East in the medieval period he was a major figure. Originally from France, he came to the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem during the Second Crusade. After marrying the heiress to the neighbouring Principality of Antioch in 1153, he became its ruler. However, in 1160 Reynald was captured by the Muslim emir of Aleppo and he was a prisoner until ransomed in 1176.
Reynald's wife had died during his captivity and he could not return to Antioch. Instead he married the heiress of Oultrejourdain, the Christian territory to the south of the Dead Sea. Its principal stronghold was Karak Castle, where Reynald took up residence. The fortress held an important strategic position at what might be called the hinge of Saladin's emerging Egyptian-Syrian state. From Karak Reynald could attack the caravan route from Egypt to Syria and the route from Damascus to the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Reynald also gave support to the Kingdom of Jerusalem and in 1177 was one of the leaders of the Christian army that defeated Saladin at Montgisard.
Reynald later seized the port of Aqaba and in 1182 sent a raiding squadron into the Red Sea. He intended that the ships would prey on the pilgrim trade and then put men ashore to attack Mecca and Medina. Saladin sent forces to oppose the raiders, and their last remnant was captured and executed only a few miles from Medina. This was the closest the Christians ever came to attacking the two holiest cities of Islam, and their near success was a major embarrassment for Saladin.
Twice Saladin tried to capture Reynald's castle at Karak, but each time he failed. Finally, in 1187, during a time of Christian-Muslim truce, Reynald launched a treacherous attack on a caravan from Damascus that was passing his lands. Being now prepared for a final confrontation with the Christians, Saladin used this attack as an excuse to go to war. In July 1187 Saladin defeated the Christian army of King Guy of Jerusalem at the Horns of Hattin. Reynald was among those captured and Saladin had him executed. Jerusalem fell to Saladin in October, returning the city to Muslim control after nearly a century of Christian occupation. Karak Castle fell to the Muslims a year later.
Thus an apparently minor incident near Karak, the attack on a caravan, had culminated in momentous events for the Christians: defeat at Hattin and the loss of Jerusalem. No doubt the recent attackers at al-Karak hoped their actions would lead to larger consequences, but they are very unlikely to be as significant as those of 1187. No doubt Jordan's tourist industry will be damaged for a time, but it is unlikely that the pro-Western government of Jordan's King Abdullah will be undermined. There is no new Saladin waiting to attack Christian, or rather Western, interests in the Middle East.
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
How Jihadist States End: The Mahdists and ISIS
When the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was set up in the summer of 2014 it was the first jihadist political entity since the Mahdist state which controlled Sudan between 1885 and 1898.
The Mahdist state ended when its army was slaughtered by forces under Britain's General Kitchener at the battle of Omdurman on 2 September 1898, almost 118 years ago. This was a decisive victory from which the Mahdists never recovered. As anti-ISIS forces advance on Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq today, it seems the state ruled by ISIS will perish not in some great climactic battle but in protracted and bloody street fighting among urban ruins. Yet it remains doubtful whether the end of the jihadist state will mean the end of ISIS terrorist activities.
Ruled by Egypt since 1820, the inhabitants of Sudan exploited the turmoil caused by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 to regain their freedom. Their leader was Muhammad Ahmad, who claimed to be the Mahdi, the Islamic messiah who would come to deliver Muslims from oppression. Initially the British were ready to give up Sudan and sent General Gordon to evacuate the last Egyptian forces from the country. However, Gordon decided to oppose the Mahdi and ended up besieged in Khartoum. Reluctantly the British government sent a small army to save Gordon, but at the start of 1885 the Mahdists stormed Khartoum and killed the general. For the moment the British withdrew from Sudan, but this blow to British imperial prestige would not be forgotten.
The Mahdi died only six months after Gordon, but Abdallahi ibn Muhammad took his place, being known as the Khalifa (caliph or successor). Mahdist Sudan was an Islamic fundamentalist state, but its efforts to spread its influence into other countries were largely unsuccessful. Expeditions against both Egypt and Ethiopia were defeated, and in 1896 General Kitchener led a British army into Sudan, intent on destroying the Mahdist state and avenging Gordon. Logistical problems initially proved more of an obstacle than Mahdist resistance, but Kitchener's slow and methodical advance down the River Nile never faltered. In September 1898 the invaders finally reached the Mahdist capital of Omdurman and the Khalifa decided to risk everything in a major battle. Unfortunately religious fanaticism was no match for artillery and machine guns. The Mahdists were slaughtered and their state was at an end, with the Khalifa being killed during mopping up operations in 1899. The Mahdist challenge had been totally crushed and Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan would continue largely undisturbed until the country finally became independent in 1956.
Exploiting civil war in Syria and internal turmoil in Iraq, ISIS set up its state in the summer of 2014. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was not presumptuous enough to call himself the Mahdi, but he did claim the title of caliph (successor to the Prophet Muhammad). Taking the name Caliph Ibrahim, he claimed to rule the world's Muslims and imposed an Islamic fundamentalist regime on the territories he controlled in Syria and Iraq. The Mahdists were left alone for some years to consolidate their control of Sudan, but almost as soon as it came into being, ISIS was under attack from its enemies. The USA and its allies have been carrying out air attacks on ISIS positions and America's local proxies have been making steady, if slow, progress in driving ISIS forces from towns in both Syria and Iraq. Raqqa and Mosul, the last remaining major ISIS-held cities, seem likely to be the final combat zones for the movement, scenes of brutal urban conflict rather than a final great battle.
However, by the terms of its own ideology, ISIS is committed to one final apocalyptic battle. It claims that at Dabiq (near Aleppo in Syria) the forces of Islam, with the Mahdi among their leaders, will defeat the forces of 'Rome' and win dominion over the world. (Dabiq is also the name of the movement's online magazine.) Even if such an encounter were to take place, the result would only be a new Omdurman, with 'Roman' (Western) firepower slaughtering the Islamic militants.
However the ISIS state ends, will its demise be as complete as that of the Mahdist state in Sudan in 1898? There were no Mahdist militants carrying out terror attacks in Victorian London as General Kitchener closed in on Omdurman. ISIS can launch or inspire terrorist attacks in Western cities even as its hold on towns in Syria and Iraq begins to crumble.
The battle of Omdurman marked the definite end of the Mahdist state in Sudan, but the end of the state controlled by ISIS will not be the end of the struggle. ISIS-linked groups are already fighting in Egypt, Libya, and Afghanistan, and ISIS-inspired terrorists may pop up at any time in Western countries. Mahdist Sudan was a geographically limited phenomenon; ISIS can live on in other forms as a continuing global threat even after its state has disappeared.
When the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was set up in the summer of 2014 it was the first jihadist political entity since the Mahdist state which controlled Sudan between 1885 and 1898.
The Mahdist state ended when its army was slaughtered by forces under Britain's General Kitchener at the battle of Omdurman on 2 September 1898, almost 118 years ago. This was a decisive victory from which the Mahdists never recovered. As anti-ISIS forces advance on Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq today, it seems the state ruled by ISIS will perish not in some great climactic battle but in protracted and bloody street fighting among urban ruins. Yet it remains doubtful whether the end of the jihadist state will mean the end of ISIS terrorist activities.
Ruled by Egypt since 1820, the inhabitants of Sudan exploited the turmoil caused by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 to regain their freedom. Their leader was Muhammad Ahmad, who claimed to be the Mahdi, the Islamic messiah who would come to deliver Muslims from oppression. Initially the British were ready to give up Sudan and sent General Gordon to evacuate the last Egyptian forces from the country. However, Gordon decided to oppose the Mahdi and ended up besieged in Khartoum. Reluctantly the British government sent a small army to save Gordon, but at the start of 1885 the Mahdists stormed Khartoum and killed the general. For the moment the British withdrew from Sudan, but this blow to British imperial prestige would not be forgotten.
The Mahdi died only six months after Gordon, but Abdallahi ibn Muhammad took his place, being known as the Khalifa (caliph or successor). Mahdist Sudan was an Islamic fundamentalist state, but its efforts to spread its influence into other countries were largely unsuccessful. Expeditions against both Egypt and Ethiopia were defeated, and in 1896 General Kitchener led a British army into Sudan, intent on destroying the Mahdist state and avenging Gordon. Logistical problems initially proved more of an obstacle than Mahdist resistance, but Kitchener's slow and methodical advance down the River Nile never faltered. In September 1898 the invaders finally reached the Mahdist capital of Omdurman and the Khalifa decided to risk everything in a major battle. Unfortunately religious fanaticism was no match for artillery and machine guns. The Mahdists were slaughtered and their state was at an end, with the Khalifa being killed during mopping up operations in 1899. The Mahdist challenge had been totally crushed and Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan would continue largely undisturbed until the country finally became independent in 1956.
Exploiting civil war in Syria and internal turmoil in Iraq, ISIS set up its state in the summer of 2014. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was not presumptuous enough to call himself the Mahdi, but he did claim the title of caliph (successor to the Prophet Muhammad). Taking the name Caliph Ibrahim, he claimed to rule the world's Muslims and imposed an Islamic fundamentalist regime on the territories he controlled in Syria and Iraq. The Mahdists were left alone for some years to consolidate their control of Sudan, but almost as soon as it came into being, ISIS was under attack from its enemies. The USA and its allies have been carrying out air attacks on ISIS positions and America's local proxies have been making steady, if slow, progress in driving ISIS forces from towns in both Syria and Iraq. Raqqa and Mosul, the last remaining major ISIS-held cities, seem likely to be the final combat zones for the movement, scenes of brutal urban conflict rather than a final great battle.
However, by the terms of its own ideology, ISIS is committed to one final apocalyptic battle. It claims that at Dabiq (near Aleppo in Syria) the forces of Islam, with the Mahdi among their leaders, will defeat the forces of 'Rome' and win dominion over the world. (Dabiq is also the name of the movement's online magazine.) Even if such an encounter were to take place, the result would only be a new Omdurman, with 'Roman' (Western) firepower slaughtering the Islamic militants.
However the ISIS state ends, will its demise be as complete as that of the Mahdist state in Sudan in 1898? There were no Mahdist militants carrying out terror attacks in Victorian London as General Kitchener closed in on Omdurman. ISIS can launch or inspire terrorist attacks in Western cities even as its hold on towns in Syria and Iraq begins to crumble.
The battle of Omdurman marked the definite end of the Mahdist state in Sudan, but the end of the state controlled by ISIS will not be the end of the struggle. ISIS-linked groups are already fighting in Egypt, Libya, and Afghanistan, and ISIS-inspired terrorists may pop up at any time in Western countries. Mahdist Sudan was a geographically limited phenomenon; ISIS can live on in other forms as a continuing global threat even after its state has disappeared.
Tuesday, May 24, 2016
ISIS on the Ropes: After a Knockout, What Then?
The Iraqi government has announced that its forces are beginning the final battle to retake Fallujah. Although close to the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, the town has been held by ISIS for almost two and a half years. Like the Iraqi recapture of Ramadi from ISIS at the end of 2015, the fight for Fallujah is expected to be prolonged and bloody, but few doubt that ISIS will be defeated.
Combined with ISIS defeats elsewhere in Iraq and in neighbouring Syria, the loss of Fallujah will be a major blow to the Sunni Islamist terror group. Perhaps even more worrying for ISIS has been the recent Iraqi successes at Hit and Rutba. In both towns it is claimed Irqi government forces were aided by Sunni tribesmen who had turned against ISIS. If the group can no longer rely on the support of Iraqi Sunnis, previously hostile to the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, then it is indeed in deep trouble.
Optimists are talking about a rapid collapse of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq before the end of this year. The ISIS capital at Raqqa in Syria is already said to be under threat. Should the Iraqi recapture of Fallujah prove easier than expected, then there will be growing pressure to liberate Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, from ISIS control this year rather than wait until 2017 as previously planned. ISIS would certainly appear to be on the ropes, but it is unlikely to go down without a fight. Nevertheless, if its many enemies deliver the final knockout punch more quickly than expected, what will a post-ISIS Middle East look like?
No doubt many parties will rush to claim they played a major role in the defeat of ISIS. The United States and its allies will point to their two year bombing campaign against ISIS targets as a vital factor in ensuring victory. However, whatever the role of airpower, only ground forces can recapture towns and territory. The two principal victors will be the Shiites and the Kurds, both of whom will be looking to derive new advantages from their success.
In Syria the Shiite-linked victors will be the Alawite government of Bashir Assad, backed by Iran and Russia. In Iraq the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad will claim victory, once again with Iran as its chief backer. Despite its many sins, ISIS has been the most powerful Sunni militant group in the Middle East and its defeat by Shiite forces will give that side a major boost in the Sunni-Shiite struggle that increasingly dominates the region.
In addition, Saudi Arabia, the self-declared leader of Sunni Islam, has embarked on an internal reform programme that some see as a dangerous gamble. If it succeeds, it will bring about a major economic and social transformation of the kingdom. If it fails, the result could be internal disorder and even the fall of the House of Saud. Such a collapse would be a greater blow to Sunnis than the defeat of ISIS.
The other victors in the ground struggle against ISIS would be the Kurds. In both Syria and Iraq they have played a vital role in fighting ISIS, being particularly close to the United States and its Western allies. However, the long-term aim of the Kurds is to create their own state, and this goal makes their Western friends uneasy. The Kurds have been denied heavy weapons and even minor incidents, such as Canadian special forces personnel attaching Iraqi Kurdistan flags to their uniforms, have caused protests.
Yet if the Kurds are on the winning side against ISIS, they will certainly want to build upon their success. During the chaos caused by ISIS successes in the summer of 2014, the Kurds seized control of the Iraqi city of Kirkuk. If the Iraqi government recaptures Mosul from ISIS, it will surely want Kirkuk returned to its control as well. The Kurds are unlikely to agree to this. Which side would the West take in an Iraqi-Kurd conflict? Similarly, the Iraqi Kurds may increase their support for the revived Kurdish insurgency in south-east Turkey. What will the United States do if the Iraqi Kurds come into open conflict with Turkey, a major NATO ally?
The fall of ISIS would certainly be very welcome to the international community, but it is unlikely to bring peace and stability to the Middle East. Old conflicts will grow in importance while new ones will be created.
Combined with ISIS defeats elsewhere in Iraq and in neighbouring Syria, the loss of Fallujah will be a major blow to the Sunni Islamist terror group. Perhaps even more worrying for ISIS has been the recent Iraqi successes at Hit and Rutba. In both towns it is claimed Irqi government forces were aided by Sunni tribesmen who had turned against ISIS. If the group can no longer rely on the support of Iraqi Sunnis, previously hostile to the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, then it is indeed in deep trouble.
Optimists are talking about a rapid collapse of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq before the end of this year. The ISIS capital at Raqqa in Syria is already said to be under threat. Should the Iraqi recapture of Fallujah prove easier than expected, then there will be growing pressure to liberate Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, from ISIS control this year rather than wait until 2017 as previously planned. ISIS would certainly appear to be on the ropes, but it is unlikely to go down without a fight. Nevertheless, if its many enemies deliver the final knockout punch more quickly than expected, what will a post-ISIS Middle East look like?
No doubt many parties will rush to claim they played a major role in the defeat of ISIS. The United States and its allies will point to their two year bombing campaign against ISIS targets as a vital factor in ensuring victory. However, whatever the role of airpower, only ground forces can recapture towns and territory. The two principal victors will be the Shiites and the Kurds, both of whom will be looking to derive new advantages from their success.
In Syria the Shiite-linked victors will be the Alawite government of Bashir Assad, backed by Iran and Russia. In Iraq the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad will claim victory, once again with Iran as its chief backer. Despite its many sins, ISIS has been the most powerful Sunni militant group in the Middle East and its defeat by Shiite forces will give that side a major boost in the Sunni-Shiite struggle that increasingly dominates the region.
In addition, Saudi Arabia, the self-declared leader of Sunni Islam, has embarked on an internal reform programme that some see as a dangerous gamble. If it succeeds, it will bring about a major economic and social transformation of the kingdom. If it fails, the result could be internal disorder and even the fall of the House of Saud. Such a collapse would be a greater blow to Sunnis than the defeat of ISIS.
The other victors in the ground struggle against ISIS would be the Kurds. In both Syria and Iraq they have played a vital role in fighting ISIS, being particularly close to the United States and its Western allies. However, the long-term aim of the Kurds is to create their own state, and this goal makes their Western friends uneasy. The Kurds have been denied heavy weapons and even minor incidents, such as Canadian special forces personnel attaching Iraqi Kurdistan flags to their uniforms, have caused protests.
Yet if the Kurds are on the winning side against ISIS, they will certainly want to build upon their success. During the chaos caused by ISIS successes in the summer of 2014, the Kurds seized control of the Iraqi city of Kirkuk. If the Iraqi government recaptures Mosul from ISIS, it will surely want Kirkuk returned to its control as well. The Kurds are unlikely to agree to this. Which side would the West take in an Iraqi-Kurd conflict? Similarly, the Iraqi Kurds may increase their support for the revived Kurdish insurgency in south-east Turkey. What will the United States do if the Iraqi Kurds come into open conflict with Turkey, a major NATO ally?
The fall of ISIS would certainly be very welcome to the international community, but it is unlikely to bring peace and stability to the Middle East. Old conflicts will grow in importance while new ones will be created.
Monday, March 2, 2015
Islamic State: Who Will Crush the Extremists?
Extremist Sunni Muslim movements are nothing new in the history of the Middle East. Today we have the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL) in Syria and Iraq. Two hundred years ago it was the first Saudi state, bursting out of the Arabian desert to raid Iraq and the Hijaz.
Both movements share a religious ideology which is intolerant of Jews, Christians, and Shia Muslims; indeed any Muslims who are not obedient to their fundamentalist creed. Although the Saudis raided Iraq as early as 1802, destroying the Shia shrine at Karbala and killing thousands of the city's Shia inhabitants, they came to world notice in 1806 by taking control of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Similarly, although IS has its origins in the Syrian civil war, it came to world attention in June 2014 by seizing control of Mosul, Iraq's second biggest city.
Such challenges to the established order in the Middle East could not go unanswered. Who was willing and able to crush the extremists?
In 1806 Mecca and Medina were part of the Ottoman empire, but the Ottoman sultan did not have adequate military forces of his own to expel the Saudi occupiers. He could not call on European assistance in what was a Muslim quarrel, and in any case the Europeans were too busy with their own affairs, namely the Napoleonic wars.
After the French occupation of 1798-1801, the Ottoman province of Egypt had remained in confusion for some years. Then an Albanian soldier, Muhammad Ali, had risen to power in Cairo and built up a strong local army. As he was nominally the vassal of the Ottoman sultan, he seemed the ideal candidate to deal with the Saudi menace.
From 1811 Muhammad Ali sent his sons to lead Egyptian forces against the Saudis in Arabia. The holy cities were recaptured by 1813, but Muhammad Ali was determined to continue the war until the Saudis were totally destroyed. Only in 1818 was the Saudi capital city captured and the three principal Saudi leaders sent to Istanbul, where the Ottoman sultan had them publicly executed.
The Ottoman sultan had been vindicated and the extremists crushed, but victory came with a price. The sultan had to overlook the increasing autonomy of his Egyptian vassal, with his growing army and navy. By the early 1830s it was Muhammad Ali who was threatening to overthrow the sultan, and it was only the intervention of the European powers which forced the Egyptian ruler to curb his ambitions.
Today, after its recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USA is reluctant to intervene directly against IS. It would prefer the major Muslim regional powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to do the job, but they show no willingness to undertake the task. So the USA has fallen back on the old formula that seemed to work well in Afghanistan in 2001-2 and in northern Iraq in 2003. The USA and its allies will provide air power and assistance from special forces, while most of the boots on the ground will be provided by local fighters.
Against IS in Syria these fighters will be provided by the Syrian opponents of President Assad and by the Kurds; in Iraq by the Kurds and the Iraqi army. Unfortunately none of these local forces look particularly strong, and even if they are successful, the consequences of their victory over IS may not be what the USA desires, just as the Ottoman sultan found the price of Muhammad Ali's victory over the Saudis was not to his taste.
The Syrian opposition is dominated by jihadists, even if some of them are in conflict with IS. The current plan is for Turkey to train Western-approved 'moderate' jihadists to fight both Assad and IS in Syria, but whether this is really possible is still unclear. The Syrian Kurds won the first victory over IS at Kobani largely thanks to air strikes by the USA and its allies, but whether this success can be translated into a wider campaign against IS in Syria remains problematic.
In Iraq the Shia-dominated national army is being rebuilt after its poor performance against IS in 2014, with US and other Western military advisors playing an important role. However, the Iraqi Shia militias, trained by the Iranians, are judged to be more effective, but also more sectarian. Whatever their suffering at the hands of IS, the Sunni Muslim majority in the city of Mosul is unlikely to relish the prospect of being 'liberated' by Shia fanatics.
The Kurds of northern Iraq are being built up as a major anti-IS military force, but even if they play a major role in defeating IS in Iraq, they will demand a reward for their services. For almost a quarter of a century the Kurds of northern Iraq have enjoyed de facto autonomy. If they defeat IS, they will probably expect international recognition as an independent nation. Just as victory over the Saudis increased Muhammad Ali's political and military power within the Ottoman empire, so victory over IS would be a boost for Kurdish nationhood, not only in Iraq but also among the Kurdish minorities in Syria and Turkey.
However, before the rewards of victory can be reaped, there must be victory. Somebody must crush IS. The much-trumpeted Kurdish/Iraqi spring offensive aimed at freeing Mosul from IS control seems to be underway, with Iraqi efforts to capture Tikrit as a first step. If it succeeds, it may well begin the collapse of IS power in the Middle East. If it fails, it will show that local fighters are incapable of overcoming IS. The USA and its allies will then be faced with the grim prospect of having to send large armies of their own back to the Middle East if they wish to be certain of achieving the downfall of IS.
Both movements share a religious ideology which is intolerant of Jews, Christians, and Shia Muslims; indeed any Muslims who are not obedient to their fundamentalist creed. Although the Saudis raided Iraq as early as 1802, destroying the Shia shrine at Karbala and killing thousands of the city's Shia inhabitants, they came to world notice in 1806 by taking control of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Similarly, although IS has its origins in the Syrian civil war, it came to world attention in June 2014 by seizing control of Mosul, Iraq's second biggest city.
Such challenges to the established order in the Middle East could not go unanswered. Who was willing and able to crush the extremists?
In 1806 Mecca and Medina were part of the Ottoman empire, but the Ottoman sultan did not have adequate military forces of his own to expel the Saudi occupiers. He could not call on European assistance in what was a Muslim quarrel, and in any case the Europeans were too busy with their own affairs, namely the Napoleonic wars.
After the French occupation of 1798-1801, the Ottoman province of Egypt had remained in confusion for some years. Then an Albanian soldier, Muhammad Ali, had risen to power in Cairo and built up a strong local army. As he was nominally the vassal of the Ottoman sultan, he seemed the ideal candidate to deal with the Saudi menace.
From 1811 Muhammad Ali sent his sons to lead Egyptian forces against the Saudis in Arabia. The holy cities were recaptured by 1813, but Muhammad Ali was determined to continue the war until the Saudis were totally destroyed. Only in 1818 was the Saudi capital city captured and the three principal Saudi leaders sent to Istanbul, where the Ottoman sultan had them publicly executed.
The Ottoman sultan had been vindicated and the extremists crushed, but victory came with a price. The sultan had to overlook the increasing autonomy of his Egyptian vassal, with his growing army and navy. By the early 1830s it was Muhammad Ali who was threatening to overthrow the sultan, and it was only the intervention of the European powers which forced the Egyptian ruler to curb his ambitions.
Today, after its recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USA is reluctant to intervene directly against IS. It would prefer the major Muslim regional powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to do the job, but they show no willingness to undertake the task. So the USA has fallen back on the old formula that seemed to work well in Afghanistan in 2001-2 and in northern Iraq in 2003. The USA and its allies will provide air power and assistance from special forces, while most of the boots on the ground will be provided by local fighters.
Against IS in Syria these fighters will be provided by the Syrian opponents of President Assad and by the Kurds; in Iraq by the Kurds and the Iraqi army. Unfortunately none of these local forces look particularly strong, and even if they are successful, the consequences of their victory over IS may not be what the USA desires, just as the Ottoman sultan found the price of Muhammad Ali's victory over the Saudis was not to his taste.
The Syrian opposition is dominated by jihadists, even if some of them are in conflict with IS. The current plan is for Turkey to train Western-approved 'moderate' jihadists to fight both Assad and IS in Syria, but whether this is really possible is still unclear. The Syrian Kurds won the first victory over IS at Kobani largely thanks to air strikes by the USA and its allies, but whether this success can be translated into a wider campaign against IS in Syria remains problematic.
In Iraq the Shia-dominated national army is being rebuilt after its poor performance against IS in 2014, with US and other Western military advisors playing an important role. However, the Iraqi Shia militias, trained by the Iranians, are judged to be more effective, but also more sectarian. Whatever their suffering at the hands of IS, the Sunni Muslim majority in the city of Mosul is unlikely to relish the prospect of being 'liberated' by Shia fanatics.
The Kurds of northern Iraq are being built up as a major anti-IS military force, but even if they play a major role in defeating IS in Iraq, they will demand a reward for their services. For almost a quarter of a century the Kurds of northern Iraq have enjoyed de facto autonomy. If they defeat IS, they will probably expect international recognition as an independent nation. Just as victory over the Saudis increased Muhammad Ali's political and military power within the Ottoman empire, so victory over IS would be a boost for Kurdish nationhood, not only in Iraq but also among the Kurdish minorities in Syria and Turkey.
However, before the rewards of victory can be reaped, there must be victory. Somebody must crush IS. The much-trumpeted Kurdish/Iraqi spring offensive aimed at freeing Mosul from IS control seems to be underway, with Iraqi efforts to capture Tikrit as a first step. If it succeeds, it may well begin the collapse of IS power in the Middle East. If it fails, it will show that local fighters are incapable of overcoming IS. The USA and its allies will then be faced with the grim prospect of having to send large armies of their own back to the Middle East if they wish to be certain of achieving the downfall of IS.
Friday, May 17, 2013
The Saints of Otranto: A Papal Provocation?
In 2006 Pope Benedict XVI provoked an international furore by using in his Regensburg speech the words of a medieval Byzantine emperor which condemned both the Prophet Muhammad and the Islamic religion. Vatican authorities were quick to deny any anti-Islamic intent, but many of the world's Muslims took a different view.
This month Pope Francis, Benedict's successor, has awarded sainthood to 800 Catholic Christians said to have been massacred at Otranto, Italy, in 1480 by invading Muslim troops of the Ottoman Turkish sultan. The martyrs were put to death for refusing to convert to Islam. As in 2006, the Vatican has claimed this papal action is not anti-Islamic, but will it be seen that way in the Muslim world?
Although it is Pope Francis who has completed the canonization process, the decision to fast track the Otranto martyrs to sainthood was taken by Pope Benedict XVI. In July 2007 he issued a decree recognizing that the martyrs were killed 'out of hatred for their faith', and by late 2012 the last formalities had been completed. In February 2013, at the same time as he announced his own retirement, Benedict announced that the Otranto martyrs would become saints.
The Ottoman Turkish sultan Mehmed II had captured the city of Constantinople (now Istanbul), the 'second Rome', in 1453 and put an end to the Byzantine empire. The conqueror added the name of Caesar to his already long list of titles. However, he was well aware that he could not truly claim to be the inheritor of the legacy of the ancient Roman empire until he captured Rome itself. However, many distractions delayed Mehmed's plan to invade Italy and drive the pope out of Rome. Only in 1480 did he begin serious preparations for an invasion.
As a first step in this operation, the Ottoman ruler ordered his forces to seize the Italian port of Otranto, which was not far across the Adriatic Sea from Ottoman-held Albania. The city fell to the Muslim invaders in August 1480. Many of the Christian inhabitants were killed or enslaved, with 800 said to have been offered their lives if they converted to Islam. They refused and were executed. Leaving a garrison in the captured port, most of the Ottoman forces returned to Albania, but with the intention of returning in the following year to begin the march on Rome.
The Ottoman capture of Otranto spread panic throughout Italy. Plans were made for Pope Sixtus IV to flee from Rome, but instead he called for a crusade against the infidel invaders. In 1481 a Christian crusader army, largely made up of soldiers from the kingdom of Naples and a foreign contingent from the kingdom of Hungary, marched to recapture Otranto. The crusaders laid siege to the port in May 1481, and in the same month Sultan Mehmed II died. This latter event prevented Ottoman reinforcements being sent to Otranto, and the port was soon recaptured by the Christian forces, with most of the Muslim garrison escaping to Albania. The Ottoman threat to Rome had been removed.
Quite why Pope Benedict chose to remember this otherwise forgotten event in the centuries-old struggle between Christianity and Islam is not clear. How the canonization of the Otranto martyrs will be received in the Muslim world is also unknown, despite all the Vatican claims that it is not an anti-Islamic gesture. When Pope Benedict made his Regensburg speech in 2006 the hostility between the West and the Islamic world was intense. Today, Western forces have left Iraq; they will be leaving Afghanistan next year; Osama bin Laden is dead; and Al Qaeda is now just a shadow of its former self. Tensions have eased, so perhaps Muslims will merely ignore the papal action rather than be offended.
Nevertheless, how would Westerners feel if Muslims took to lavish celebration of their martyrs for the faith? Should Tunisians commemorate the thousands of Muslims slaughtered when Christian emperor Charles V conquered Tunis in 1535? Of course they could declare that there was no anti-Christian intent in their celebration, but would they be believed? Catholics do not have a monopoly in remembering martyrs, and they should think carefully about the possible contemporary impact of their actions.
This month Pope Francis, Benedict's successor, has awarded sainthood to 800 Catholic Christians said to have been massacred at Otranto, Italy, in 1480 by invading Muslim troops of the Ottoman Turkish sultan. The martyrs were put to death for refusing to convert to Islam. As in 2006, the Vatican has claimed this papal action is not anti-Islamic, but will it be seen that way in the Muslim world?
Although it is Pope Francis who has completed the canonization process, the decision to fast track the Otranto martyrs to sainthood was taken by Pope Benedict XVI. In July 2007 he issued a decree recognizing that the martyrs were killed 'out of hatred for their faith', and by late 2012 the last formalities had been completed. In February 2013, at the same time as he announced his own retirement, Benedict announced that the Otranto martyrs would become saints.
The Ottoman Turkish sultan Mehmed II had captured the city of Constantinople (now Istanbul), the 'second Rome', in 1453 and put an end to the Byzantine empire. The conqueror added the name of Caesar to his already long list of titles. However, he was well aware that he could not truly claim to be the inheritor of the legacy of the ancient Roman empire until he captured Rome itself. However, many distractions delayed Mehmed's plan to invade Italy and drive the pope out of Rome. Only in 1480 did he begin serious preparations for an invasion.
As a first step in this operation, the Ottoman ruler ordered his forces to seize the Italian port of Otranto, which was not far across the Adriatic Sea from Ottoman-held Albania. The city fell to the Muslim invaders in August 1480. Many of the Christian inhabitants were killed or enslaved, with 800 said to have been offered their lives if they converted to Islam. They refused and were executed. Leaving a garrison in the captured port, most of the Ottoman forces returned to Albania, but with the intention of returning in the following year to begin the march on Rome.
The Ottoman capture of Otranto spread panic throughout Italy. Plans were made for Pope Sixtus IV to flee from Rome, but instead he called for a crusade against the infidel invaders. In 1481 a Christian crusader army, largely made up of soldiers from the kingdom of Naples and a foreign contingent from the kingdom of Hungary, marched to recapture Otranto. The crusaders laid siege to the port in May 1481, and in the same month Sultan Mehmed II died. This latter event prevented Ottoman reinforcements being sent to Otranto, and the port was soon recaptured by the Christian forces, with most of the Muslim garrison escaping to Albania. The Ottoman threat to Rome had been removed.
Quite why Pope Benedict chose to remember this otherwise forgotten event in the centuries-old struggle between Christianity and Islam is not clear. How the canonization of the Otranto martyrs will be received in the Muslim world is also unknown, despite all the Vatican claims that it is not an anti-Islamic gesture. When Pope Benedict made his Regensburg speech in 2006 the hostility between the West and the Islamic world was intense. Today, Western forces have left Iraq; they will be leaving Afghanistan next year; Osama bin Laden is dead; and Al Qaeda is now just a shadow of its former self. Tensions have eased, so perhaps Muslims will merely ignore the papal action rather than be offended.
Nevertheless, how would Westerners feel if Muslims took to lavish celebration of their martyrs for the faith? Should Tunisians commemorate the thousands of Muslims slaughtered when Christian emperor Charles V conquered Tunis in 1535? Of course they could declare that there was no anti-Christian intent in their celebration, but would they be believed? Catholics do not have a monopoly in remembering martyrs, and they should think carefully about the possible contemporary impact of their actions.
Sunday, October 21, 2012
A New NATO War in Syria?
After raising international tensions to new heights, it now seems that Israel and the United States are going to postpone a direct attack upon Iran until next year, aiming to get elections in both countries out of the way and to give sanctions against Iran a last chance to work. However, the proxy war against Iran in strife-torn Syria seems likely to be intensified once the US presidential elections are over in early November.
Both US presidential candidates have made it clear that some action must be taken soon about the civil war in Syria. The warlike Mitt Romney, should he win the election, has virtually promised an American invasion of Syria. However, he would not formally take up office until early next year, so he could not exercise his powers as American commander-in-chief until then.
A re-elected President Obama could act much sooner. He would no doubt like to repeat America's arms-length role in securing victory for the anti-Gaddafi insurgents in Libya in 2011. This would mean imposing an air and sea blockade and deploying special forces to assist the local rebels. This strategy worked against the friendless Gaddafi regime in Libya, but it seems less likely to bring a swift and cheap victory over President Assad in Syria, given his close support from Iran.
The United States would obviously like its NATO ally Turkey to carry out any direct military intervention in Syria if that is required. However, the Turkish government has clearly stated that it will only authorize a military invasion if it receives open and substantial assistance from those NATO states which have talked most loudly in favour of outside intervention in Syria, namely the United States, Britain, and France (the former colonial power in Syria).
Turkey has already lost one warplane to Syria's air defences. It will expect support from other NATO air forces and particularly that of the United States. Whether by accident or design, Britain, France, and the United States will all have amphibious task forces in the eastern Mediterranean in the next month or so. Will this be an opportunity for British, French and American marines to storm ashore on Syria's Mediterranean coastline?
If this is the NATO plan, it seems extremely foolish. One of the areas of strongest support for President Assad's regime is along Syria's Mediterranean coastline, where so many of his fellow Alawites live. Even with the distraction of a Turkish land invasion to the north, Syrian government forces may well be able to put up considerable resistance to a NATO amphibious assault.
Another problem with Syria's Mediterranean coast is that it is home to Russia's only overseas military base - the naval facility at the port of Tartus. So far Russia has given much support to President Assad's regime, albeit mostly in the dipolmatic sphere. Would Russia move to direct military aid if NATO threatened to invade Syria? This seems unlikely. Despite Russia's supposed military revival during the Putin years, it remains incapable of any serious overseas power projection. In 1999 the Russians let down their Serb friends when they were the victims of NATO air attacks; in 2012 it seems unlikely the Russians will do anything very different if a NATO assault is launched against Assad's forces in Syria.
If Russia remains powerless in the Syrian crisis, what will Israel do? Although the Israelis almost reached Damascus in both the wars of 1967 and 1973, it seems unlikely that they will mount a direct invasion of Syria at the moment. Nevertheless an Israeli military build-up in the occupied Golan Heights would no doubt be useful to distract President Assad's forces while NATO operations took place on Syria's northern borders. Already the Syrian civil war is spreading into neighbouring Lebanon, and that is one area where Israel might be ready to intervene. It will hope to crush Hezbollah, friends of both Assad and Iran, more effectively than it did when it attacked Lebanon in 2006.
One would have thought that after more than a decade of ineffectual but costly combat in Afghanistan, NATO countries would have grown tired of launching wars in Islamic states. Apparently not. No doubt encouraged by the supposed NATO victory in Libya in 2011, the alliance seems ready to plunge into a new conflict in Syria without having the slightest idea where it will lead. NATO countries are said to be democracies, but neither Turkey, Britain, France nor the United States have any mandate from their electorates to initiate a new war in the Muslim world.
Both US presidential candidates have made it clear that some action must be taken soon about the civil war in Syria. The warlike Mitt Romney, should he win the election, has virtually promised an American invasion of Syria. However, he would not formally take up office until early next year, so he could not exercise his powers as American commander-in-chief until then.
A re-elected President Obama could act much sooner. He would no doubt like to repeat America's arms-length role in securing victory for the anti-Gaddafi insurgents in Libya in 2011. This would mean imposing an air and sea blockade and deploying special forces to assist the local rebels. This strategy worked against the friendless Gaddafi regime in Libya, but it seems less likely to bring a swift and cheap victory over President Assad in Syria, given his close support from Iran.
The United States would obviously like its NATO ally Turkey to carry out any direct military intervention in Syria if that is required. However, the Turkish government has clearly stated that it will only authorize a military invasion if it receives open and substantial assistance from those NATO states which have talked most loudly in favour of outside intervention in Syria, namely the United States, Britain, and France (the former colonial power in Syria).
Turkey has already lost one warplane to Syria's air defences. It will expect support from other NATO air forces and particularly that of the United States. Whether by accident or design, Britain, France, and the United States will all have amphibious task forces in the eastern Mediterranean in the next month or so. Will this be an opportunity for British, French and American marines to storm ashore on Syria's Mediterranean coastline?
If this is the NATO plan, it seems extremely foolish. One of the areas of strongest support for President Assad's regime is along Syria's Mediterranean coastline, where so many of his fellow Alawites live. Even with the distraction of a Turkish land invasion to the north, Syrian government forces may well be able to put up considerable resistance to a NATO amphibious assault.
Another problem with Syria's Mediterranean coast is that it is home to Russia's only overseas military base - the naval facility at the port of Tartus. So far Russia has given much support to President Assad's regime, albeit mostly in the dipolmatic sphere. Would Russia move to direct military aid if NATO threatened to invade Syria? This seems unlikely. Despite Russia's supposed military revival during the Putin years, it remains incapable of any serious overseas power projection. In 1999 the Russians let down their Serb friends when they were the victims of NATO air attacks; in 2012 it seems unlikely the Russians will do anything very different if a NATO assault is launched against Assad's forces in Syria.
If Russia remains powerless in the Syrian crisis, what will Israel do? Although the Israelis almost reached Damascus in both the wars of 1967 and 1973, it seems unlikely that they will mount a direct invasion of Syria at the moment. Nevertheless an Israeli military build-up in the occupied Golan Heights would no doubt be useful to distract President Assad's forces while NATO operations took place on Syria's northern borders. Already the Syrian civil war is spreading into neighbouring Lebanon, and that is one area where Israel might be ready to intervene. It will hope to crush Hezbollah, friends of both Assad and Iran, more effectively than it did when it attacked Lebanon in 2006.
One would have thought that after more than a decade of ineffectual but costly combat in Afghanistan, NATO countries would have grown tired of launching wars in Islamic states. Apparently not. No doubt encouraged by the supposed NATO victory in Libya in 2011, the alliance seems ready to plunge into a new conflict in Syria without having the slightest idea where it will lead. NATO countries are said to be democracies, but neither Turkey, Britain, France nor the United States have any mandate from their electorates to initiate a new war in the Muslim world.
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