In 2009 Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi arrived in Rome for a state visit to Italy. Pinned to his uniform was a photograph of Omar Mukhtar, hero of the Libyan resistance to Italian imperialism. In 2011 the rebels fighting to overthrow Gaddafi named one of their military formations the 'Omar Mukhtar brigade'. Both sides in the current Libyan civil war claim Omar Mukhtar as their inspiration. He remains one of Libya's national heroes, the 'Lion of the Desert' who fought the Italian invaders for twenty years, until he was captured and executed by them in 1931.
The Italians had invaded Libya, then ruled by the Ottoman empire, in 1911. The Turks made peace in the following year and handed over the territory to Italy, but the native Muslim inhabitants refused to accept infidel rule. Their resistance struggle went on for more than two decades and Omar Mukhtar became its figurehead.
Today the victory of the NATO-backed Libyan rebels seems almost complete. Yet Muammar Gaddafi and his forces are still fighting, still resisting. Is it possible that he can go on resisting for years just as Omar Mukhtar did?
This seems unlikely since Gaddafi has few of the advantages which allowed Omar Mukhtar to carry on a guerrilla war for decades. These advantages were terrain, religious commitment, foreign support, and the distraction of his enemies.
Omar Mukhtar was a native of Cyrenaica, the north eastern region of Libya, and its difficult terrain provided hiding places for his guerrilla forces. Today Cyrenaica is completely hostile to Gaddafi and its principal city, Benghazi, served as the rebel capital until the liberation of Tripoli. It seems likely that Gaddafi will be driven out of his remaining strongholds near the Mediterranean coast and be forced southwards into the Sahara. There his forces will be even more vulnerable to NATO air attacks.
Omar Mukhtar was a member of the Senussi religious brotherhood, which enjoyed considerable support in North Africa and the wider Islamic world. Gaddafi has few supporters among the world's Muslims and he is regarded as a secular apostate by most Islamists, ranging from Al Qaeda to the House of Saud.
Omar Mukhtar's resistance struggle in Libya received the backing of neighbouring Egypt. Although the Egyptian government of the period was under British domination, the British had little interest in assisting their Italian imperial rivals. Gaddafi is not totally shunned by Libya's neighbours today. Algeria in particular is suspicious that the new NATO-backed Libyan regime is just a front for a revival of Western colonialism in North Africa. However, it seems unlikely that Algeria will give Gaddafi direct military assistance or provide him with a safe haven.
The initial Italian invasion led to the subjugation of most of Libya by 1913, but once Italy joined the First World War in 1915 the situation changed dramatically. Many Italian troops were withdrawn and the Libyan resistance took possession of most of the interior of the country. Even when Mussolini and his fascists came to power in Italy in 1922, Italian control of Libya was still largely restricted to a coastal strip. With no other distractions, Italian military conquest was renewed from 1925 onwards. However, it was only after General Rodolfo Graziani took charge in 1930 that Italian counter-insurgency efforts became truly effective. The rural inhabitants of Cyrenaica were driven into concentration camps; the Libya-Egypt border was sealed; and mobile columns, supported by aircraft, harassed the guerrillas relentlessly until Omar Mukhtar was captured and killed.
The First World War was a major distraction for the Italians. It gave the Libyan resistance a chance to regroup and reoccupy territory, setting back the Italian pacification of the country by perhaps a decade. Despite French president Sarkozy's remark that Syria may well be NATO's next target, it seems unlikely that the alliance will be distracted by a new war before it has finished its work in Libya. Gaddafi, unlike Omar Mukhtar, will not be given a chance to regroup his forces and regain ground. His defeat seems certain.
Yet only ten years ago commentators were making similar predictions about the Taliban in Afghanistan. Western military strategy in that country in late 2001 was very similar to the current strategy in Libya. The West would provide air power, while local forces, aided by a few Western special forces troops, would do most of the ground fighting against the enemy.
Unfortunately, the Taliban, supposedly crushed at the end of 2001, were to enjoy most of the advantages which allowed Omar Mukhtar to prolong his resistance in Libya. The Taliban found refuge in the rugged terrain of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; they continued to enjoy support within the wider Islamic world; many in the political and military establishment of neighbouring Pakistan assisted their cause; and their main Western enemy, the USA, was distracted by a new war in Iraq from 2003 onwards.
These factors allowed the Taliban to survive their apparently crushing defeat in 2001. For the reasons already noted, Muammar Gaddafi does not seem to have those advantages and it seems unlikely that he can stave off final defeat for much longer.
