In 2006 the United States launched two proxy wars against Islamist militants. Israel was to destroy Hezbollah in Lebanon, while Ethiopia was to crush the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. Contrary to all expectations, Israel's attacks on Lebanon failed to destroy Hezbollah. However, in Somalia, the invading Ethiopians quickly defeated the Islamist militants and installed an internationally recognised Somali government in the capital Mogadishu.
Now, two years later, the Ethiopians are pulling out of Somalia, the Somali government is on the verge of collapse, and the Islamists seem likely to retake Mogadishu. Meanwhile Israel has launched a major offensive against the Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip in a determined effort to restore its reputation for military might which was undermined by its lacklustre performance in the 2006 Lebanon war.
Gaza is to be reduced to rubble because otherwise other Middle Eastern countries will think Israel is weak and they will try to destroy the Jewish state. This myth of Israeli vulnerability has a long history. It may have had some truth in the period up to 1967, but the Six Day War of that year showed Israel to be the most powerful military state in the Middle East, a position it has never since lost.
The idea that Israel suffered some sort of defeat in the 2006 Lebanon war that now needs to be redressed by a crushing victory in Gaza is also fanciful. Israel certainly failed to destroy Hezbollah in 2006 and its military operations were mismanaged. However, Hezbollah got the message. The organisation has not launched any attacks on Israel in the last two years. Israel fought for peace on its northern border and it achieved that result.
As to a wider threat which requires Israel to take tough military action, it simply does not exist. Of the Arab states which border Israel, Egypt and Jordan are totally subordinate to America and Israel; Lebanon's Hezbollah is making no attacks; and Syria has not dared to risk any direct military confrontation with Israel for more than a quarter of a century.
If the near abroad poses no threat to Israel, what of more distant countries? Iran's supposed nuclear threat to Israel has been exaggerated by American and Israeli commentators to suit their own agendas. If Iran wants nuclear weapons, the motive is self-defence, to discourage attacks by the United States and its allies, not to threaten other countries.
Thus, on one side, we have Israel attacking Gaza so it can boost its military reputation, even though the idea of Israeli vulnerability is a complete myth. On the other side, the Hamas militants are ready to provoke Israel and resist its forces because they believe in another myth, that of Muslim solidarity.
The idea of the Arab or wider Muslim 'street' rising up to overthrow their rulers if they do not suffort the oppressed Palestinians, in Gaza or the West Bank, is still aired by certain commentators despite its absurdity. As Trotsky said long ago, in the age of the machine gun, mob rule is dead. As long as the undemocratic but pro-Western rulers of countries like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia retain the support of their security forces, what their populations think about Palestinian suffering is irrelevant.
If there is no chance of support for Hamas in the wider Muslim world, what of its particular friends? We are regularly warned that the evil alliance of Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran poses a threat not just to Israel and the Middle East, but to the whole world. Can Hamas at least expect help from its companions in evil? Apparently not. As already noted, both Hezbollah and Syria have no stomach for a military clash with Israel at the moment. Nor, despite its anti-Israel rhetoric, will Iran take any actions which might give the United States an excuse to launch a military attack on it.
Hamas in Gaza will go down to inevitable defeat still hoping vainly that the rest of the Muslim world will come to its aid. Israel will have shown its toughness once again, although it faces no serious military threat to its existence from any country in the Middle East. The people of Gaza will be the innocent victims, crushed by the weight of two myths, that of Muslim solidarity on one side and of Israeli vulnerability on the other.
Sunday, January 4, 2009
Friday, December 26, 2008
Back to Barbary? Muslim Pirates and the West
Muslim pirates seize Western merchant ships and take them to their home ports. There the crews and the ships are only freed on payment of large ransoms to the pirates. This story was of only historical interest until recent years. It was the tale of the Barbary pirates of North Africa who terrorised Christian shipping in the Mediterranean Sea between the sixteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. These corsairs combined turning a profit from booty and ransoms with a holy war against the infidel.
Do modern Somali pirates have any resemblance to their Barbary predecessors and do the methods used by Western navies against the Barbary corsairs have any relevance to current anti-piracy efforts?
Originally the Muslim corsairs sailing out of ports such as Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli were genuine holy warriors. However, as the centuries passed, religious commitment became less important than the economic benefits of piracy.
Today's Somali pirates deny any religious motive is behind their actions, while Somali Islamist militants declare they are opposed to piracy. Both groups take these positions to avoid provoking direct American intervention in Somalia. As long as Somali piracy is viewed as a criminal rather than a terrorist activity, the United States seems reluctant to take any major action to suppress it.
Instead we have the bizarre spectacle of the tanker Sirius Star, the largest vessel ever captured by pirates, being taken to a Somali pirate haven while the United States Navy, the most powerful naval force in the world, does nothing except take photographs. If a religious commitment was once a good cover for the piratical activities of the Barbary corsairs, it seems today that being seen as purely secular criminals gives the Somali pirates some sort of immunity.
If modern Somali piracy has important differences from the activities of the Barbary corsairs, do the methods used in the past by Western nations against the forces of Barbary have any modern relevance?
Currently an ever-growing multinational fleet of warships is gathering in the waters off Somalia. Yet hunting small and swift pirate vessels at sea has always been a hit or miss affair, which even modern communications cannot make much more effective. In earlier centuries the fleets of Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and even the infant United States believed that patrolling had to be supplemented by direct attacks on the home ports of the Barbary pirates. Only when the Barbary rulers saw their cities bombarded and their ships sunk could they be forced to at least short-term suspension of their predatory activities.
Recent United Nations resolutions give Western and other countries the right to pursue Somali pirates on both sea and land. However, the chances of Western forces making direct attacks on pirate ports do not seem great. When an Anglo-Dutch fleet bombarded the pirate base of Algiers in 1816, the action was greeted with international approval. If Western forces inflicted similar damage on a Somali pirate port such as Eyl, the modern reaction would be less favourable.
Barbary piracy began to decline during the eighteenth century less because of the actions by Western navies than because the Barbary states increasingly came to see legitimate trade with Christian Europe as more lucrative than pirate attacks. The French might claim their occupation of Algiers in 1830 was the only way to end piracy from that port, but in fact such activities had been in decline for decades.
Naval patrols and even naval or air bombardment of ports can only be short-term ways of dealing with Somali piracy. What is required for a long-term solution to the problem is the restoration of order and effective government within Somalia and the revival of legitimate economic activities which will provide income to match that from pirate ransoms.
Unfortunately such developments are unlikely to take place quickly and Somali piracy will persist in the immediate future. Preventive measures may reduce its impact, but unless the wider problems of the Horn of Africa receive more direct attention from the international community piracy will not be eradicated. It took more than three centuries to suppress the Barbary corsairs. Even the most pessimistic assessment must hope for a more speedy resolution of the problem posed by the Somali pirates.
Do modern Somali pirates have any resemblance to their Barbary predecessors and do the methods used by Western navies against the Barbary corsairs have any relevance to current anti-piracy efforts?
Originally the Muslim corsairs sailing out of ports such as Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli were genuine holy warriors. However, as the centuries passed, religious commitment became less important than the economic benefits of piracy.
Today's Somali pirates deny any religious motive is behind their actions, while Somali Islamist militants declare they are opposed to piracy. Both groups take these positions to avoid provoking direct American intervention in Somalia. As long as Somali piracy is viewed as a criminal rather than a terrorist activity, the United States seems reluctant to take any major action to suppress it.
Instead we have the bizarre spectacle of the tanker Sirius Star, the largest vessel ever captured by pirates, being taken to a Somali pirate haven while the United States Navy, the most powerful naval force in the world, does nothing except take photographs. If a religious commitment was once a good cover for the piratical activities of the Barbary corsairs, it seems today that being seen as purely secular criminals gives the Somali pirates some sort of immunity.
If modern Somali piracy has important differences from the activities of the Barbary corsairs, do the methods used in the past by Western nations against the forces of Barbary have any modern relevance?
Currently an ever-growing multinational fleet of warships is gathering in the waters off Somalia. Yet hunting small and swift pirate vessels at sea has always been a hit or miss affair, which even modern communications cannot make much more effective. In earlier centuries the fleets of Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and even the infant United States believed that patrolling had to be supplemented by direct attacks on the home ports of the Barbary pirates. Only when the Barbary rulers saw their cities bombarded and their ships sunk could they be forced to at least short-term suspension of their predatory activities.
Recent United Nations resolutions give Western and other countries the right to pursue Somali pirates on both sea and land. However, the chances of Western forces making direct attacks on pirate ports do not seem great. When an Anglo-Dutch fleet bombarded the pirate base of Algiers in 1816, the action was greeted with international approval. If Western forces inflicted similar damage on a Somali pirate port such as Eyl, the modern reaction would be less favourable.
Barbary piracy began to decline during the eighteenth century less because of the actions by Western navies than because the Barbary states increasingly came to see legitimate trade with Christian Europe as more lucrative than pirate attacks. The French might claim their occupation of Algiers in 1830 was the only way to end piracy from that port, but in fact such activities had been in decline for decades.
Naval patrols and even naval or air bombardment of ports can only be short-term ways of dealing with Somali piracy. What is required for a long-term solution to the problem is the restoration of order and effective government within Somalia and the revival of legitimate economic activities which will provide income to match that from pirate ransoms.
Unfortunately such developments are unlikely to take place quickly and Somali piracy will persist in the immediate future. Preventive measures may reduce its impact, but unless the wider problems of the Horn of Africa receive more direct attention from the international community piracy will not be eradicated. It took more than three centuries to suppress the Barbary corsairs. Even the most pessimistic assessment must hope for a more speedy resolution of the problem posed by the Somali pirates.
Sunday, November 2, 2008
Somali Piracy: Overlooking Crime to Avoid Militancy?
Traditionally the world's foremost naval power ensures the safety of ships of all nations on the sea lanes circling the globe. This was what Britain's Royal Navy did in the nineteenth century.
Today's United States Navy is more powerful than any previous naval force in the history of the world. One might expect it to take swift and effective action to crush the growing menace of Somali piracy. In fact it has done remarkably little to deal with the modern heirs of the Barbary corsairs.
More than two centuries ago the activities of those Muslim pirates from North Africa led to the establishment of the United States Navy. Today's Muslim corsairs from Somalia can range across the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean seizing ships virtually unopposed. The ships and crews are held for ransom, while American warships can only watch and wait.
The United States Navy does not lack ships, trained personnel, and cutting-edge technology to deal with these maritime gangsters. What is lacking is the political will in Washington to order the navy into action. Why is this?
It seems to be a repeat of the phenomenon which has already manifested itself in the land war in Afghanistan. In a poor country lucrative economic activities are few. If they are illegal, is it wise for an intervening foreign power to suppress them if such suppression merely provides new recruits for the militant forces which the foreign power is trying to destroy?
In Afghanistan the illegal but lucrative activity is the drug trade in heroin, with poppy the most attractive crop for local farmers. The country is now the world's leading producer of the drug. There has long been a reluctance by the United States to suppress this trade because it provides income for both friendly warlords and ordinary Afghan farmers. Other members of NATO have complained that the heroin trade also provides a major source of income for the Taliban.
To suppress the heroin trade might reduce the Taliban's funds, but it would also alienate a large section of the Afghan population. If Afghan farmers are forced to give up poppy cultivation without being offered a financially viable alternative crop, they will become impoverished and desperate, ready-made recruits for the Taliban.
Piracy is now probably the most lucrative economic activity in Somalia, a nation usually regarded as the perfect example of a 'failed state'. As yet there are no known links between the pirates of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and the Islamist militants battling in Somalia's capital Mogadishu. Indeed the Islamists have on occasion shown marked hostility towards the pirates.
Similarly the Taliban once claimed to be opposed to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and even suppressed it for a time. However, once they saw its money-making potential, they put aside their scruples and demanded their cut. How long will the Somali Islamists resist the temptation to take a share in the spoils of piracy?
For the moment the Somali pirates are seen as 'ordinary' criminals, with no obvious links to Islamist terrorism that would invite American attacks such as those made in the past on supposed al Qaeda bases in Somalia. Instead American warships escort a few lucky merchant ships, but do not intervene as the pirates take captured vessels back to their home ports. Clearly the rationale is that, as in Afghanistan, it is better to let ordinary crime prosper if suppressing it would provide new recruits for Islamist militants.
Recently NATO, including the United States, has announced its intention to take more forceful action against the heroin trade in Afghanistan. If this action takes place, it may well reduce income going to the Taliban, but it may also alienate large sections of the Afghan rural population, giving the Taliban new supporters. Off the coast of Somalia the pirates continue to ply their trade with minimal interference from the United States Navy. Warships from other NATO nations are soon to join the Americans, but decisive action against the pirates appears unlikely. For the moment it still seems better to overlook crime rather than drive the criminals into the arms of the Islamist militants.
Today's United States Navy is more powerful than any previous naval force in the history of the world. One might expect it to take swift and effective action to crush the growing menace of Somali piracy. In fact it has done remarkably little to deal with the modern heirs of the Barbary corsairs.
More than two centuries ago the activities of those Muslim pirates from North Africa led to the establishment of the United States Navy. Today's Muslim corsairs from Somalia can range across the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean seizing ships virtually unopposed. The ships and crews are held for ransom, while American warships can only watch and wait.
The United States Navy does not lack ships, trained personnel, and cutting-edge technology to deal with these maritime gangsters. What is lacking is the political will in Washington to order the navy into action. Why is this?
It seems to be a repeat of the phenomenon which has already manifested itself in the land war in Afghanistan. In a poor country lucrative economic activities are few. If they are illegal, is it wise for an intervening foreign power to suppress them if such suppression merely provides new recruits for the militant forces which the foreign power is trying to destroy?
In Afghanistan the illegal but lucrative activity is the drug trade in heroin, with poppy the most attractive crop for local farmers. The country is now the world's leading producer of the drug. There has long been a reluctance by the United States to suppress this trade because it provides income for both friendly warlords and ordinary Afghan farmers. Other members of NATO have complained that the heroin trade also provides a major source of income for the Taliban.
To suppress the heroin trade might reduce the Taliban's funds, but it would also alienate a large section of the Afghan population. If Afghan farmers are forced to give up poppy cultivation without being offered a financially viable alternative crop, they will become impoverished and desperate, ready-made recruits for the Taliban.
Piracy is now probably the most lucrative economic activity in Somalia, a nation usually regarded as the perfect example of a 'failed state'. As yet there are no known links between the pirates of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and the Islamist militants battling in Somalia's capital Mogadishu. Indeed the Islamists have on occasion shown marked hostility towards the pirates.
Similarly the Taliban once claimed to be opposed to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and even suppressed it for a time. However, once they saw its money-making potential, they put aside their scruples and demanded their cut. How long will the Somali Islamists resist the temptation to take a share in the spoils of piracy?
For the moment the Somali pirates are seen as 'ordinary' criminals, with no obvious links to Islamist terrorism that would invite American attacks such as those made in the past on supposed al Qaeda bases in Somalia. Instead American warships escort a few lucky merchant ships, but do not intervene as the pirates take captured vessels back to their home ports. Clearly the rationale is that, as in Afghanistan, it is better to let ordinary crime prosper if suppressing it would provide new recruits for Islamist militants.
Recently NATO, including the United States, has announced its intention to take more forceful action against the heroin trade in Afghanistan. If this action takes place, it may well reduce income going to the Taliban, but it may also alienate large sections of the Afghan rural population, giving the Taliban new supporters. Off the coast of Somalia the pirates continue to ply their trade with minimal interference from the United States Navy. Warships from other NATO nations are soon to join the Americans, but decisive action against the pirates appears unlikely. For the moment it still seems better to overlook crime rather than drive the criminals into the arms of the Islamist militants.
Friday, October 10, 2008
Border Wars, Past and Present
Since the beginning of September American attacks on supposed Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists inside Pakistan have increased. To date there have been nine missile strikes by UAVs and for the first time a cross-border US commando raid has taken place; all violations of Pakistan's national sovereignty.
The United States and its NATO allies claim that the long-running guerrilla struggle against them within Afghanistan can only be defeated if the insurgents' safe bases in neighbouring Pakistan are destroyed. The efforts of Pakistan's army to carry out this task have had little success and the Americans increasingly feel that only they can carry out the operation successfully. However, any escalation of the border war may have serious consequences for all concerned.
Since 1945 there have been a number of conflicts in which cross-border activities by insurgents have played an important part. The forces fighting such insurgents have usually tried one of two main strategies, or a combination of the two, with varying degrees of success.
The first strategy is for the counter-insurgent force to establish a physical barrier along its side of the border, or, in one case, to establish such a barrier along a strip inside the neighbouring country that is playing host, willingly or unwillingly, to the insurgents. If sufficiently extensive, well-constructed, and well-manned, such a barrier can defeat guerrillas trying to rejoin the struggle from their safe havens abroad.
The classic example of a successful border barrier fulfilling this role was the so-called Morice line built by the French army along the Algeria-Tunisia border in 1957-58. Algerian insurgents trying to return to their homeland from their camps in Tunisia found it almost impossible to break through the Morice line. Their casualties were heavy and by the end of 1958 the Algerians in Tunisia were almost completely cut off from their fellow fighters inside Algeria. During 1959 French forces came near to stamping out the insurgency within Algeria, and the success of the Morice line was an important factor in achieving this result.
During the Vietnam war the USA tried to emulate the French by setting up the so-called McNamara line along the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam from 1967 onwards. Unfortunately the principal routes taking supplies and reinforcements to the communist insurgents in South Vietnam passed through the neighbouring countries of Laos and Cambodia. The South Vietnamese border with these states was so long and its terrain so difficult that any attempt to build a continuous barrier was impossible.
In 1978 Israel seized a strip of Lebanese territory bordering its own northern frontier and established a militarized zone which was to act as a barrier preventing guerrilla attacks on its territory. This zone, which was later extended further into Lebanon, had some success in disrupting guerrilla attempts to reach Israeli territory, and Israel did not give up the zone until 2000.
The second strategy to prevent cross-border insurgent operations is to attack their safe havens in neighbouring territory with air strikes or, in the last resort, destroy them by a land invasion. Even counter-insurgent forces creating barrier lines may still feel the need to strike at enemy bases beyond those lines. The temptation to conduct such operations is even stronger for counter-insurgents who cannot create effective barriers, as in Vietnam in the past and in Afghanistan today.
Even as the Morice line took shape, the French military were ready to risk launching an air strike against an Algerian insurgent base at Sakiet in Tunisia in early 1958. The international outcry that resulted discouraged the French from repeating the operation. In contrast, Israeli air attacks on enemy bases deeper in Lebanon became a regular occurrence when guerrillas attempted to break through their security zone in the south of the country. In Vietnam, once it became clear that no border barrier could stop communist inflitration into South Vietnam, the United States began bombing enemy bases and supply routes in Laos and Cambodia. As in Pakistan today, the US government refused to admit that these air attacks were taking place.
The problem with direct attacks on guerrilla safe havens in neighbouring countries is that they become subject to steady escalation. Rather than helping to stop a war in one country, they end up spreading the conflict into the neighbouring state or states. Cambodia in 1970 is perhaps the best example. Dissatisfied with the results of the 'secret' bombing of that country, American and South Vietnamese forces launched a massive invasion of Cambodia. For three months they scoured border areas, destroying communist bases and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Nevertheless the Vietnamese communists survived the blow and continued their struggle. The real victims were the Cambodians. Their country was politically destabilized and the newly installed pro-American government found itself under increasing attack from the communists, both Cambodian and Vietnamese.
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 seemed initially to be a much more successful effort to destroy terrorist bases in a neighbouring state. The Palestine Liberation Organization and its fighters were driven out of the country. Unfortunately, Israel's methods in achieving this success increasingly alienated native Muslim groups in Lebanon. Local guerrillas, above all those of Hezbollah, began a war against the invaders in southern Lebanon. By 2000 the Israelis were ready to leave all Lebanese territory, including their security zone. Israel's new assault on Lebanon in 2006 was an attempt to destroy Hezbollah, but it failed to achieve any decisive success.
Launching direct military attacks on guerrilla bases in neighbouring countries clearly brings the risk of expanding wars rather than bringing them to an early end. A barrier strategy might seem a safer course of action. However, in today's conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border no barrier can be built, largely because of the length of the frontier and the very difficult terrain it crosses. Even if a barrier could be built, America and its allies would never be able to man it. The Morice line required 80,000 troops to hold it, that is, more troops than the US and other foreign nations have deployed in the whole of Afghanistan.
The United States has moved towards a strategy of unacknowledged air attacks on insurgent targets inside Pakistan, operations reminiscent of its actions against Cambodia in the Vietnam war. In Cambodia the 'secret' bombing eventually led to a full-scale invasion of the country, with unfortunate long-term consequences for both Cambodia and its invaders. There can be little doubt that an American attempt to launch a major military incursion into Pakistan aimed at destroying Taliban and Al Qaeda bases would set off a chain of events whose consequences would be equally disastrous.
Like all counter-insurgency wars, the struggle in Afghanistan is basically political rather than military. Whatever strategy the US and its NATO allies pursue in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands, it will not bring decisive victory. Militarily France's Morice line was a great success, but in the wider political context of the Algerian war it was almost irrelevant. By 1960 the war-weary French government was ready to negotiate with its 'terrorist' enemies, ending French rule in Algeria in 1962. Increasingly some sort of political settlement with the Taliban seems to be the only way to end the war in Afghanistan, regardless of whether such a settlement will deliver the leaders of Al Qaeda into American hands or not.
The United States and its NATO allies claim that the long-running guerrilla struggle against them within Afghanistan can only be defeated if the insurgents' safe bases in neighbouring Pakistan are destroyed. The efforts of Pakistan's army to carry out this task have had little success and the Americans increasingly feel that only they can carry out the operation successfully. However, any escalation of the border war may have serious consequences for all concerned.
Since 1945 there have been a number of conflicts in which cross-border activities by insurgents have played an important part. The forces fighting such insurgents have usually tried one of two main strategies, or a combination of the two, with varying degrees of success.
The first strategy is for the counter-insurgent force to establish a physical barrier along its side of the border, or, in one case, to establish such a barrier along a strip inside the neighbouring country that is playing host, willingly or unwillingly, to the insurgents. If sufficiently extensive, well-constructed, and well-manned, such a barrier can defeat guerrillas trying to rejoin the struggle from their safe havens abroad.
The classic example of a successful border barrier fulfilling this role was the so-called Morice line built by the French army along the Algeria-Tunisia border in 1957-58. Algerian insurgents trying to return to their homeland from their camps in Tunisia found it almost impossible to break through the Morice line. Their casualties were heavy and by the end of 1958 the Algerians in Tunisia were almost completely cut off from their fellow fighters inside Algeria. During 1959 French forces came near to stamping out the insurgency within Algeria, and the success of the Morice line was an important factor in achieving this result.
During the Vietnam war the USA tried to emulate the French by setting up the so-called McNamara line along the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam from 1967 onwards. Unfortunately the principal routes taking supplies and reinforcements to the communist insurgents in South Vietnam passed through the neighbouring countries of Laos and Cambodia. The South Vietnamese border with these states was so long and its terrain so difficult that any attempt to build a continuous barrier was impossible.
In 1978 Israel seized a strip of Lebanese territory bordering its own northern frontier and established a militarized zone which was to act as a barrier preventing guerrilla attacks on its territory. This zone, which was later extended further into Lebanon, had some success in disrupting guerrilla attempts to reach Israeli territory, and Israel did not give up the zone until 2000.
The second strategy to prevent cross-border insurgent operations is to attack their safe havens in neighbouring territory with air strikes or, in the last resort, destroy them by a land invasion. Even counter-insurgent forces creating barrier lines may still feel the need to strike at enemy bases beyond those lines. The temptation to conduct such operations is even stronger for counter-insurgents who cannot create effective barriers, as in Vietnam in the past and in Afghanistan today.
Even as the Morice line took shape, the French military were ready to risk launching an air strike against an Algerian insurgent base at Sakiet in Tunisia in early 1958. The international outcry that resulted discouraged the French from repeating the operation. In contrast, Israeli air attacks on enemy bases deeper in Lebanon became a regular occurrence when guerrillas attempted to break through their security zone in the south of the country. In Vietnam, once it became clear that no border barrier could stop communist inflitration into South Vietnam, the United States began bombing enemy bases and supply routes in Laos and Cambodia. As in Pakistan today, the US government refused to admit that these air attacks were taking place.
The problem with direct attacks on guerrilla safe havens in neighbouring countries is that they become subject to steady escalation. Rather than helping to stop a war in one country, they end up spreading the conflict into the neighbouring state or states. Cambodia in 1970 is perhaps the best example. Dissatisfied with the results of the 'secret' bombing of that country, American and South Vietnamese forces launched a massive invasion of Cambodia. For three months they scoured border areas, destroying communist bases and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Nevertheless the Vietnamese communists survived the blow and continued their struggle. The real victims were the Cambodians. Their country was politically destabilized and the newly installed pro-American government found itself under increasing attack from the communists, both Cambodian and Vietnamese.
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 seemed initially to be a much more successful effort to destroy terrorist bases in a neighbouring state. The Palestine Liberation Organization and its fighters were driven out of the country. Unfortunately, Israel's methods in achieving this success increasingly alienated native Muslim groups in Lebanon. Local guerrillas, above all those of Hezbollah, began a war against the invaders in southern Lebanon. By 2000 the Israelis were ready to leave all Lebanese territory, including their security zone. Israel's new assault on Lebanon in 2006 was an attempt to destroy Hezbollah, but it failed to achieve any decisive success.
Launching direct military attacks on guerrilla bases in neighbouring countries clearly brings the risk of expanding wars rather than bringing them to an early end. A barrier strategy might seem a safer course of action. However, in today's conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border no barrier can be built, largely because of the length of the frontier and the very difficult terrain it crosses. Even if a barrier could be built, America and its allies would never be able to man it. The Morice line required 80,000 troops to hold it, that is, more troops than the US and other foreign nations have deployed in the whole of Afghanistan.
The United States has moved towards a strategy of unacknowledged air attacks on insurgent targets inside Pakistan, operations reminiscent of its actions against Cambodia in the Vietnam war. In Cambodia the 'secret' bombing eventually led to a full-scale invasion of the country, with unfortunate long-term consequences for both Cambodia and its invaders. There can be little doubt that an American attempt to launch a major military incursion into Pakistan aimed at destroying Taliban and Al Qaeda bases would set off a chain of events whose consequences would be equally disastrous.
Like all counter-insurgency wars, the struggle in Afghanistan is basically political rather than military. Whatever strategy the US and its NATO allies pursue in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands, it will not bring decisive victory. Militarily France's Morice line was a great success, but in the wider political context of the Algerian war it was almost irrelevant. By 1960 the war-weary French government was ready to negotiate with its 'terrorist' enemies, ending French rule in Algeria in 1962. Increasingly some sort of political settlement with the Taliban seems to be the only way to end the war in Afghanistan, regardless of whether such a settlement will deliver the leaders of Al Qaeda into American hands or not.
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
Mr Bush's Unfinished Business
As George W. Bush's second term as president of the United States draws to a close, two of his declared foreign policy aims remain unfulfilled. First, he has not yet captured or killed Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda associates who were behind the 9/11 atrocities. Secondly, he has not carried out his endlessly repeated threat to take military action to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
With only a few months remaining of his presidency, Bush has seemed increasingly unlikely to be able to attend to either piece of unfinished business. Now, with the rapid deterioration in relations between Russia and the West as a consequence of the August war in Georgia, it seems even more unlikely that President Bush will have the chance to act against these two designated targets.
If Bush was to order a successful military strike which killed or captured Osama bin Laden and his principal associates, this would undoubtedly boost his popularity with the American people and he could leave the Oval Office on a positive note. Whether such an action would have any long term beneficial impact on the 'war on terror' is another matter. As Osama bin Laden himself noted shortly after 9/11, his life does not greatly matter as he has achieved his goal: to set off a major confrontation between the West and the Muslim world. If he was killed, bin Laden would be just another Islamist martyr and in time somebody else would come to take his place. Israel has been killing Muslim terrorist leaders regularly for sixty years with little sign that the terrorist threat will ever come to an end.
Since Osama bin Laden is said to be hiding somewhere in the tribal territories on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan, any major American military strike against him will involve a serious violation of Pakistan's national sovereignty. Civil unrest is already growing in that country and an American invasion would only further inflame the situation. This consideration has so far limited American actions to air strikes by UAVs which both Washington and Islamabad have sought to play down. NATO's war in Afghanistan is going badly at the moment and to spread the war into an already volatile Pakistan would only make a bad situation worse.
The new hostility between NATO and Russia presents a further obstacle to striking against Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Some 90% of supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan are landed at the port of Karachi and pass through Pakistan to reach the Afghan border. If this route was closed, NATO forces would soon be in a desperate situation, given that Iran is unlikely to let supplies come in through Iranian ports. All that remained would be the northern supply route across Russia and several of the Central Asian republics.
Earlier this year Russia tentatively agreed to the use by NATO of this northern land route if required. The agreement of the Central Asian states was still to be negotiated. However, after recent events in the Caucasus, it now seems unlikely that Russia would be willing to provide this supply route for NATO. Thus America and its allies would be unwise to destabilise Pakistan, their principal supply route to Afghanistan, by carrying out a major military incursion into that country with Osama bin Laden as their target.
With regard to Osama bin Laden the fear that military intervention might make a bad situation worse is a powerful constraint on American action. With regard to Iran, the second piece of unfinished business, the constraint is slightly different. Here the fear is that American military action against Iran might plunge an improving situation in neighbouring Iraq back into chaos.
Whatever the supposed threat posed by nuclear developments in Iran, the fact is that the Iranians have made some contribution to the present comparative peace in Iraq by mediating disputes between Iraqi Shiite factions. They have encouraged those factions to be patient and wait until the United States has withdrawn its military forces from Iraq, as now seems increasingly likely in the next year or two.
If the United States launched military attacks on Iran aimed at destroying its nuclear facilities, such warfare would inevitably spill over into Iraq, where some Shiite groups would undoubtedly launch attacks on American forces. The present comparative peace in Iraq, so dearly bought with American blood and treasure, would be lost in an instant. This consideration does much to prevent President Bush ordering an attack on Iran.
Russia has up to now co-operated with the Americans and the Europeans in imposing sanctions on Iran in order to curb its nuclear developments. Although Russia no more wants to see a nuclear-armed Iran than does America or Israel, its attitude to the Iranians may well change as a result of Western reaction to the Georgian war. Russia could pull out of the sanctions regime and it might increase sales of defensive military systems to Iran as it has already increased such sales to Syria.
Thus the worsening relations with Russia seem likely to create even more obstacles to President Bush carrying out military action against Osama bin Laden and Iran, his two pieces of unfinished business abroad. However, the Bush administration has shown its indifference to rational calculations in the past and its window of opportunity for military action is closing fast. One can only hope that George W. Bush's years in the White House end with a whimper and not a bang.
With only a few months remaining of his presidency, Bush has seemed increasingly unlikely to be able to attend to either piece of unfinished business. Now, with the rapid deterioration in relations between Russia and the West as a consequence of the August war in Georgia, it seems even more unlikely that President Bush will have the chance to act against these two designated targets.
If Bush was to order a successful military strike which killed or captured Osama bin Laden and his principal associates, this would undoubtedly boost his popularity with the American people and he could leave the Oval Office on a positive note. Whether such an action would have any long term beneficial impact on the 'war on terror' is another matter. As Osama bin Laden himself noted shortly after 9/11, his life does not greatly matter as he has achieved his goal: to set off a major confrontation between the West and the Muslim world. If he was killed, bin Laden would be just another Islamist martyr and in time somebody else would come to take his place. Israel has been killing Muslim terrorist leaders regularly for sixty years with little sign that the terrorist threat will ever come to an end.
Since Osama bin Laden is said to be hiding somewhere in the tribal territories on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan, any major American military strike against him will involve a serious violation of Pakistan's national sovereignty. Civil unrest is already growing in that country and an American invasion would only further inflame the situation. This consideration has so far limited American actions to air strikes by UAVs which both Washington and Islamabad have sought to play down. NATO's war in Afghanistan is going badly at the moment and to spread the war into an already volatile Pakistan would only make a bad situation worse.
The new hostility between NATO and Russia presents a further obstacle to striking against Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Some 90% of supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan are landed at the port of Karachi and pass through Pakistan to reach the Afghan border. If this route was closed, NATO forces would soon be in a desperate situation, given that Iran is unlikely to let supplies come in through Iranian ports. All that remained would be the northern supply route across Russia and several of the Central Asian republics.
Earlier this year Russia tentatively agreed to the use by NATO of this northern land route if required. The agreement of the Central Asian states was still to be negotiated. However, after recent events in the Caucasus, it now seems unlikely that Russia would be willing to provide this supply route for NATO. Thus America and its allies would be unwise to destabilise Pakistan, their principal supply route to Afghanistan, by carrying out a major military incursion into that country with Osama bin Laden as their target.
With regard to Osama bin Laden the fear that military intervention might make a bad situation worse is a powerful constraint on American action. With regard to Iran, the second piece of unfinished business, the constraint is slightly different. Here the fear is that American military action against Iran might plunge an improving situation in neighbouring Iraq back into chaos.
Whatever the supposed threat posed by nuclear developments in Iran, the fact is that the Iranians have made some contribution to the present comparative peace in Iraq by mediating disputes between Iraqi Shiite factions. They have encouraged those factions to be patient and wait until the United States has withdrawn its military forces from Iraq, as now seems increasingly likely in the next year or two.
If the United States launched military attacks on Iran aimed at destroying its nuclear facilities, such warfare would inevitably spill over into Iraq, where some Shiite groups would undoubtedly launch attacks on American forces. The present comparative peace in Iraq, so dearly bought with American blood and treasure, would be lost in an instant. This consideration does much to prevent President Bush ordering an attack on Iran.
Russia has up to now co-operated with the Americans and the Europeans in imposing sanctions on Iran in order to curb its nuclear developments. Although Russia no more wants to see a nuclear-armed Iran than does America or Israel, its attitude to the Iranians may well change as a result of Western reaction to the Georgian war. Russia could pull out of the sanctions regime and it might increase sales of defensive military systems to Iran as it has already increased such sales to Syria.
Thus the worsening relations with Russia seem likely to create even more obstacles to President Bush carrying out military action against Osama bin Laden and Iran, his two pieces of unfinished business abroad. However, the Bush administration has shown its indifference to rational calculations in the past and its window of opportunity for military action is closing fast. One can only hope that George W. Bush's years in the White House end with a whimper and not a bang.
Sunday, August 10, 2008
Back to the Battlefields in the Caucasus
The outbreak of open warfare between Russia and Georgia over the disputed territory of South Ossetia underlines the dangerous volatility of the post-Cold War political situation in the Caucasus. The region's numerous nationalities enjoyed an enforced amity under Soviet rule, but after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 ethnic nationalism reasserted itself and rival groups came into conflict. Bitter and bloody in themselves, these Caucasian clashes have a broader significance because of the part they can play in wider geopolitical struggles.
The first such wider struggle which was reflected in the Caucasus was the emerging clash between a newly resurgent Islam and its infidel enemies. Christian Armenia sought to aid the independence struggles of the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh within the neighbouring Muslim state of Azerbaijan. Between 1992 and 1994 Russia assisted the Armenians in their war, finally forcing Azerbaijan to give up its efforts to subdue Nagorno-Karabakh, which became a quasi-independent state linked to Armenia.
However, if Russia could defeat Islamic aspirations abroad, it had less success at home in certain parts of the Caucasus which remained within the Russian Federation. The Muslims of Chechnya proved the biggest problem. They had a tradition of resistance to Russian hegemony that reached back several centuries and achieved its peak in Shamil's great struggle during the nineteenth century. It was hardly surprising that when the Soviet Union broke up, the Chechens declared their own independent state.
In 1994-96 the Russians carried on a bitter war to end Chechen independence, but in the end they were defeated. In 1999 Russia resumed its onslaught on Chechnya, leading to further heavy fighting. Nevertheless by 2005 the Chechen resistance had been broken and violence sank to manageable levels. In part this had been achieved by Russia offering deals to certain Chechen resisters. They were allowed to run the state so long as they stayed loyal to Moscow.
In the aftermath of 9/11 it might have been expected that the USA and its allies would show more sympathy for Russia's struggles against Islamist insurgents in Chechnya, but this proved not to be the case, Britain, for example, still providing refuge for Chechen militants. This Western coolness towards assisting Russia in the Caucasus was because that area was now becoming a battlefield for another wider geopolitical struggle. This was between an expansionist USA and a Russia which felt itself increasingly threatened by NATO encirclement.
The Americans made determined efforts to befriend those Caucasian states which had political grievances against Russia. These were Georgia, angry at Russian support for the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within its territory, and Azerbaijan, which wished to regain its lost region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Another reason for American interest in these countries was oil. The potential of the vast oil and gas reserves around the Caspian Sea became well known during the 1990s. The chief problem in exploiting them was that most of the pipelines from the area to the wider world passed through Russia. The United States wished to find a pipeline route that avoided Russia and seemed to have found it through the Caucasian corridor formed by Azerbaijan and Georgia. There already was an old pipeline following the route from the Caspian to the Black Sea, but the Americans favoured a new pipeline that would go from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, with a terminal at Ceyhan, a Turkish port on the Mediterranean Sea. This pipeline is now operational.
To further secure its new position in the Caucasus, the USA gave military aid to both Georgia and Azerbaijan, and held out the possibility of NATO membership to Georgia. In return President Saakashvili of Georgia was happy to send Georgian troops to America's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Saakashvili's anti-Russian rhetoric increased markedly during the first half of 2008 and he made clear his intention of repossessing both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by force if necessary. Apparently both Washington and Moscow did not take his words seriously, given the surprise of both the USA and Russia at Georgia's military move into South Ossetia.
For Russia this is clearly a provocation that cannot be ignored. If pro-Russian South Ossetia falls to Georgia, it can only encourage Azerbaijan to renew its efforts to retake Nagorno-Karabakh. That in turn would probably rekindle the insurgency in Chechnya, seriously undermining Russia's position in the Caucasus. Moscow has chosen to fight. The Georgians are clearly counting on the USA and its NATO allies to come and save them, but are those countries ready to escalate a regional war into a great power confrontation that risks worldwide conflict?
The first such wider struggle which was reflected in the Caucasus was the emerging clash between a newly resurgent Islam and its infidel enemies. Christian Armenia sought to aid the independence struggles of the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh within the neighbouring Muslim state of Azerbaijan. Between 1992 and 1994 Russia assisted the Armenians in their war, finally forcing Azerbaijan to give up its efforts to subdue Nagorno-Karabakh, which became a quasi-independent state linked to Armenia.
However, if Russia could defeat Islamic aspirations abroad, it had less success at home in certain parts of the Caucasus which remained within the Russian Federation. The Muslims of Chechnya proved the biggest problem. They had a tradition of resistance to Russian hegemony that reached back several centuries and achieved its peak in Shamil's great struggle during the nineteenth century. It was hardly surprising that when the Soviet Union broke up, the Chechens declared their own independent state.
In 1994-96 the Russians carried on a bitter war to end Chechen independence, but in the end they were defeated. In 1999 Russia resumed its onslaught on Chechnya, leading to further heavy fighting. Nevertheless by 2005 the Chechen resistance had been broken and violence sank to manageable levels. In part this had been achieved by Russia offering deals to certain Chechen resisters. They were allowed to run the state so long as they stayed loyal to Moscow.
In the aftermath of 9/11 it might have been expected that the USA and its allies would show more sympathy for Russia's struggles against Islamist insurgents in Chechnya, but this proved not to be the case, Britain, for example, still providing refuge for Chechen militants. This Western coolness towards assisting Russia in the Caucasus was because that area was now becoming a battlefield for another wider geopolitical struggle. This was between an expansionist USA and a Russia which felt itself increasingly threatened by NATO encirclement.
The Americans made determined efforts to befriend those Caucasian states which had political grievances against Russia. These were Georgia, angry at Russian support for the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within its territory, and Azerbaijan, which wished to regain its lost region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Another reason for American interest in these countries was oil. The potential of the vast oil and gas reserves around the Caspian Sea became well known during the 1990s. The chief problem in exploiting them was that most of the pipelines from the area to the wider world passed through Russia. The United States wished to find a pipeline route that avoided Russia and seemed to have found it through the Caucasian corridor formed by Azerbaijan and Georgia. There already was an old pipeline following the route from the Caspian to the Black Sea, but the Americans favoured a new pipeline that would go from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, with a terminal at Ceyhan, a Turkish port on the Mediterranean Sea. This pipeline is now operational.
To further secure its new position in the Caucasus, the USA gave military aid to both Georgia and Azerbaijan, and held out the possibility of NATO membership to Georgia. In return President Saakashvili of Georgia was happy to send Georgian troops to America's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Saakashvili's anti-Russian rhetoric increased markedly during the first half of 2008 and he made clear his intention of repossessing both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by force if necessary. Apparently both Washington and Moscow did not take his words seriously, given the surprise of both the USA and Russia at Georgia's military move into South Ossetia.
For Russia this is clearly a provocation that cannot be ignored. If pro-Russian South Ossetia falls to Georgia, it can only encourage Azerbaijan to renew its efforts to retake Nagorno-Karabakh. That in turn would probably rekindle the insurgency in Chechnya, seriously undermining Russia's position in the Caucasus. Moscow has chosen to fight. The Georgians are clearly counting on the USA and its NATO allies to come and save them, but are those countries ready to escalate a regional war into a great power confrontation that risks worldwide conflict?
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
Fifty Years On: A Free Iraq or New Masters?
The American and Iraqi governments are continuing their negotiations to find a legal basis for a continued US presence in Iraq after the end of this year, when the current United Nations mandate expires. An agreement is promised before the end of July.
Coincidentally, this July will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution which brought to an end the last foreign military presence in Iraq. The coup of 14 July 1958 overthrew the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy, set up a republic, and forced the British to give up their last military base in the country.
By the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty, Britain agreed to give Iraq independence (in 1932), but in return the British government retained the right to keep military forces in the country. The two principal bases were the air stations at Habbaniyah, west of Baghdad, and Shaibah, outside Basra.
In 1952 Egyptian army officers deposed King Farouk and set up a republic, which was soon dominated by Gamal Abdel Nasser. His doctrine of secular pan-Arab nationalism won many adherents throughout the Middle East, and these included senior officers in the Iraqi army.
Nasser believed that one great Arab state could be created and as a first step Egypt and Syria announced their union at the United Arab Republic (UAR) in early 1958. In Iraq both the king, Faisal II, and the prime minister, Nuri al-Said, were hostile to this new creation. As a defensive measure, Iraq announced a link with Jordan, which was also pro-Western, anti-Nasser, and ruled by a Hashemite royal family.
In Lebanon many Muslims wanted the country to join the new UAR, but the Christian Maronites were hostile to such action, moving the country towards civil war. King Hussein of Jordan feared that pro-Nasser elements in his country were conspiring against him and appealed for Iraqi support. The Iraqi government promised to send troops to aid him.
These troops were to travel via Baghdad, giving pro-Nasser army officers such as General Qasim and Colonel Arif the perfect opportunity to launch their own coup. On 14 July Arif's men seized control of Baghdad and murdered King Faisal and most of the Iraqi royal family. On the following day Nuri al-Said was hunted down and killed.
In reaction to these events in the Middle East, President Eisenhower authorised the first US military intervention in the region. American marines landed at Beirut and peace was soon restored in Lebanon. British paratroops were flown to Jordan to bolster King Hussein's grip on power. However, there was no repeat of Britain's 1941 intervention in Iraq to overthrow a hostile government.
Instead Britain tamely accepted the new republican government in Baghdad which was soon dominated by General Qasim. The British government had already relinquished the Shaibah air base in 1956. The new ruler of Iraq now demanded a British withdrawal from Habbaniyah. This was completed in May 1959, ending a British military presence in Iraq which had begun more than forty years earlier during the First World War.
Today the old air base at Habbaniyah is Camp Habbaniyah, garrisoned by US forces. Shaibah was incorporated in Basra International Airport in the 1960s. That airport was occupied by the British during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and is now their last major base in the country. The wheel seems to have come full circle. The bases given up fifty years ago are once again in the hands of Western military forces. How long will they stay this time?
Despite the nationalist protestations of some Iraqi politicians and demands from certain quarters in the United States for an early American withdrawal, it seems unlikely that the US military will be pulling out of Iraq in the near future. All that is up for negotiation is the terms on which the Americans remain in that country. Any country that accepts American bases, whether it be Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy, South Korea, or Japan, has to grant US forces extraterritorial status. The Iraqi government too will be forced to do this, although whether this status will be extended to civilian security contractors is another matter. Only a repeat of the 1958 revolution might prevent the Americans from staying on, but that seems a very remote possibility.
Coincidentally, this July will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution which brought to an end the last foreign military presence in Iraq. The coup of 14 July 1958 overthrew the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy, set up a republic, and forced the British to give up their last military base in the country.
By the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty, Britain agreed to give Iraq independence (in 1932), but in return the British government retained the right to keep military forces in the country. The two principal bases were the air stations at Habbaniyah, west of Baghdad, and Shaibah, outside Basra.
In 1952 Egyptian army officers deposed King Farouk and set up a republic, which was soon dominated by Gamal Abdel Nasser. His doctrine of secular pan-Arab nationalism won many adherents throughout the Middle East, and these included senior officers in the Iraqi army.
Nasser believed that one great Arab state could be created and as a first step Egypt and Syria announced their union at the United Arab Republic (UAR) in early 1958. In Iraq both the king, Faisal II, and the prime minister, Nuri al-Said, were hostile to this new creation. As a defensive measure, Iraq announced a link with Jordan, which was also pro-Western, anti-Nasser, and ruled by a Hashemite royal family.
In Lebanon many Muslims wanted the country to join the new UAR, but the Christian Maronites were hostile to such action, moving the country towards civil war. King Hussein of Jordan feared that pro-Nasser elements in his country were conspiring against him and appealed for Iraqi support. The Iraqi government promised to send troops to aid him.
These troops were to travel via Baghdad, giving pro-Nasser army officers such as General Qasim and Colonel Arif the perfect opportunity to launch their own coup. On 14 July Arif's men seized control of Baghdad and murdered King Faisal and most of the Iraqi royal family. On the following day Nuri al-Said was hunted down and killed.
In reaction to these events in the Middle East, President Eisenhower authorised the first US military intervention in the region. American marines landed at Beirut and peace was soon restored in Lebanon. British paratroops were flown to Jordan to bolster King Hussein's grip on power. However, there was no repeat of Britain's 1941 intervention in Iraq to overthrow a hostile government.
Instead Britain tamely accepted the new republican government in Baghdad which was soon dominated by General Qasim. The British government had already relinquished the Shaibah air base in 1956. The new ruler of Iraq now demanded a British withdrawal from Habbaniyah. This was completed in May 1959, ending a British military presence in Iraq which had begun more than forty years earlier during the First World War.
Today the old air base at Habbaniyah is Camp Habbaniyah, garrisoned by US forces. Shaibah was incorporated in Basra International Airport in the 1960s. That airport was occupied by the British during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and is now their last major base in the country. The wheel seems to have come full circle. The bases given up fifty years ago are once again in the hands of Western military forces. How long will they stay this time?
Despite the nationalist protestations of some Iraqi politicians and demands from certain quarters in the United States for an early American withdrawal, it seems unlikely that the US military will be pulling out of Iraq in the near future. All that is up for negotiation is the terms on which the Americans remain in that country. Any country that accepts American bases, whether it be Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy, South Korea, or Japan, has to grant US forces extraterritorial status. The Iraqi government too will be forced to do this, although whether this status will be extended to civilian security contractors is another matter. Only a repeat of the 1958 revolution might prevent the Americans from staying on, but that seems a very remote possibility.
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